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ABSTRACT
This thesis conducts empirical studies on China's stock market using contemporary
financial theories in order to explain the anomalies in China's stock market and then put
forward some policy implications on the basis of the empirical research findings.
The thesis consists of seven chapters. In addition to providing a brief introduction to the
relationship between stock market development and economic growth. Chapter I describes
several anomalies occurring in the international stock markets and sets up a research
framework for the thesis to further study. Chapter 2 is a literature review. It reviews major
contemporary theories or hypotheses related to initial public offerings (IPOs) underprieing,
long-run underperformance and asset pricing characteristics. Chapter 3 is a general
description of China's stock market development, which offers an institutional background
such as IPOs system and slock market structure. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 conduct empirical
studies using data from China's stock market. In Chapter 4, using cross sectional
regression, I examine whether short run underprieing exists in China's stock market and
the validity of a series of theories used in explaining this phenomenon. In Chapter 5, based
on standard event study methodology, I investigate whether long-run underperformance ol
IPOs exists in China's stock market, and to what extent. In Chapter 6, according to Fama-
MaeBcth approach, I build a univariant model to examine whether Capital Asset pricing
Model and Fama-French Three-Factor Model hold in China's stock market, and lo analyse
empirically the asset pricing characteristics of China's stock market. Chapter 7, the last
chapter, is the summary of the thesis. Some suggestions and policy implications are
presented.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Stock Market Development and Economic Growth
In recent years an increasing amount of attention has been devoted to the connection
between financial markets and economic development. It is widely accepted that
financial development is positively related to economic growth. According to
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), financial liberalisation and deepening such as the
establishment and development of a competitive financial market can have a positive
effect on its economic performance and growth. The World Bank, in its World
Development Report 1989, also underlines the importance of domestic resource
mobilisation and financial development, claiming that finance is the key to investment
and hence to growth. New insights in growth theory and the theory of finance
establishing a link between finance and development have spurred interest in this
topic, as has the appearance of a large number of empirical studies which have
demonstrated a clear positive correlation between financial indicators and economic
growth. Greenwood and Smith (1997) show that large stock markets can lower the
cost of mobilizing savings and thereby facilitate investment in the most productive
technologies. Levine (1991) and Bencivenga, Smith and Starr (1996) argue that stock
market liquidity - the ability to trade equity easily - is important for growth. Levine
(1997) argues that stock market development is positively and robustly associated
with long-run economic growth on the basis of their cross-country growth regression
analysis.
China's efforts to reform its economic and financial system have unfolded
contemporaneously with the increased attention that economists and policy-makers
have paid to the roles that the stock market plays in promoting growth since the
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economic reform started in 1979. Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen
Stock Exchange (SZSE) were established on the 26th of November 1990 and the 1st
of July 1991 respectively. The establishment of two national exchanges marked a new
era for China's stock market development, which builds up a new platform for
Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), to re-construct their ownership and get
financed. Since then, more and more Chinese companies launch their initial public
offerings (IPOs), either on the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange. The establishment and development of China's stock market makes a great
contribution to the Chinese economic model transition.
1.2 IPO underpricing, long-run underperformance and CAPM
Since the 1980s, a record number of firms worldwide started to go public. Initial
Public Offerings (IPOs) are the firm's first offerings of shares to the public for raising
equity capital in the stock market. It is the first step for firms to be floated on stock
markets. Ghosh (2006) presents that without the IPOs, the U. S. stock market boom
of the 1990s would not have been sustained for such a long time and with such
strengths to push the US stock prices to a historical high.
There are three anomaly phenomena associated with the process of IPOs in the stock
markets. The best-known anomaly associated with the process of the IPOs is the IPO
underpricing. The IPO underpricing, namely the large initial returns, which is
measured from the offering price to the market price at the end of the first trading day.
In 1963 the United States Securities and Exchange Commission first empirically
found that there were positive average initial returns on companies going public.
Logue (1973) and Ibbotson (1975) are among the first to use United States data to
document this anomaly in their academic literature.
The anomaly has already been well documented and many different IPO underpricing
hypotheses have been developed, but satisfactory explanations have not been found
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yet. 1 Economists have still been haunted by these questions: Why the shares are
"abnormally" discounted to the outside investors both systematically and statistically?
Why would a firm willingly underprice its shares at the cost of limiting the equity
capital received?
Other anomaly regarding Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) considered in my thesis is
their poor long-run investment performance reported in Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990)
and Ritter (1991). Aggarwal and Rivoli and Ritter examine the long-run performance
of new issues in the US and report some degree of underperformance in the
aftermarket. Various studies with international data generally suggest that the long-run
underperformance of IPOs is a global phenomenon.
It might not be difficult to find that the long-run underperformance puzzle is related to
not only the primary stock market but also the secondary stock. In fact, the IPO
underpricing, the first puzzle we have mentioned, is also closely related to the
secondary stock market as well. The underpricing phenomenon that happened in the
primary stock market might be the result of overpricing in the secondary stock market,
which gives us a very strong hint that we have to take the secondary stock market into
account when trying to explain the above two puzzles.
Although it is a common perception that there is a positive relationship between
expected return and risk - for instance, risky investment will generally yield higher
returns than investments free of risk - it was only with the development of the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) that the trade-off between risk and expected return
could be quantified. On the basis of research of Markowitz (1959), Sharpe (1964),
Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) independently developed the standard form of the
capital asset pricing model, which is often referred to as the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin
model or the standard CAPM. The essence of CAPM is that the expected return on
any asset is a positive linear function of its beta and that beta is the only measure ot
risk needed to explain the cross-section of expected returns. The development ol the
CAPM can be regarded as a revolution in the field of finance. There is, of course, a
' These relevant hypotheses, issues and literature will be discusses in details in Chapter 2.
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huge amount of literature to examine if the CAPM is valid since the CAPM was
developed. The early empirical tests such as the empirical findings of Fama and
MacBeth (1973) focusing on the relationship between return and the beta confirm the
CAPIVTs prediction that the higher the risk, the higher the return. With further studies,
Fama and French (1992, 1993) find that beta cannot explain the difference in return
between portfolios formed on the basis of the ratio of book value of equity to market
value of equity. Fama and French (1993) then invent a famous three-factor model
(FF3FM), arguing that many of the CAPM average-return anomalies can be captured
by their model using three explanatory variables, the excess return on a broad market
portfolio, the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the
return on a portfolio of large stocks (SMB, small minus big); and the difference
between the return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and the return on a
portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks (HML, high minus low).
As mentioned above, following Chinese economic reform in 1979, some Chinese
scholars suggested that central government establish financial markets to solve some
critical conflicts in the process of economic reform such as the conflict between
ownership right and operating right, the conflict between state ownership and material
incentive. China started its stock market experience in 1991. Though IPO
underpricing, underperformance and CAPM have already been highlighted and
studied for a very long time, unfortunately these topics have just been touched upon
by Chinese scholars in the late of 1990s. Su (1998), jointly with Fleisher, might take a
lead in exploring the IPO underpricing phenomenon in China's stock market. Their
findings, though confirming that IPO underpricing did exist in China, were still rather
astonishing: the mean IPO initial return was 948.59 percent, which was much higher
compared to those that had been reported in other country studies, for instance,
conducted by Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994). Their research results enlighten
us to generate a hypothesis that the IPO underpricing might be caused by over-pricing
in the secondary stock market due to high speculation and bubbles. Chinese scholars
started their similar research in 1999. Mok and Hui (1998) argue that A-sharc IPOs
underpricing level in Shanghai stock market is far higher than findings in other stock
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markets, and explore that the so-called long-run underperformance exist in A-share
and B-share stock markets in Shanghai by testing the speculative bubble hypothesis.
In 1997, Chinese scholars, Liu Bo and Zhao Xiaoping (1997), took the lead in using
the standard CAPM to do an empirical analysis on the relationship between returns
and beta in China's stock market. It is quite understandable that their findings cannot
point out a clear relationship between returns and beta due to the primitiveness of
China's stock market. To the best of knowledge, using Fama and French three factor
model (FF3FM) on China's stock market is still rare. Since then more Chinese
scholars have started similar studies in this area, but generally speaking, comparing to
similar studies for mature markets, the relevant studies for China's stock market are
under-researched. The systematic research applying the latest theories of IPO
underpricing, IPO underperformance and CAPM testing with China's stock market
are rather important and timely. Since the establishment of Chinese stock exchanges,
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), China's
stock market has been an important avenue for the investment of funds and for the
growth of the private sector since then. The evidence of anomalies and CAPM
findings has a huge effect on the functioning of China's stock market and the cost of
raising funds for individual Chinese firms. Accordingly, this study will contribute to
the literature by examining the hitherto unexplored matter of the investment
performance of the Chinese primary stock market and secondary stock market.
1.3 Data and Methodology
1.3.1. Sample Description and Data Collection
1.3.1.1 Sample Description
Our sample firms are selected from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.
These firms are the earliest listed companies in China and they have been listed so far.
Due to different econometric methods employed in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter
6, the sample data set has slight differences in these three chapters. The sample data
set used in Chapter 4 contains 698 A-share firms going public and subsequently listed
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either on Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange during the sample period as of
December 2000. In Chapter 5, the sample data set includes 237 A-share IPOs listed on
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during period 1997-2001. Finally, 237 A
shares traded in China's stock market were selected as the sample data set in Chapter
6 from 1998 to 2002.
The IPO A-share issued before the end of 1993 and the IPO shares delisted during the
sample period are not included in our sample data set. There are four reasons for this.
The Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange established in 1990 and
1991, respectively. During the period from 1991 to 1993, share price volatility in
China's stock market was rather high. The data, especially the first day market closing
prices prior to 1994 are full of speculative bubbles and cannot be used. The second
reason is the reform of the Chinese accounting system. On July 1993, the new
"Enterprise Accounting Standards" and "Enterprise Financial Accounting Principle"
came into effect and brought the Chinese accounting practices closer to international
standards. The third reason is the time limitation of portfolio benchmarks when
various long-run performances of IPOs are measured and compared by different
definition requirements. For instance, long-run returns involve long holding periods
after the exclusive offering of the initial return period such as 1-year, 3-year and
5-year, so the sample firms in Chapters 5 and 6 are somewhat reduced. Final reason is
the time lag in the publication of the annual reports.
1.3.1.2 Data Collection
The data for Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 are mainly extracted from the Shanghai Stock
Exchange Statistics Yearbook published by Shanghai People's Publishing House and
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange Statistics Yearbook published by Chinese Finance
Publishing House, and the prospectus and the annual financial reports ol the sample
firms. The data for Chapter 6 are retrieved from Datastream, an on-line financial
database, which is a subsidiary of Primark Global Information Systems. Other data
related to stock capitalization and book to market ratio arc collected lrom the "Wind",
a famous database in China. As for the data used in Chapter 1, Chapter 2, and Chapter
3, they are collected from the World Bank Database, the Statistical Information Centre
6
of China Securities and Regulatory Commission, Finance China Database,
Development Research Centre of the State Council of China, various years of China
Statistical Yearbook, and relative websites.
1.3.2. Methodology
In Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, the single factor model and multi-factor model
are set up to test if the hypotheses exist in China's stock market by using data from
China's stock market. The factors adopted in the models are either documented in the
literature or represent the special status of China's stock market. Finally we compare
our findings with those from similar studies in the literature as well, and give
explanations to China's stock market regarding those anomalies we investigated.
Going further, in the process of modelling, firstly, the method of Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression analysis and the method of robust regression analysis are
applied to our empirical studies. These two analytic tools are supplementary. The OLS
is one of the most powerful and popular approaches of regression analysis under
certain assumptions of classical linear regression model (CLRM) and ideal data given,
but, if the assumptions of CLRM are violated or the data is not ideal, using standard
OLS in regression analysis will cause inefficiency of OLS estimators. If we ignore the
presence of problems, some hypothesis testing based on the OLS may be highly
misleading and result in erroneous conclusions. Robust regression method aims to
achieve almost the efficiency of OLS with ideal data and substantially
better-than-OLS efficiency in non-ideal situations such as non-normal errors or
outliers. Robust regression encompasses a variety of different techniques, each with
advantages and drawbacks for dealing with problematic data (Hamilton, 1998). In our
study, the robust regression is used to overcome the weakness of OLS in regression
analysis, at the same time, we will compare the results from both of methods.
Secondly, In order to conduct a successful empirical analysis, some remedial
measures are adopted to correct the non-ideal cross-sectional data and time series data
collected from China's stock market. Generally speaking, the cross-sectional data
have the problem of heterogeneity because samples often contain outliers that lead to
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a heteroscedasticity problem in the regression analysis. Time series data have a serial
correlation problem and a non-stationary problem that causes spurious regression
phenomenon in the regression analysis. Those problems result in inefficient OLS
estimators in the regression model. Without solving these problems, empirical
findings will be inconvincible and even totally unacceptable.
1.3.2.1 Dealing with the heteroscedasticity issue in regression analysis
In the regression analysis, because the cross-sectional data often contains outliers, the
problem of heteroscedasticity is often more common in cross-sectional data by using
OLS in regression analysis. The logarithmic transformation, as a very useful remedial
measure, is adopted in our studies to avoid the presentation of the heteroscedasticity
issue in regression analysis. The logarithmic transformation can compress the scales in
which the variables are measured, thereby, reducing a tenfold difference between two
values to a twofold difference, avoiding the presence of outliers in the samples
(Gujarati, 1995). That is an important reason why we use the logarithmic
transformation to transform the original data into ideal data to avoid
heteroscedasticity.
1.3.2.2 Dealing with serial correlation issue in regression analysis
The first-difference method is widely applied to transform data for solving the
problem of auto-correlation or serial correlation in our studies, because it is easy to
perform. Just as the problem of hetero-scedascity is common in cross-sectional data,
the problem of serial correlation or auto-correlation is also common in time series
data. Under auto-correlation or serial correlation, the OLS estimators are also no
longer minimum variance among all linear unbiased estimators or no longer efficient
by using the standard OLS formulas in regression analysis, although they are
unbiased. 2 The first-difference method is applied to transform data solving the
problem in my study.
1.3.2.3 Dealing with spurious regression issue in regression analysis
2 Gujarati, Damodar, N., 1995, Basic Econometrics, Third Edition, McGraw-Hill International
Editions, 408-409
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It easily causes the problem of spurious regression by using non-stationary time series
data to run regression analysis. The results from spurious regression may not reflect
the true association between those variables. In particular, economic time series data
often have strong trends of movement in the same direction, upward or downward.
The presence of spurious regression brings on incorrect regression model, affects the
accuracy of forecasting and misleads policy-makers. In practice, most economic time
series data are non-stationary, such as stock price. In our study, the main data used in
empirical analysis are monthly stock prices. So we directly use the methods of log
transformation and difference transformation to avoid the presence of spurious
regression in the regression model. It is worth adding that from an econometric point
of view, the two methods of data transformation are applied to turn non-stationary
data into stationary data and remain its mean value and its variance not to vary
systematically over time; from an economic point of view, the two methods are used
to transform the stock prices into returns.
1.4 The Objective of This Study
In addition to the description of the historic development of China's stock market, the
primary market and the secondary market, there are three objectives of this study. The
first one is to investigate if the underpricing anomaly exists in China's stock market
and look for the explanations to this phenomenon. This study is going to relate IPO
initial returns to variables either widely used in studies of IPO underpricing in
literature or elaborately selected to take into account some special, factors, which
might also have influences on IPO underpricing in China's stock market, hoping to
make a valuable contribution to better understanding of IPOs' anomalies in China's
stock market. The second objective is fo examine and measure the extent of long-run
underperformance of Chinese IPOs and then empirically test the validity of two
hypotheses: the divergence of opinion hypothesis (Miller 1977) and the speculative
bubble hypothesis (Tinic 1988, Shiller 1990). Both hypotheses are widely used to
explain the long-run underperformance phenomenon in the stock markets. In short, we
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empirically examine Chinese IPOs to provide one case of the international evidence
on the long-run underperformance of IPOs. These two tests are conducted in China's
primary stock market. Last, but not least, is to conduct quantitative analyses to assess
the share pricing characteristics in China's secondary stock market. Models of the
pricing of risk - the CAPM and FF3FM, augmented in standard ways - are employed
to test hypotheses derived from the CAPM and FF3FM using data from China's stock
market, with an idea that the results of CAPM and FF3FM testing could make a
contribution to the explanation of IPO underpricing and long-run underperformance.
At the same time, all of the findings in this dissertation are compared with those from
similar studies in the literature respectively.
1.5 The Structure of This Study
The study comprises seven chapters.
Following the introduction, Chapter 2 is the literature review. It starts with a brief
literature review on the relationship between stock market development and economic
growth, followed by IPO underpricing, long-run underperformance, CAPM testing
and application of Fama-French three-factor model which are all surveyed and
reviewed. Moreover, relevant literature done by Chinese scholars is also included.
This chapter acts as a theoretical foundation for the empirical studies carried out in the
following three chapters.
Chapter 3 reviews China's stock market development, especially focusing on
evolution of stock issuance and listing system, development of stock pricing and
allocation mechanism, and lays a foundation for better understanding China's stock
market, in particular some features differing from other stock markets in the world.
Chapter 4 discusses the IPO underpricing phenomenon in China's stock market.
Firstly, major theories explaining this anomaly are expatiated, such as the Winner's
Curse Hypothesis, the Signalling Hypothesis, the Ownership Dispersion Hypothesis,
which are based on microeconomic uncertainty and information asymmetry. Then
following a brief statement of China' stock market, the study integrates three
1 0
hypotheses to test the existence of underprieing phenomenon, and reach the
conclusion that ll'O undcrpricing docs exist in China' stock market, which is
coincident with the literature.
Chapter 5 studies the long-run underpeiIbrmance ol ll'O companies in China's slock
market. I wo hypotheses, the divergence of opinion hypothesis (Miller l ir/7) and the
speculative bubble hypothesis (Tinic l(>NN,Shiller I1)1)!))arc presented to explain the
phenomenon of the long-run undcrperforinance of ll'Os. Then the chapter carries out
an empirical test to examine if the phenomenon exists on companies listing in China's
stock market and if the hypotheses help to explain this phenomenon, hoth of the
answers are positive.
Chapter 6 empirically examines the validity of the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAI'M) and three-factor model (IT3I'M) invented by I'aina and French using data
from China's stock market to give a better description of returns in China's stock
market, f irstly, the CAI'M and ITTI M arc reviewed. Secondly, these two models and
their modifications are used to analyse empirically the asset pricing characteristics ol
China's stock market from different aspects, f inally, conclusions are presented and
some extra explanations of the CAI'M and IT H M tests in China's stock market are
added. As an emerging stock market, it is still a long way for China's policy-makers
to narrow the gap between China's stock market and developed stock markets.
Chapter 7, the last Chapter, presents the summary and conclusions of the dissertation
and some suggestions are also put forward for the improvement ol Chinas stock
market on the basis of empirical findings achieved in Chapters 4, 5 and (>.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
Since 1980, thousands of firms started to go public to raise capital. Comment and
Jarrell (1995) report that since 1979, more and more firms in the United States have
been selling and spinning off divisions, reducing the importance of internal capital
markets and increasing the importance of public capital markets. Over the same time
period initial public offerings (IPOs) have reached record levels. Ritter and Welch
(2002) describe that the number of companies going public in the United State
exceeded one per business day from 1980 to 2001. There was also an incredible speed
and scale of development on IPOs in emerging stock markets such as China's. In 1992,
there were only 14 A shares listed on Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock
Exchange and total funds raised RMB 5 million. By the end of 2006, the A shares
listed on SSE and SZSE had reached 1,293 and raised capital RMB 1,572.24 million. 1
Although the number of IPOs has varied from year to year in stock markets, it is very
apparent that the initial public offerings (IPOs) have become an important channel for
firms to raise capital for their growth.
IPOs' boom attracted lots of attention of researchers. There have been a large number
of both theoretical and empirical studies on the IPOs and relative studies. In this
Chapter, the review starts with a brief literature review on the relationship between
stock market development and economic growth; part two provides the literature
review on IPOs that concentrates on the decision to go public, underpricing of new
issue and long-run underperformance, and finally, a review on the capital asset pricing
model and its extension such as the three-factor model are given in Part three.
' http://www.csrc.gov.cn/cn/statiinfo/index.jsp?
1 2
2.1 The Relationship between Stock Market Development and Tconomic Growth:
literature review on the importance of stock market to economy
In recent years, there has been an expanding theoretical literature on the links between
stock markets and economic growth. As early as 1976, Fama (1976) writes that an
efficient capital market is an important component of a capitalist system. If the capital
market is to function smoothly in allocating resources, prices of securities must be
good indicators of value. Greenwood and Smith (1997) argue that the markets,
especially financial markets, promote economic growth, and that growth in turn leads
to the formation of the markets. Three points are summarised. Firstly, market
formation is an endogenous process. Markets open when the economy is wealthy
enough to support them. The cost of market formation will be reduced by market
development which follows some period of real development. Secondly, financial
markets enhancc economic growth. Financial markets promote the allocation of
capital to its highest return uses; provide liquidity; permit the efficient pooling of risk;
change the composition of saving to boost capital accumulation and foster
specialization in firm development and adoption of new technologies. Thirdly, the
consequence of perfect competition in the markets formation is that it is perceived to
be efficient by market participants.
Bencivcnga, Smith and Starr (1995) present a model where the employment of
long-gestation capital production technologies requires the existence ol supporting
financial markets. In their model, these capital production technologies have different
gestation periods for converting current output into future capital, where longer
gestation technologies enjoy greater returns. Investors, however, do not wish to lose
control of their savings for very long periods. Thus, long gestation production
technologies require that ownership be transferred throughout the life of the
production process in secondary capital markets. I he transfer of ownership is costly,
and long gestation capital production technologies will therefore be less attractive. So
the liquidity, as measured by transactions costs of financial markets, affects the set of
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technologies in use and the equilibrium rate of growth of economy. Reductions in
transactions costs always induce a shift to longer-gestation, higher-return capital
production technologies, and such reductions can raise high returns on savings.
These effects are conducive to higher rate of growth. But an increase in liquidity of
the stock market can also cause a shift in the composition of saving away from the
initiation of new capital investment and towards the purchase of existing
capital-in-process (CIP) in secondary capital markets. When this effect is large enough,
which requires an alteration in the equilibrium choice of investment technologies,
improvement in the liquidity of stock markets will be growth reducing. On the
contrary, if a sufficiently large reduction in transactions costs leads to the use of longer
gestation capital investments of sufficiently greater productivity, then capital market
improvements are growth enhancing.
Atje and Jovanovic (1993) present a cross-country study of stock markets and
economic growth and they find a significant correlation between economic growth
and the value of stock market trading relative to GDP for 39 countries over the period
1980-1988. Their model was initially estimated by OLS with lagged or initial
variables under the assumption that both investment and stock market activity are
endogenous. In their samples of 39 countries they find that lagged investment is not
significant, but that the product of investment with initial stock market activity is, and
conclude that stock markets do indeed increase the rate of return on investment, and
therefore induce economic growth.
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1993) construct and compare a broader collection of
stock market development indicators which are total market capitalization divided by
GDP; total value traded divided by GDP; the turnover ratio; asset pricing indicators
and dummy variables of institutional indicators based on the information provided in
the feedback, for many countries, to explore the interactions between stock market
development and financial intermediary development. 1hey find that the relationship
between the development of stock markets and the functioning of financial
intermediaries may be complementary.
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996) collect and analyse an array of stock market
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development indicators, including stock market size, market liquidity, turnover ratio,
market concentration, market volatility, the degree of market integration and
institutional indicators, using data on 41 countries from 1986 to 1993, to provide a
positive relationship between stock market development and economic development.
Their findings are supported by Levine and Zervos (1996, 1998). In a series of papers,
Levine and Zervos (1996) employ pooled cross-country, time-series regressions to
evaluate the relationship between stock market development and economic growth,
using data on 41 countries over the period 1976-1993. They find that stock market
development is positively associated with economic growth.
Once again, Levine and Zervos (1998) provide a strong, positive link between stock
markets and long-run economic growth by using data on 47 countries from 1976
through 1993. They present measures of stock market and banking development and
economic growth indicators to empirically investigate the relationship between stock
markets, banks and economic growth. They find that stock market liquidity and
banking development are both positively and robustly correlated with the rates of
economic growth, capital accumulation, and productivity growth when entered
together in regressions, even after controlling for economic and political factors. Their
results are consistent with the views that financial markets, especially stock markets,
provide important services for economic growth, and that stock markets provide
different services from banks.
Similarly, Rajan and Zingales (1998) develop a new methodology to investigate
whether financial sector development has an influence on industrial growth. Under the
assumption that capital markets in the United States, especially for the large listed
firms they analyse, are relatively frictionless, they argue that financial development
facilitates economic growth, specifically, industries that rely heavily on external
finance develop disproportionately faster in countries with better developed financial
markets in a large sample of countries over the 198(rs. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven
and Levine (2005) extend the Rajan and Zingales (1998) methodology, and further
confirm that stock market development fosters aggregate economic growth.
Though some economists still cast doubts on the positive links between stock market
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development and economic growth, generally speaking, it is widely, though gradually,
accepted that stock markets are positively related to economic growth with the
increasing evidence, either theoretical reasoning or empirical findings. The roles that
stock markets play in promoting economic growth have been recognised. 2
2.2 The Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)
2.2.1 Theoretical Explanations of Going Public Decision
The finance literatures suggest that stock markets serve important functions even in
those economies in which there already exists a well developed banking sector. This is
because equity financing and debt financing are in general not perfect substitutes, in
other words, they have different attributes. The firms can choose different ways to
fund capital for their development according to their preference. Going public has
been frequently used since 1980.
Why do firms go public? The decision to go public perhaps is one of the most
important and least studied questions in corporate finance. There has been some
research to address the going public decision. Basically, according to Subrahmanyam
and Titman (1999), the literature on the decision to go public is roughly classified by
three viewpoints, the role of information, corporate control rights and others.
2.2.1.1 Focusing on the Role of Information
Lucas and McDonald (1990) present an information-theoretic, infinite horizon model
to explain a large number of facts about price behaviour around equity issues and the
timing of those issues. In their model, there are two assumptions: one is infinitely
lived firms; the other is short-term information asymmetries between managers and
outside investors. The managers have information about the firms today, but the
outside investors will not obtain that information from the market until the next period.
2 For instance, Lucas (1988) stated that economists "badly over-stress" the role of the financial system.
The empirical evidence also shows that crisis-like developments in the financial markets has occurred
with increasing frequency in recent years, and that such phenomena at least temporarily limit the scope
for economic development. The East Asian financial crisis is the latest and most severe example.
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The firms are undervalued if the revelation of this information causes the price to rise.
The firms postpone their equity issue until the undervaluation is corrected. They also
explain the fact that equity issues tend to follow a general increase in the market. If in
a bear market, the firms will delay their issuing to wait for a coming bull market,
because the firms expect an increase in their equity price.
Chemmanur and Fughieri (1999) develop a rigorous theoretical analysis of the going
public decision of a firm. Under the assumption of asymmetric information, the
entrepreneur has private information about his firm's value, but outside investors can
reduce this informational disadvantage by evaluating the firm at a cost. The
equilibrium timing of the going public decision is determined by the firm's trade-off
between minimizing the duplication in information production by outsider investors
and avoiding the risk-premium demanded by venture capitalists. Thus, they show that,
in equilibrium, firms go public only when a sufficient amount of information about the
firms has accumulated in the public domain, because the longer track records about
firms can reduce the cost of information acquisition for outside investors. Conversely,
the firms will be private at an earlier stage in their lives.
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) argue that the information aspects of the going
public decision also explore the issue that there is a so-called snowballing effect
resulting from the positive interaction between going public and development of the
financial market.
They show that if costly information is diverse and cheap to investors, and if valuable
information is freely available to investors, the firm chooses to go public; it remains
private if the investors have to incur significant costs to obtain the information. They
also point out that there is a positive interaction between going public and the size of
stock markets. When the stock market grows, more stocks are publicly traded, the
information conveyed by the share price generally improves, it is more attractive for
individuals to become stock markets' investors, these additional active investors
improve the capital allocation process, making it more attractive tor additional firms
to go public.
Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) argue that the firm's IPO conveys valuable
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information to the competitors in the product market. They analyse how both
technological and competitive risks affect the timing of private and initial public
offerings in an emerging industry. The timing of the choice of financing depends on
three factors: the public perception that the industry is viable, the prior probability that
a superior technology will appear and the initial cost of research and development that
must be paid by new entrants.
2.2.1.2 Focusing on the Corporate Control Rights
Zingales (1995) provides a new framework to analyse the decision of a firm to go
public. His paper focuses on the role of an initial public offering in maximising the
proceeds an initial owner obtains by eventually selling his firm, and argues the
decision to go public is affected by corporate control. Zingales also explains that the
separation of control rights and cash flow rights can raise the proceeds. By selling
cash flow rights to dispersed shareholders, the initial owner maximises his proceeds
from the sale of cash flow rights. By directly bargaining with a potential buyer, the
initial owner maximises his proceeds from the sale of control rights. The model
suggests that when the potential buyer is expected to increase the value of cash flow
rights, then the initial owner can use an IPO to extract a portion of surplus, without
bargaining with the buyer. What fraction of corporate control rights to retain is a very
important issue to the initial owner. Finally, his model provides implications on the
strategy to be followed in selling a firm as well as on the timing of IPOs and going
private transactions.
Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) address the issue that the change in the structure
of ownership and in controlling shareholder can provide important insights into the
motives to go public. Their empirical study shows that diversification of controlling
shareholders' portfolio and the reduction of the risk of the controlling group's holdings
are the motivation of IPOs. The finding is consistent with Zingales (1995); the transfer
of corporate control as a key factor affects the decision to go public.
Mello and Parsons (1998) highlight the fact that going public is a complex process
with distinct markets for dispersed shares and controlling blocks. An optimal strategy
is set up for going public. IPO is a first step for going public and particularly suited to
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the sale of dispersed shares to small and passive investors; the sale of controlling
blocks to active investors should occur subsequently. They also develop a framework
for evaluating alternative methods of sale and show that discriminating in favour of
active investors can raise the market value of the firm for all shareholders and assure
an efficient ownership structure.
2.2.1.3 Other Viewpoints about the Decision to Go Public
Pagano (1993) provides a model of the effect of opportunities for diversification on
entrepreneurs' portfolio choices. He argues that diversification is an important motive
in the decision to go public. In an economy in which equity markets are imperfect, the
entrepreneurs face costs of diversifying their portfolios. The costs of diversification
may induce the entrepreneurs to avoid the use of equity markets. The entrepreneurs
undertake to go public when they face borrowing constraints and lack liquidity.
Lerner (1994) focuses on a single US industry, biotechnology, using a sample of 350
firms from 1978 to 1992, to examine the timing of initial public offerings and private
financings. His study shows that industry market-to-book ratios have a substantial
effect on the decision to go public rather than to acquire additional venture capital
financing. These firms go public when equity valuations are high, or to employ private
financing.
Schultz and Zaman (2001) report that many internet firms went public in the late
1990s, and provide two explanations to explain why those firms went public so early.
The first explanation is to take advantage of irrationally high price for internet shares.
The second explanation is to establish market share and take advantage of economies
of scale because internet business has tremendous potential. They also examine the
behaviour of individuals closest to internet firms such as firm managers, underwriters,
and venture capitalists, to explore their motives for going public. The managers of
internet firms sell fewer shares from their personal holding in IPOs than managers of
other firms do; venture capitalists are more likely to be involved in internet IPos than
others; underwriters with the most valuable reputation are more likely to underwrite
internet IPOs than IPOs of other firms.
The decision to go public is very complicated. It is hard to explain it clearly with a
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single model or a single viewpoint. Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) summarise
the costs and benefits of going public from many models.
The costs of going public include: i) Adverse selection. The asymmetric information
exists in the process of going public, and hence adversely affects the average quality
of the firms going public. All investors should be treated equally, although some
investors have information about the firms. Thus the share price can be discounted to
investors. This adverse selection cost usually happens to young or small listing firms
because they have little track record and low visibility as highlighted by Chemmanur
and Fulghieri (1999). This adverse selection cost should be positively related to the
age and size of the firms; ii) Administrative expense and fees. Like Ritter (1987)
analysis, these are direct costs, including underwriting fees, registration fees, auditing
fees, certification fees, dissemination of accounting information fees, and stock
exchange fees, etc. these direct costs should be positively correlated to the size of
firms and, iii) Loss of confidentiality. The listing firms face the disclosure of
information about firms to all investors according to the rules of stock exchanges.
The benefits of going public include: i) Overcoming borrowing constraints. The best
benefit of go public is to obtain access to a source of finance other than the bank. In
general, the firm goes public when it cannot fund capital at very favourable terms
from other financing source, ii) Greater bargaining power with bank. When the tirm
faces higher interest rates and a more concentrated credit source, it is more likely to go
public. By gaining access to stock markets and disclosing information to investors, the
firm brings competition to its lenders and obtains cheaper credit, iii) Liquidity and
portfolio diversification. Going public provides the owners with opportunities to
diversify their portfolio and share risk with other investors, as in Pagano (1993), in the
meantime, the firm can reinvest in other assets, optimize its ownership structure, and
raise fresh equity capital by going public. Other benefits such as monitoring,
investors' recognition, change of control and windows of opportunity are also
included.
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2.2.2. The IPO Underpricing
Underpricing of IPOs is the best-known anomaly associated with the process of going
public, namely large initial return, which is measured from the offering price to the
closing price at the end of the first trading day after the IPO. This phenomenon is well
documented in a large number of finance literatures. In 1963, the U. S. Securities and
Exchange Commission first empirically found that there was a positive average initial
return on firms going public. This discovery was based on casual observation and no
explanations were offered, but academic studies followed. Logue (1973) and Ibbotson
(1975) are among the first to use US data to document this anomaly in academic
literature. Ibbotson (1975) tested a sample of 120 IPOs from 1960 to 1969, finding
that the distribution of initial return was highly skewed, with a positive mean and a
median near zero. Thereafter, numerous further studies have confirmed the
underpricing anomaly. For instance, Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994) report that
for 2,439 US IPOs in 1975-1984, the average initial return on IPOs with an offering
price of less than US$3.00 is 42.8 percent whereas the average initial return on IPOs
with an offering price of US$3.00 or more is only 8.6 percent. Aggarwal, Leal, and
Hernandez (1993) report 78.5 percent, 16.3 percent, and 33.0 percent average initial
returns on IPOs in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, respectively. Dawson (1987) reports a
17.6 percent initial return for the IPOs in Hong Kong, and Kim, Krinsky, and Lee
(1991) find an initial return of 79.0 percent for the Korean IPOs. Rydqvist (1993)
reports a 12.0 percent initial return on IPOs in Sweden. Those empirical studies not
only confirm the existence of the underpricing anomaly but also argue that this
anomaly is a common phenomenon both in the developed stock markets and in the
emerging stock markets, although the degree of underpricing varies from country to
country. Various empirical findings on short-run underpricing called tor a great deal ot
theoretical study to explain the puzzling phenomena and to postulate new hypotheses,
otherwise, these theoretical studies in turn motivated further empirical studies that
tested the new implications.
A number of IPO underpricing hypotheses have been developed for this anomaly
phenomenon, focusing on various aspects of the relationships between investors,
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issuers, and underwriters taking the firms public. Here, based on Ritter and Welch
(2002), these hypotheses are characterised on the basis of asymmetric information
assumption.
2.2.2.1 Hypotheses Based on Asymmetric Information
Many of the hypotheses of underpricing are based on assumption of asymmetric
information. Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that the asymmetric information affects
substantially capital structure and financial equilibrium. A simple model of a one-short
equity offering based on asymmetric information is developed in their study, where
risk-adverse insiders who are seeking funds have private information about their
firm's true value or quality, but insiders have no way to convey private information
directly to other potential shareholders. In such a setting, insiders' willingness to
invest in his firm can serve as a signal of firm's quality. In fact, the signal that is taken
by potential shareholders as a signal of the true value or quality of a firm is a fraction
of equity in the firm that is retained by the insiders. Usually insiders of better types of
firms signal true firm value or quality to the market by retaining a larger fraction of
their firm's equity than the poorer type firm. The value of the firm increases with the
fraction of firm's equity held by the insiders. Signalling incurs costs by inducing
insiders to retain a larger fraction of their firm's equity than they would if inlormation
could be directly transferred. Such signalling equilibrium exists because, for better
type firms, the costs of retaining a larger fraction of the firm's equity by the insiders is
lower than the costs caused by the insiders before offering, for holding an optimal
portfolio from purely risk-sharing considerations. The resulting equilibrium differs
importantly from models that ignore informational asymmetries. On the basis ol
Leland and Pyle's research, several contemporary hypotheses trying to explain IPOs
underpricing are developed
2.2.2.1.1 Winner's Curse Hypothesis
One of the famous hypotheses for the underpricing of IPOs is the "Winner's Curse"
explanation introduced by Rock (1986).
Rock (1986) presents an adverse selection model, incorporating the information
asymmetry and rationing to explain the underpricing anomaly. In a hrm commitment
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offering, a fixed number of shares are offered at a fixed price, rationing will occur if
the offer is oversubscribed. In general, rationing occurs when good shares are offered
to the public; it will make some uninformed investors worse off. But the rationing
does not lead to underpricing. Rock divides investors into two groups: the informed
investors who have the best knowledge of the market price of the shares being sold
and uninformed investors. The informed investors will crowd the uninformed
investors out of the share offer, or the uninformed investors will be allocated only a
fraction of shares if the shares are underpriced, on the other hand, informed investors
will withdraw from the share offer, the uninformed investors will "win" the entire
shares if the shares are overpriced. The partial allocation of shares produces an
adverse selection problem. To induce a sufficient number of uninformed investors to
the IPO market, therefore , the shares must be priced at a discount to overcome the bias
of allocation. So, underpricing of IPOs is the compensation to uninformed investors
for the bias in the allocation of new shares, and for attracting uninformed investors to
the IPO market.
An implication of Rock's model is that riskier issues should be underpriced to a
greater extent than has been proved by Beatty and Ritter (1986). Beatty and Ritter
(1986) develop and test two propositions. One is that there is an equilibrium
relationship between the expected underpricing of IPO and ex ante uncertainty about
per share value. Rock's model (1986) is employed in their study to prove that the
greater the ex ante uncertainty, the greater the underpricing. The other is that this
underpricing equilibrium is enforced by the investment banking industry. An
investment banker who "cheats" on this underpricing equilibrium will lose its clients.
If, on average, the new shares are not underpriced enough, the average initial return
will be too low, and potential investors will face the winner's curse. They will cease
doing business with this underwriter; on the other hand, if the new shares are
underpriced too much, so that the average initial return is too high, the issuers will
cease employing this underwriter.
A direct test of Rock's model is provided by Koh and Walter (1989), using data from
Singapore. Their empirical results are consistent with the major empirical implications
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of Rock's theory. The winner's curse is strongly evident in the Singapore market and
hence rationing of new issues is used due to the underpricing anomaly. Lee, Taylor
and Walter (1996) provide further evidence on the pricing of IPOs in Singapore, using
data from 1973 to 1992. Their results are consistent with the implications of Rock's
model (1986). The initial return is positively related to the oversubscription and
retained ownership. Rationing can explain underpricing which was supported by Koh
and Walter (1989). The winner's curse is strongly evident, and the informed investors
crowd uninformed investors out when new shares are underpriced. But with retained
ownership as a signalling role, as suggested by Leland and Pyle (1977), this variable is
not powerful.
Chowdhry and Sherman (1996) develop a model to show that the strategic allocation
of shares in IPO can reduce the winner's curse problem faced by investors. Usually
the policy for allocating shares is that the issuers in many countries tend to favour
small over large investors which is suggested by Rock (1986), because favouring
small investors increases the issuers' expected revenue. Chowdhry and Sherman argue
that different IPO methods may affect the adverse selection problem, and the level of
underpricing by comparing US firm commitment and U.K. open offer for sale IPO
methods. In the UK-style system, the underwriters are given less freedom, less
discretion in the allocation of shares than underwriters in the US. Thus, the UK
method would cause a greater underpricing, which may be reduced by the policy ol
favouring small investors whereas the US method has potential to reduce the level ol
underpricing.
2.2.2.1.2 The Costly Information Acquisition Hypothesis
The investment bankers induce investors to reveal favourable information during the
pre-sell period. The favourable information investors reveal is used by underwriters to
price new shares and allocate shares to investors according so called indications ol
interest. This argument was developed by Benveniste and Spindt (1989).
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) analyse the underwriters' IPO marketing process and
show how to use information from investors to price and allocate new issues. I hey
argue that the underwriters can reduce IPO underpricing by using their access to
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investors to collect information. The IPO marketing process is constructed as an
auction, conducted by underwriters. By choosing suitable rules relating the offer price
and the share allocation to the investors' indications of interest, underwriters induce
the investors to disclose positive information. The new shares' offering price must be
set low to make a profit to compensate investors for disclosure of the positive
information. Underpricing is a result of a pre-market auction. To investors,
underpricing is compensation for disclosing good information to underwriters; to
underwriters and issuers, the underpricing is the cost for obtaining indications of
interest from investors. They also find that the issuers' desire to gain maximum
proceeds affects the type of underwriting contract chosen. Under a firm commitment
contract, underwriters are given more discretion, if ex ante price uncertainty is great,
underwriters' incentive is to pre-sell the whole offering, which promotes the level of
underpricing. So, if firms face a high price uncertainty, a best-efforts underwriting
contract is a good choice.
Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) analyse a sample of 38 IPOs managed by a single
underwriter during the period 1983-1988, finding that approximately 70 percent of the
IPOs are allocated to institutional investors in firm commitment offering. This finding
confirms the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) prediction that US underwriters behave
strategically in the allocation of IPO.
2.2.2.1.3 The Signalling Hypothesis
Underpricing of IPO means "leave a good taste" with investors. In iact, it attracts
investors to come back to the market because the issuers want to sell seasoned issues
at a high price. This hypothesis is provided by Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Welch
(1989), and Grinblatt and Hwang (1989).
Allen and Faulhaber (1989) present a model to explain that the underpricing ol IPOs is
an equilibrium signal of firm quality, under the assumption ol the best information
about the firm's prospects held by the firm itself. Good firms wish to give investors a
signal about their superior prospects, because it may be very costly or impossible to
value firms' true value or quality because of informational asymmetry. So a low IPO
price and quantity can be used as a signal to show investors that the firm is good.
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Underpricing ot IPO is a credible signal to investors, because only good firms can be
expected to recoup this loss after their performance is realised. The model implies that
the better firms will underprice more, will have higher earnings, and will initiate
dividends earlier. Good firms leave a good taste with investors, so that their seasoned
offering will be sold at higher price.
Welch (1989) provides a signalling model in which high quality firms underprice in
order to gain a higher price in seasoned offering. The model strongly suggests that
IPO firms pursue a multiple issue strategy when they choose both the price and the
proportion of the firm they offer at their IPO. There is asymmetric information
between investors and firm owners. High quality firm owners use underpricing as a
signal to convey their superior information to investors because the marginal cost of
underpricing for high quality firms is lower. At the same time, the high quality firm
owner will be rewarded at the time of the seasoned issue by a higher price for shares.
The underpricing is a credible signal if the imitation cost is high enough for low
quality firms. Welch's model implies that good firms, which underprice more,
experience a less unfavourable price response at the time of the seasoned issue.
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) develop a signalling model with two signals to explain
new issues underpricing. In the Leland and Pyle (1977) model, they use only one
signal which is retaining a larger fraction of shares by the firm's insiders to overcome
the asymmetric information problem. In Grinblatt and Hwang's model, the issuer is
assumed to have better information about his firm's future cash flow than outsiders.
Two signals, the degree of underpricing and a larger fraction of shares held by insiders,
are used to convey the mean and variance of a firm's future cash flow to the market,
and to overcome asymmetric information problem. In the model's separating
equilibrium, a firm's intrinsic value is positively related to the degree of underpricing
of IPOs and the insider's holdings.
Those three signalling models all indicate that 'ieave a good taste in investors
mouths" is a result of seasoned offerings at a favour price. Allen and Faulhaber (1989)
and Welch (1989) provide conditions for the existence of separating equilibrium in the
model with two risk-neutral issuer types and an exogenously specified constraint on
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outside financing. I he Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) model has an endogenously
determined amount of external financing and a continuum of risk-adverse issuer types.
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1997) develop a theory of unit IPOs in a simple
asymmetric information set-up, in which the firm going public issues a package of
equity with warrants. They assume insiders have private information about the firm. In
equilibrium, high risk firms issue underpriced units of equity and warrants; low risk
firm issue underpriced equity alone. With or without warrants acts as a signal in their
model.
How and Howe (2001) use a sample from Australia to test signalling hypothesis,
focusing on the choice of securities as a signalling mechanism in a market
characterized by informational asymmetry. They provide evidence that supports the
signalling hypothesis explanation for the inclusion of warrants in IPOs.
Loughran and Ritter (2002) offer an explanation for the IPO underpricing
phenomenon. They argue that IPO underpricing is an indirect form of underwriter
compensation, because investors are willing to offer quid pro quos to underwriters to
gain favourable allocations on hot deals. Underpricing is also an indirect cost to
issuers; they agree with underpricing only when they are simultaneously getting good
news in the form of unanticipated wealth increase.
Su (2004) empirically investigates "winner's curse" and signalling models using data
of 587 Chinese IPOs during January 1994 to December 1999. His study once again
confirms that underpricing exists in China's stock market, and explores that IPO
underpricing is related to pre-IPO information asymmetry and serves as a signal of
firm quality. He finds the answers to Chinese IPOs underpricing. Firstly, underpricing
is correlated to the size of offering, insider ownership, and allocation mechanism and
so on. Secondly, to some extent, underpricing can be explained in terms of a strategy
for firms to signal their value to investors. His empirical results are consistent with
adverse selection and signalling hypotheses.
Cao and Shi (2006) construct a theoretical model to explain the clustering of
underpriced IPOs. The key ingredients of the model are aggregate demand uncertainty
in an industry and asymmetric information regarding the quality ot individual firms.
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They suggest that firms can signal their quality by underpricing new issues in the IPO
market. IPOs underpricing can promote the publicity and consumer awareness of,the
industry, the expected aggregate demand for the industry's products increases with
increasing publicity of the industry. They show that asymmetric information and
expectations on aggregate product demand interact with each other to generate
multiple equilibriums.
All theories of underpricing based on asymmetric information share the prediction that
underpricing is positively related to the degree of asymmetric information.
2.2.2.2 Hypotheses Based on Symmetric Information
There are also theories of underpricing that do not rely on asymmetric information
that is resolved at the beginning of trading, the main one being the so-called
ownership dispersion hypothesis. Booth and Chua (1996) and Brennan and Franks
(1997) develop a new explanation of the underpricing anomaly: the ownership
dispersion hypothesis. Booth and Chua (1996) develop an explanation for IPO
underpricing in which the issuer's demand for ownership dispersion creates an
incentive to underpricing and oversubscription. The issuing firm may intentionally
underprice their shares in order to generate excess demand and be able to have a large
number of small shareholders. There is at least an advantage for firms to disperse
ownership, because dispersed ownership may improve liquidity, and this strategy
would tend to make for a lower rate of return required by investors and thus a higher
equilibrium price for the firm's shares. IPO underpricing would lead to
oversubscription, which allows broad initial ownership dispersion and in turn achieves
a liquid secondary market for the shares. Promoting oversubscription can also
maximise issue proceeds. Issuer's demand for broad ownership dispersion and a liquid
secondary market for the shares determine the equilibrium level of underpricing. This
explanation focuses on improving liquidity. Brennan and Franks (1997) provide a
study of how the dispersion of ownership and control evolves in UK firms, using data
from a sample of 69 IPOs in the UK. They argue that underpricing is associated with
oversubscription and dispersion ownership and control is a result of underpricing. In
their model, rationing favours small investors over large investors. Underpricing
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promotes oversubscription to allow the issuer both to ration the allocation of shares
and to discriminate between applicants so as to reduce the individual sizc of new
block-holdings post-IPO. This dispersed ownership will both increase the liquidity of
the market for the stock, and make it more difficult for outsiders to challenge or
monitor managements. Their explanation is also called the reduced monitoring
hypothesis.
Pham, Kalev and Steen (2003) use a sample of Australian IPOs to investigate the
relationship between underpricing, ownership structure and post-listing liquidity of
IPOs. In their study, they use breadth and equality of shareholder distribution lo
measure the ownership structure, and employ trading turnover and the bid-ask spread
to measure the post-listing liquidity. Breadth of shareholder distribution reflects the
size and diversity of the outside investor base of an IPO after allocation and is
calculated by dividing the total number of new investors by the dollar amount of
issued shares. Equality of shareholder distribution refers lo the difference in the
proportions of ownership possessed by outside investors. Trading turnover is
calculated by scaling daily trading volume for the total number of that firm's issued
shares and the bid-ask spread refers lo the daily closing bid and ask quotes. Iheir
empirical work yields statistically significant evidence iu support of the following
propositions. Firstly, the level of underpricing is positively related to the breadth ol
shareholding base, and negatively related to the inequality ol outside shareholder
distribution formed after the allocation process. Secondly, the degree ol underpricing
is positively related lo the post-listing liquidity. They also provide an explanation that
ownership structure plays the main role in forming the relationship between
underpricing and liquidity. Their empirical results are consistent with Brcnnan and
Franks (1997).
2.2.3 The Long-run Underpformence of IPOs
Another anomaly of IPOs is their poor long-term slock price performance, the
so-called long-run underperformance in the stock market reported by Aggarwal and
Rivoli (1990) and Ritter (1991). They examine the long-run performance of new
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issues in the US and report some degree of underperformance in the aftermarket.
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990), on the basis of a sample of 1,598 IPOs issued during
1977-1987, document an abnormal return of-13.73 percent for investors purchasing
all IPOs in the open market at the close of the first trading day and holding each for a
period of 250 trading days. Ritter (1991) examines the underperformance of US IPO
firms categorised by adjusted initial returns using a sample of 1,526 IPOs issued
during 1975-1984. He reports that there is a tendency for firms with high adjusted
initial returns to have the worst aftermarket performance. The tendency is stronger for
smaller issues than for large issues. Besides, Ritter's study also indicates that the
underperformance of IPOs extends beyond the first year of trading. Loughran and
Ritter (1995) document the significant downward drift of IPO firms in the US three to
five years subsequent to the offerings, and find that the poor stock performance
extends to five years after issue, with no further underperformance in the sixth year,
using a sample of 4,753 US companies going public betweenl970 and 1990.
Various studies with international data generally suggest that the long-run
underperformance of IPOs is a global phenomenon. Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996)
report a three-year abnormal return of -46.5 percent for Australian IPOs during
1976-89 periods. Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez (1993) find that the IPOs in Brazil
and Chile underperformed a benchmark by 47 percent and 24 percent, respectively, by
the end of three years after issue. Keloharju (1993) for Finland, Levis (1993) for the
UK, and Ljungqvist (1994) for Germany report average market-adjusted losses of 47.0
percent, 8.1 percent, 21.1 percent, and 8.6 percent, respectively, by the third year
anniversary of their first trade.
There have been several hypotheses proposed to explain the phenomenon of the
long-run underperformance of IPOs.
2.2.3.1 The Divergence of Opinion Hypothesis
Miller (1977) advances the divergence opinion to explain the sources of long-run
underperformance. He assumes that there are constraints on shorting IPOs, and the
investors have heterogeneous expectations about the valuation of a firm due to a great
deal of uncertainty and incomplete information. Investors are divided into two groups,
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one is investors who are optimistic about future prospects of the IPO firm, and the
other being pessimistic investors. There will be a range of different firms' valuations
given by optimistic investors and pessimistic investors. Since new shares will tend to
be purchased by optimistic investors, the price of shares will be higher. As time goes
on and more information becomes available, the variance of opinions between
optimistic investors and pessimistic investors will decrease, and then the market price
will drop. Thus, Miller (1977) predicts that IPOs will underperform in the long run.
Jain and Kini (1994) provide evidence that there is a substantial decline in post-issue
due to asymmetric information existing, the evidence shows that the managerial
ownership retention is positive related to post-IPO operating performance, but there is
no evidence to show that underpricing is a signal of quality. They also document the
post-IPO performance relative to the pro-IPO performance. They provide evidence to
show that high pro-IPO performance level may lead investors to develop optimistic
assessments of earning growth for the IPO firms, despite an increase in sale and
capital expenditures. They also address the issue that managers attempt to
window-dress their accounting figures prior to going public, which leads to pro-IPO
performance being overstated; post-IPO performance being understated. I heir
evidence strongly supports the Miller (1977) hypothesis.
Chahine (2004) provides analysts' optimistic forecast hypothesis to long-run
underperformance. While there is asymmetric information between firms,
underwriters, and investors, the analysts" forecasts tend to systematically exceed the
actual earning figure. Firms go public when their performance is very strong and, thus
overoptimistic forecasts of them become more Irequent which will bring up more
optimistic investors, thereby the price of shares will go up and up. Disclosure ol more
information about the weaker luture earnings would lead to an earning lorecast
adjustment, which will calm optimistic investors' nerves to the pricc ol shares
correction. They argue that the post-IPO performance is relative to earning lorecast
revisions.
2.2.3.2 The Impresario Hypothesis
Shiller (1990) presents the impresario hypothesis to explain the underperformance of
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IPOs. In the hypothesis, he argues that the market is subject to fad. The investment
bankers act as the "impresario" promoting new issues. The investment banks
underprice the new shares to create the appearance of excess demand for attracting
investors. Comparing the Miller (1977) model, Shiller's hypothesis predicates that
underpricing of IPOs is negatively related to underperformance, which is supported by
Ritter (1991).
Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) analyse initial and long-run returns for all Singapore
IPOs made from July 1, 1973 to December 31, 1992. Initial returns which were found
to be around 30 percent are positively related to the level of oversubscription and
retained ownership. The long-run returns for Singapore IPOs are not abnormally poor
and not related to initial "underpricing". They further investigate the high
oversubscription which is a peculiar feature of the Singapore IPOs market and are not
associated with a "speculative bubble" or "fad" explanation. They argue that high
oversubscription is better described as demand expansion by informed investors.
2.2.3.3 The Windows of Opportunity Hypothesis
Ritter (1991) reports that long-run underperformance exists in the US market by
testing a sample of 1,526 IPOs which are listed on Amex-NYSE and NASDAQ from
1975 to 1984. The level of underperformance varies from year to year. Younger firms
and firms going public in the "hot issue" period have more serious underperformance.
There are two explanations provided by Ritter (1991). For investors, they are
overoptimistic about the earning potential of young firms whereas for issuers, firms
take advantage of "windows of opportunity", which is supported by Loughran and
Ritter (1995), Jong-Hwan Yi (2001) and Cai and Wei (1997). The "Windows of
Opportunity" hypothesis predicts that there will be low long-run returns on conducting
IPOs and on firms conducting seasoned equity offerings.
Loughran and Ritter (1995) examine a sample of 4,753 firms going public in the US
during 1970 to 1990 to address whether the poor subsequent performance is merely a
manifestation of long-run return reversals. They also document that the degree of
underperfomance to issuing firms varies over time. Firms do not underperform when
firms issue shares during a quiet period when there is little issuing activity, whereas
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firms underperform when they sell shares during a high-volume period. Their
evidence is consistent with a market where firms take advantage of transitory
windows of opportunity by issuing equity when, on average, they are substantially
overvalued.
Cai and Wei (1997) examine a sample of 180 IPOs listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange during 1971 to 1992 period, finding the post-issue operating perform poor.
The post-issue ownership concentration has been lowered significantly due to the
ownership structure of Japanese firms held high by financial institutions. In Japanese
IPOs, important evidence shows that managers take advantage of "windows of
opportunity" to issue new shares when the cost of capital is low, which strongly
supports Loughran and Ritter (1995) and Ritter (1991).
Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998) take into account the accounting factor to document
that the negative relationship between discretionary current accruals and subsequent
return is common to all firms during the 1976 to 1999 test period. The hypothesis is
that investors naively extrapolate pre-issue earnings, and ignore relevant information
contained in pre-issue discretionary current accruals. In this interpretation, an
informational imperfect market is too optimistic when a seasoned equity issue is
offered and later on becomes disappointed when the high earnings cannot be
sustained.
Yi (2001) finds IPO firms going public with negative earnings have statistically,
significantly negative abnormal mean returns, which may be caused by the investors
who may have been too optimistic about future prospects of these IPO firms. The
finding in this study is consistent with Ritter's finding (1991).
Kutsuna, Okamura and Cowling (2002) examine the relationship between the
ownership structure pre and post-IPOs, and the operating performance of the Japanese
OTC market (JASDAQ) companies by using data of 247 JASDAQ companies. Their
empirical results show that the top 10 shareholders decrease their stakes after IPO, but
the ownership is still concentrated. Banks increase their stakes after the offering. On
the relationship between ownership structure and operating performance, their
empirical results support the view that the post-IPO deterioration in operating
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performance is partly attributable to the reduced managerial ownership, which
contrasts with Cai and Wei (1997). They also argue that market capitalisation is
positively related to pre-IPO operating performance while the size and the firm's age
is negatively related. Their regression analysis shows that poor operating performance
before and after IPO is associated with large and established companies.
Kooli and Suret (2004) empirically investigate Canadian IPOs to provide an out of
sample evidence of the long-run performance of IPOs. They test the performance for
up to 5 years after listing over 445 Canadian IPOs from 1991 to 1998. Firstly, they
find that the average initial return on the first trading day is 20.57 percent. Secondly,
the sample underperforms in the long run. The observed pattern is not always
statistically significant, and depends on the methodology used and on the weighting
schemes. When the performance is measured by the value-weighted cumulative
abnormal returns, the empirical result shows that Canadian IPOs underperform
significantly after the first 5 years; when the performance is measured by
buy-and-hold abnormal returns, the empirical result is no longer statistically
significant. The interpretations of IPOs underperformance are explored in their study.
The divergence of opinions hypothesis does not apply in explaining the altermarket
performance of Canadian IPOs, but the fads hypothesis can be used to explain the
long-run behaviour of large IPOs.
Ritter and Welch (2002) put forward that "Long-run performance may be the most
controversial area of IPO research, with some researchers lining up behind an efficient
markets point of view and others lining up behind a behavioural point of view". Eckbo
and Norli (2005) propound that this long-run return evidence challenges the efficient
markets hypotheses and motivates the development of behavioural asset pricing
models. To some researchers, for instance, Loughran and Ritter (2000), and Wu and
Kwok (2007), have started to use the capital asset pricing model and Fama-French
three-factor model to investigate the long-run performance in stock market and
examine the efficient markets hypotheses.
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2.3 The Capital Asset Pricing Model and Fama-French Three-factor Model
When investing in the stoek market, the top priority for investors is to get expected
returns and risks balanced. Although it is a common perception that there is a positive
relationship between expected return and risk - for instance, risky investment will
generally yield higher returns than investments free of risk - it was only with the
development of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) that the trade-off between
risk and expected return could be quantified. Markowitz (1959) creatively casts the
investor's portfolio selection problem in terms of expected return and variance of
return and he further argues that investors would optimally hold a mean-variance
efficient portfolio; that is, a portfolio with the highest expected return for a given level
of variance. Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin (1966) independently
developed the standard form of the capital asset pricing model, which is often referred
to as the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin model or the standard CAPM. The standard CAPM
yields the following expression for the equilibrium expected returns, E(Ri), on asset i:
E ( R , )= R f + [ E ( Rm ) - R f ] / 3 , ( I )
where Rf is the riskless rate of interest; E(Rm) is the expected return on the market
portfolio of all assets; and /i, = co v(R,, Rm )/S?rm) the co-variance between the return
on asset i and the market return divided by the variance ol the market return, is the
measure of systematic risk of asset i.
The main implications could be expressed as lollows:
1) CAPM relates the expected return for any asset with the risk for that asset as
measured by beta.
2) p, the slope in the regression of an asset's return on the market, is the only risk that
affects expected return, namely, sullices to explain expected return. When this
proposition holds, then
3) There is a positive price of risk in the capital markets. [E(Rm) - Rf], the market risk
premium in terms of excess returns, is positive.
Put differently, the essence of CAPM is that the expected return on any asset is a
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positive linear function of its beta and that beta is the only measure of risk needed to
explain the cross-section of expected returns.
The development of the CAPM can be regarded as a revolution in the field of finance.
There is, of course, a huge amount of literature to examine if the CAPM is valid since
the CAPM was developed.
2.3.1 The Relationship between Returns and Beta
The early empirical tests focusing on the relationship between return and the beta
confirm the CAPM's prediction that the higher the risk, the higher the return such as
the empirical findings of Fama and MacBeth (1973). But with the process of testing
the CAPM, several anomalies in terms of firm characteristics such as the
price-earnings-ratio and size emerged, challenging the CAPM's argument that the beta
is sufficient to describe the cross-section expected. That is to say, these firm
characteristics might also have an explanatory power for the cross section of the
expected returns beyond the beta of the CAPM.
2.3.2 The Relationship between Returns and Price-earning Ratio
The price-earnings-ratio effect was first documented in the academic literature by
Basu in 1977. Basu (1977) describes it as such a phenomenon: firms with low
price-earnings-ratio have higher expected returns, and firms with high
price-earnings-ratio have lower expected returns.
2.3.3 The Relationship between Returns and Size of Market
Banz (1981) first documents the size effect, which refers to low market capitalisation
firms having higher expected returns and vice versa. Banz (1981) finds that market
capitalisation (a stock's price times shares outstanding) adds to the explanation of the
cross-section of average returns provided by market @s. Average returns on small
(low market capitalisation) are too high given their @ estimates, and average returns
on large stocks are too high.
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2.3.4 The Relationship between Returns, Beta, Size, P/E Ratio, and Book-to-market
Besides, Fama and French (1992) have found stronger evidence to cast doubt on the
CAPM's implication that the beta is sufficient to describe the expected returns. Fama
and French (1992) look closely at the relationship between expected return and the
beta in a large cross-section of equities, testing the joint roles of market beta, size,
earnings-price ratio and book-to-market equity in the cross-section of average returns
on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. Their findings are: beta does not seem to
help explain the cross-section of average stock returns, and the combination of size
and book-to-market equity seems to absorb the roles of earnings-price ratio in average
stock returns. Put differently, they explain the cross-section of average stock returns
not by beta defined in the CAPM, but rather by two other factors, the size and the
book-to-market equity. When these two factors are taken into account, beta adds
nothing to the explanation.
2.3.5 Fama and French Three-factor Model
Fama and French (1992,1993) find that beta cannot explain the difference in return
between portfolios formed on the basis of the ratio of the book value of equity to the
market value of equity. Fama and French (1993) then invent a famous three-factor
model, arguing that many of the CAPM average-return anomalies can be captured by
this model. They start with the observation that two classes of stocks have tended to
do better than the market as a whole: one being stocks with small size, that is to say,
small market capitalisation; the other is stocks with a high book-to-market ratio
(customarily called "value" stocks: their opposites are called "growth" stocks). They
then add two factors to CAPM to reflect a portfolio's exposure to these two classes
and finally form their famous three-factor model, which is called the Fama and french
Three-factor Model, the FF3FM hereafter. The model says that the expected return on
a portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate ^ /-^is explained by the sensitivity of its
return to three factors: (i) the excess return on a broad market portfolio ^; (ii)
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the difterence between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a
portfolio of large stocks (SMB, small minus big); and (iii) the difference between the
return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of
low-book-to-market stocks (HML, high minus low). In other words, SMB is meant to
mimic the risk factor in returns related to size. HML is meant to mimic the risk factor
in returns related to value (that is book-to-market ratios). Specifically, the expected
excess return on portfolio 1 is,
E ( R l ) - R f = b l [ E ( R m ) - R f ]+ s l E { S M B )+ h i E ( H M L )
b s /?
where ', ' and ', are the factor sensitivities or loadings.
Fama and French (1996) use this three-factor model to examine the simple monthly
percent excess returns on 25 portfolios formed on size and BE/ME and listed on
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ during July 1963 to December 1993. The results show
octhat coefficient ' is (i) negative for portfolios located in the extreme quartiles of the
stocks of small capitalisation and low ratio book to market and (ii) positive for
portfolios located in the extreme quartiles of the stocks of big capitalisations and high
book to market ratio. In addition to these results on the extremes, the coefficient is not
significantly different from zero; which makes it possible to affirm that the
three-factor model explains cross-section stock returns. Their results are consistent
with their assumption that the anomalies largely disappear in the three-factor model.
Many of the recent studies on long-run return suggest market inefficiency, specifically,
long-run under-reaction or over-reaction to information. Fama (1998) gives the
suggestion a solid no. He addresses the issue that the evidence does not suggest that
market efficiency should be abandoned. Market efficiency survives from the challenge
of the studies on long-run return anomalies, and the anomalies are chance results. The
most important is that long-run return anomalies are fragile and they may disappear by
a reasonable change in the method of measurement.
Lewllen (1999) examines the time-series relationships among expected return, risk,
and book-to-market (B/M) at the portfolio level. Lewellen (1999) finds some evidence
that an industry's book-to-market ratio predicts changes in its expected return, but the
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high variance of monthly returns reduces the precision of the estimates. Further, B/M
is strongly relative to changes in risk, as measured by the Fama and French (1993)
three-factor model. After controlling for changes in risk, B/M just contains little
additional information about expected return. Finally, the evidence shows that the
three-factor model explains time-varying expected returns better than a
characteristic-based model.
Loughran and Ritter (2000) employ the Fama and French three-factor model to
re-examine the long-run underperformance of IPOs with logical arguments,
simulations and sensitivity tests. Firstly, they argue that the magnitude of abnormal
returns depend on the methodology used and on the weighting schemes confirmed by
Kooli and Suret (2004). In their simulations, there are more severe mis-valuations
among small firms and in high-volume periods. When the Fama and French
three-factor model is used with value-weighted portfolios, only about half of the
abnormal returns are captured. In their sensitivity tests, they re-examine the
underperformance of firms conducting IPOs and seasoned equity offerings, the
empirical analysis shows that after purging the factors of new issues, the new issues
reliably underperform on both an equally weighted and a value-weighted basis. This
underperformance is more severe in high-volume periods than in low-volume periods.
Once size and book-to-market effects are accounted for, IPOs appear to underperform
only in a high-volume period. 3 Consistent with the windows of opportunity
framework, the underperformance of SEOs is more severe following high-volume
markets.
Wu and Kwok (2007) provide an empirical investigation of the long-run performance
of global IPOs by employing a comprehensive sample of IPOs made by the United
States industrial companies between 1986 and 1997 to examine the window of
opportunity hypothesis. They compute the buy-and-hold abnormal returns and
cumulative abnormal returns up to three years after issuing and adopt the
3 The studies on FF3FM are continuing. Some scholars are trying to improve this model. Ferguson
and Shockley (2003) provide a theoretical rationale for the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model.
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Fama-French factor model to overcome cross-correlations of event-firm abnormal
returns. Based on the Fama-French factor model regression results of calendar
monthly portfolio returns, global IPOs firms not only underperform in the market but
also underperform in relation to their domestic counterparts in the three year after
issuance. Within the global sample, issues with a larger global tranche are more prone
to long-run return shortfall than others. In fact, the overall results show that global
IPOs underperformance is primarily driven by those with a large global tranche. The
results are consistent with the window of opportunity hypothesis.
2.4 Chinese Scholars' Studies on IPOs and CAPM
The anomalies associated with the process of initial public offerings are common
phenomena both in the developed stock market and emerging stock market, although
the degree of these anomalies varies from country to country. These anomalies have
attracted lots of researchers' attention. China's stock market is new, but it also faces
these anomalies. Chinese scholars are examining the anomalies and relevant
hypotheses in China's stock market and trying to look for more suitable explanations
for these anomalies using methodologies widely used in the literature.
Su (1998), joint with Fleisher, might take a lead in exploring the IPO underpricing
phenomenon in China's stock market using the IPO underpricing theories. Su and
Fleisher (1999) examine several hypotheses on the cross-sectional underpricing of
initial public offerings in China's stock market, using data from 308 firm-commitment
Chinese IPOs from January 1, 1987 through December 31, 1995. Their empirical
study shows that the signalling hypothesis can be used to explain the underpricing
rather well, and various lottery mechanisms for allocation of IPO shares exacerbate
underpricing. They also find that the differences between Chinese A-share and
B-share are mainly due to differences in investors' opinion and opportunity. Chinese
scholars started their IPOs long-run underperformance research in 1999. Mok and Hui
(1998) argue that A-share IPOs underpricing level in Shanghai stock market is far
higher than findings in other stock markets, and explore the issue that the so-called
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long-run underperformance exists in A-share and B-share stock markets in Shanghai
by testing the speculative bubble hypothesis. In their empirical study, the pattern of
the cumulative average excess market return (MACR) is used to test the implication of
speculative bubble hypothesis which is that large initial positive excess returns would
be followed by large negative excess returns. The results from testing are that on the
first few trading days, the MACR of different sub-samples of IPOs were negative; the
MACR of the 60 underpriced A-share IPOs was negative for the first 75 trading days,
and then fluctuated within a narrow band of a few percent above the market return for
the rest of the 350-day holding period; the MACR of B-share IPOs remained positive
until the end of 350 trading days but it peaked at about 18 percent at 154 days, and
then declined slowly towards the market return. In 1997, Chinese scholars, Liu Bo and
Zhao Xiaoping 1997, took the lead in using the standard CAPM to do an empirical
analysis on the relationship between returns and beta in China's stock market. It is
quite understandable that their findings cannot point to a clear relationship between
returns and beta due to the primitiveness of China's stock market. To the best of
knowledge, using Fama and French three factor model (FF3FM) on China's stock
market is still rare.
Chan, Wang and Wei (2004) study the underpricing and the long-run performance of
A-share and B-share IPOs issued in China during the 1993 to 1998 period. Firstly,
they find that the average underpricing for A-share and B-share IPOs are 178 percent
and 11.6 percent, respectively. The underpricing of A-share is positively related to the
period between the offering and the listing and the number of investors in the province
from which the IPO comes, and negatively related to the number of shares issued.
Secondly, they find A-share IPOs slightly underperform their non-IPO benchmarks
with wealth relatives, while B-share IPOs outperform their non-IPO benchmarks with
wealth relatives, which suggests that stock price performance is not purely driven by
speculation, but is a reflection of a firm's operating performance.
Chen, Firth and Kim (2004) investigate the pricing of IPOs of A-share and B-share,
using data of 701 A-share IPOs and 117 B-share IPOs listed from 1992 to 1997. The
empirical work shows that the degree of A-share underpricing is 145 percent while the
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degree ot B-share underpricing is 10 percent, and the risk is strongly and positively
associated with the underpricng of A-share. They also argue that B-share underpricing
is positively related to seasoned equity otterings (SEOs) and government ownership.
The results from the cross-sectional model show that the underpricing is a positive
relative with price-to-book ratio and P/E ratio.
Su (2004) investigates the relationship between underpricing of IPOs and pre-IPOs
information asymmetry in China's stock market by using data from 587 IPOs between
January 1994 and December 1999. He finds that the underpricing is correlated to the
size of offerings, insider ownership, market conditions and IPOs allocation
mechanism. He argues that underpricing can be explained as a signal of a firm's value
to a degree. His empirical results, to a great extent, are consistent with the "winner's
curse" and signalling hypotheses.
Yu and Tse (2006) examine the degree of underpricing of IPOs for 343 online
fixed-price offerings from November 1995 to December 1998. The initial return is on
average 123.59 percent. Their results suggest that ex ante uncertainty has a very high
explanatory power in explaining the Chinese IPOs underpricing, Winner's Curse
Hypothesis exist in the Chinese IPO market, but the Signalling Hypothesis does not
hold in the China's stock market, which is in contrast to the findings of Su and
Fleisher (1999). Wang (2005) tests changes in operating performance of Chinese listed
companies around their IPOs during 1994 to 1999. He argues that there is a sharp
decline in post-issue operating performance measured by return on assets, operating
income to assets and sales to assets, and legal person ownership or concentration of
non-state ownership is associated with performance changes, whereas state and
individual ownerships play no role in the performance of IPO lirms. Moreover, firms
with low or high levels of legal person ownership (concentration of non-state
ownership) have positive relationships between ownership and performance changes,
while firms with intermediate levels of legal person ownership (concentration of
non-state ownership) have negative relationships between ownership and performance
changes. Chi and Padgett (2005) employ cross-sectional analysis to study the
short-run performance of Chinese initial public offerings, using data on 668 new
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issues on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Hxchanges from January 1, 1996 to
December 31, 2000. 1he empirical analysis shows that the average underpricing of
Chinese IPOs is 12c).l6 percent. They find that IPC) underpricing is primarily
explained by the high demand caused by the quota system and the high proportion of
uninformed individual investors. Information asymmetry hypothesis is supported by
estimating results while the signalling hypothesis does not. This is in contrast lo the
findings of Su and Fleisher (l1)1)1)) and consistent with the finding of Yu and Tse
(2006).
Since then more Chinese scholars have started similar studies in this area, but
generally speaking, the relevant studies of China's stock market are under-researched.
There is a long way for Chinese scholars to intensify their es and hence
contribute to the literature by examining the hitherto unexplored matter ol the
investment performance of China's stock market inc both the primary stock
market and secondary stock market. The systematic research applying the latest
theories of IPO underpricing, IPO underperformance, CAPM testing as well as
Farm-French three-factor model testing with China's stock market are rather important
and timely.
•ii
Chapter 3
China's Stock Market: Establishment and Development
3.1 A Brief Review of China 's Stock Market Development
There had been no such things as "stock market" and "capital market" in the Chinese
financial vocabulary since the takeover of power by the Communist Party in 1949
until the beginning of the 1980s when the construction of the stock market was
initiated in order to deepen Chinese economic reform.
Because of ideological reasons or theoretical confusion, Chinese policy-makers used
to take it for granted that stocks clash with socialist theories mandating the state's
public ownership of production facilities; hence the development of a stock market is
a restoration of capitalism and the stock market should not be allowed to emerge in
socialist China. But with the increasing need to reduce state subsidies and make
enterprises more efficient and competitive, China first began to accept the concept of
developing a shareholding system, and then proceeded to develop China's stock
market. This decision raised ideological issues concerning the ownership structure of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), profit making, and the balance between socialist and
capitalist principles and institutional behaviour. Facing this great pressure of
opposition to the development of a stock market, China cautiously launched its stock
market experiment after intense debate again and again. In practice, the first step was
to build up several regional stock markets in selected cities and their operations were
administered by local government. The experiment of issuing stocks started first with
small private or collective enterprises. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) did not take the
initiative because they had to avoid being involved in a politically sensitive area.
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3.1.1 Two Stock Exchanges
By 1990, while the regional stock markets achieved considerable success, the central
government found it difficult to monitor and control share issuance and trading. Then,
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) were
established on the 26th of November 1990 and the 1st of July 1991 respectively. The
establishment of two stock exchanges provided national issuance and trading markets,
subject to central government regulation and administration, where national economic
objectives and considerations would be the basis for development.
From the beginning, both exchanges were organized as non-profit and self-regulatory
organisations with the membership system. The number of members in both
exchanges increased very fast. SSE had 171 members and SZSE had 177 members in
1992. In 1993, the total number of members in both exchanges more than doubled to
907 members, SSE had 481 members and SZSE had 426 members. 1 At end of 2006,
the number of members in SSE was 153 and SZSE had 176. 2 SSE and SZSE adopted
the paperless trading system, a centralised clearing and completely
automatic-matching system. A nationwide computerised quotation system linking
regional trading centres and securities firms by satellite was launched in 1992. The
quotation system is called the National Securities Trading Automated Quotation
System (STAQS). 3 The establishment of two national exchanges marked a new era
for China's stock market development. It made it possible for stock transactions to be
conducted on a much more professional basis and to rule out the possibilities of black
market trading. In many respects, the nature and operation of SSE and SZSE are
similar, so the following detailed account of SSE will apply to SZSE as well.
1 Source: http://www.sse.com.cn/sseportal/webapp/datapresent/queryyearlytrade7prodType-9
http://www.sse.org.cn/main/marketdata/wbw/marketstat/
2 Source: http://www.sse.com.cn/ps/zhs/yjcb/ybtj/sse_stat_monthly_200612pdf.
http://www.sse.org.cn/main/images/2006/12/30/989688926837.html.
3 Source: Zhongguo Jinrong Zhanwang 1992 (China Financial Outlook 1992), the People s Bank of
China (1992).
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3.1.2 Two Regulatory Organizations
More importantly, in 1992, a two-tier regulatory structure was established. The first
level is the State Council Securities Commission (SCSC) affiliated to the State
Council of China, while the second is the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) 4 Since then, the People's Bank of China (PBOC) gradually delegated its
regulatory and administrative jurisdiction powers over security industry to the SCSC
and the CSRC. The SCSC, the decision-making body, was made responsible for
formulating unified acts, policies and regulations about stock market and
co-coordinating two stock exchanges. It reports to the State Council of China, the
ultimate governing body of China's stock market. 5 The CSRC, as an authorised
executive body of the SCSC, is in charge of supervising the activities of the stock
markets and imposing penalties according to the laws. 6 In April 1998, according to
the State Council Reform Plan, the SCSC and the CSRC merged together into a large
commission that retained the name of the CSRC directly under State Council. The
power and functions have been strengthened following the reform. A centralised
security supervisory system was thus established.
3.1.3 Two Stock Markets
Before 1992, China's stock market was a domestic market. Shares named A shares
were available only to Chinese investors and were traded only in its own currency,
Renminbi (RMB). Since 1949, China has been in short supply of foreign exchange
capital for a long time. In order to raise foreign funds and avoid weakening foreign
exchange control, China set up special kinds of shares, B shares lor foreign investors
in 1992. Relative to A shares that are available only to domestic investors, B shares
are common shares issued by Chinese enterprises especially lor foreign investors
(including those from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan) in terms ol foreign exchange.
B shares in terms of US dollars are listed in SSE and B shares in terms of HK dollars
4 See Gazette of the PRC State Council No. 1414 (1992).
5 See CSRC Charter, supra note 8, Art 1.
6 Also see CSRC Charter, supra 26, Art 2.
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are listed in SZSE. The Shanghai Vacuum Electronic Component Cell Co., Ltd. issued
China's first B share in November 1991 and other enterprises quickly followed. When
the B share of Shanghai Vacuum Electron Co., Ltd. was listed in the SSE on Feb 21st,
1992, China's B share market began to operate. 7 Since then, there have been two
parallel markets, one for domestic investors and the other for foreign investors. In
1990s, China's stock market had taken shape. China's stock market grew rapidly in
aggregate scale and market function and began to open to the world. More and more
SOEs were encouraged to go public and list on China's stock market.
The A-share market started to become quite active in the early 1990s after years of
preparing and warming up during the late 1980s. By 1993, the A-share market
including primary market and secondary market has achieved the highest level. Tables
3-1 and 3-2 show that there were 177 A shares listed in both SSE and SZSE compared
to 14 A shares listed in 1991; the total volume of issuing has risen to 42.59 billion
shares from 5 billion shares in 1991 and total raised capital has soared to 194.83
billion RMB Yuan from 5 billion RMB Yuan in 1991. The expanding scale of the
A-share market still could not meet the demand of investors, stock prices rose quickly.
Table 3-3 shows that stock prices in both SSE and SZSE reached the highest level in
1993, SSE composite index soared to 1558.95 while SZSE composite index reached to
359.44.
Compared to the development of the A-share market, the B-share market was small
and less active. By the end of 1993, the B-share market had slightly improved.. In
tables 3-1 and 3-2, total listed B-share increased to 41 from 18 listed in 1992. The
volume of issuing totalled 12.79 billion shares compared to 10.75 billion shares in
1992. Unfortunately, the total raised capital has been slightly reduced from 44.09
billion RMB Yuan in 1992 to 38.13 billion RMB Yuan in 1993.
A principal reason that China's stock market achieved great success by 1993 was a
shift of balance in the ideological debates in China. At the 14 l Chinese Communist
Party Congress in November 1992, the Chinese government officially made it clear
7 Source: Zhongguo Jinrong Zhanwang 1993 (China Financial Outlook 1993), The People s Bank of
China, Beijing, China.
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that China would develop a "socialist market economy'' that let market forces serve as
a basic means ot regulating the flow of resources and gave a credible commitment to
continuing the policy in the future. 8 In part the commitment to such a model, with
stock markets having a major role, was the fact that the Chinese government had to
adopt a realistic way to revitalize the state-owned enterprises. That shift in the
ideological debate was, in one sense, the true impetus for the great expansion of
China's stock market, particularly the primary stock market. China's stock market
acted as a vehicle to convert socialist planned economy to a market economy.
China's stock market dropped dramatically since the late 1993, then experienced more
than two years stagnation and recovered after early 1996. Since 1996, the government
expanded the scale of stock issuance so as to meet the capital demand of the large- and
medium-sized state-owned enterprises. Since then, a great number of key state-owned
enterprises, especially enterprises related to the strategic and pillar industries began to
issue their own stocks.
3.1.4 Share Structures in China's stock market
Before looking at the further development of China's stock market, it is time for us to
introduce a unique feature about share structure in China's stock market. Shares in
China's stock market, in addition to its universal classification as common share,
preference share, etc, is also defined by the status and identities of investors. Since
China's stock market emerged in the middle of 1980s, Chinese shareholding
companies have issued different shares to different shareholders. Roughly speaking,
shares in China's stock market are categorised into five different types based on the
identities of investors. They are state shares, legal person shares, employee shares,
individual shares, and foreign capital shares (Chan, Wang and Wei, 2004).
State shares refer to shares held by governmental agencies or authorised institutions
on behalf of the state. According to Company Law, Security Law and relevant
regulations, it shall include: (1) the shares converted from the net assets ol SOEs
8 See JingJi RiBao, "Zhonggong Shisi Jie San Zhong Quan Hui Gong Bao (Communique of the 14lh
CPC Third Plenum)", Nov. 15 1992, PI.
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which have been transformed into joint stock companies. (2) Shares initially issued by
companies and purchased by governmental departments investing on behalf of the
state. (3) the shares originally issued by companies and purchased by the investment
companies, assets management companies, and economic entity companies authorised
to make investment on behalf of the state. 9
Legal person shares are the shares obtained by a company or institution with a legal
person status. The legal person shares can be indirectly held by the states if the
shareholders are state-owned companies. 10 Basically, legal person shares include
state-owned legal person shares, collective enterprise legal person shares, private
enterprise legal person shares, foreign invested enterprise and institutional legal
person shares.
Employee shares refer to shares held by corporate employees. Employee shares
account for only a small part of the total issuance. According to provision regulations
concerning share issuance and trading, the employee shares cannot be traded until six
months after the initial public offering has been listed on the SSE or SZSE, and the
amount of employee shares issued may not exceed ten percent of the total outstanding
shares.
Individual shares are those shares that represent the capital contribution to a
corporation made by an individual Chinese person, whether an individual member of
the public, or an employee of the issuer. 11 Basically, those shares have the full
function born by classic stock and can be freely traded and transferred in domestic
markets.
Foreign capital shares include domestically listed foreign person shares, and
overseas-floated and listed foreign person shares. Domestically listed foreign person
shares are denominated in Chinese currency, and are purchased and sold in a foreign
currency. Likewise, the dividend and other payments on the shares are denominated in
9 See the Provisional Measures on the Regulation of State-Owned Share Rights Issued by Companies
Limited by Share, Art.2
10 See the Provisional Measures on the Regulation of State-Owned Share Rights Issued by Companies
Limited by Share, Art.3.
" See Trial Measures on Shareholding System, supra note 20, Art. 5.
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Chinese currency and paid in a foreign currency. Such foreign person shares must be
listed and traded on a Chinese securities exchange. 12 "Overseas-floated and listed
foreign person shares are shares: issued in registered form by a Chinese company
limited by shares; floated overseas to overseas investors defined to include foreigners
and investors in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan; listed overseas in the form of
shares, depository receipt certificates, or other derivative forms of the shares; and
traded in the overseas public securities trading place. As in the case of the
domestically listed foreign person shares, the overseas-listed foreign person shares are
denominated in Chinese currency and payable in a foreign currency. The dividend and
other payments on the shares are also denominated in Chinese currency and payable in
a foreign currency. 13
Briefly, the state shares, legal person shares, employee shares and individual shares
together are called the A shares. Relative to the A shares, the domestically listed
foreign person shares are called the B shares. As for the overseas-floated and listed
foreign person shares, if they are traded in the Hong Kong stock market, they are
called the H shares. If they are traded in New York stock market, they are called the N
shares. Because the number of shares listed overseas except in Hong Kong is pretty
small, H shares are sometimes referred to as all the shares listed overseas.
It is worth noting that among the A shares, only Chinese individual shares are allowed
to be traded in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In other words, the individual
shares of A-share, B-share, H-share and N-share are also called tradable shares while
the rest of them, the state shares, legal person shares, and employee shares are called
non-tradable shares. The proportion of the tradable A shares to the A shares
outstanding or all shares outstanding is obviously very small; around 60-70% of the A
shares outstanding are not allowed to be traded. 14 Table 3-4 shows that the ratio of
12 See Regulation on Domestically Listed Foreign Person Shares, supra note 68, Arts. 2-4.
13 See Essential Clauses for Articles of Association of Companies Listed Overseas,supra note 92. Art.
3.
14 We would like to add that the proportion of the tradable A shares is getting enlarged because
Chinese policy-makers are fully aware of the limitations of so-called compartmented share structure
and take actions to encourage to change non-tradable shares into tradable.
tradable shares to total shares was around 35 percent. When China shares are divided
into five types of shares, China's stock market is also divided into two submarkets so
that the A-share market is for trading Chinese individual shares and the B-share
market is for trading the B shares, the domestically listed foreign person shares. The
reason why China shares structure are divided in such a way and two submarkets are
set up for the different shares is two-fold: partly because the Chinese government aims
to preserve the dominance of the socialist public ownership in the overall shares
structure and partly because the Chinese government are worried that the frequent
inflows and outflows of foreign funds might destabilise its stock market and foreign
exchange control.
3.1.5 The Development of China's stock market
The development of China's stock remains active, even more active in the 21st
century. The great progress of Chinese A-share stock market is shown in Tables 3-1,
3-2, and 3-3. The number of listed A shares reached 1,060 in 2000 and increased to
1,411 in 2u06; total capital raised through A-share market nearly tripled, from 993.8
billion RMB Yuan in 2000 to 2,459.38 billion RMB Yuan in 2006; total market
capitalization of A shares increased to 88,113.96 billion RMB Yuan in 2006 from
47,456 billion RMB Yuan in 2000; while total turnover of A shares has increased
from 60,279 billion RMB Yuan in 2000 to 89,217.11 billion RMB Yuan in 2006.
Compared to the A-share market, the development of the B-share market was
unsatisfactory. The total volume of issuing of B-share surged to 7.1 billion shares in
2000 from 1.8 billion shares in 1999, and raised capital also increased to 13.94 billion
RMB Yuan in 2000 from 3.79 billion RMB Yuan in 1999, but the volume of issuing
B shares r.nd the raised capital in 2001, 2002, 2005 and 2006 dropped to zero.
Although the B-share market developed over ten years until 2006 and served as the
window for the internationalisation of the Chinese securities market, the market size
was small and played a weaker role in raising funds, compared to other financing
channels. On June 1, 1999, the State Council cut the stamp tax rate of B-share trading
from 0.4 percent to 0.3 percent in order to boost the B-share market. On February 19,
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2001, with the approval of the State Council, the CSRC promulgated the "Notice on
Several Issues Regarding Investment in Domestically Listed Foreign Investment
Shares by Individuals Residence in China", which allowed domestic individual
investors to invest in B shares with their legal foreign exchanges. This decision was
made mainly based on the notable changes that had taken place in the macro situation
of the foreign exchange capital flow in China, except for the reasons we mentioned
above, small market size and the weak function of raising funds. The foreign
exchange deposits of domestic residents have witnessed a rapid growth and most of
these were loaned overseas or used for purchasing bonds by the domestic banks. At
this stage, it is necessary to attract legal foreign exchange capital held by domestic
residents to the B-share market in order to boost the B-share market and support
national economic development. As of the end of December 2006, Tables 3-2 and 3-3
show that there are 109 B shares listed on the market with a total issued capital of
238.34 billion B shares and total market capitalisation of 1,289.93 billion RMB Yuan.
As China's stock market has rapidly grown, the share structure (one third tradable
shares and two thirds non-tradable shares in A-share market) has been a major
counterforce against the development of China's stock market. By the end of 2004,
Table 3-4 shows that the non-tradable shares accounted for 64 percent of the total
shares in China's stock market. The negative impacts of such a share structure are
multi-fold; it distorted the price mechanism, caused resource allocation inefficiency,
failed to synergise the common interest of shareholders for corporate governance of
listed companies and limited the function of the stock market as a mechanism to
evaluate the performance of listed companies; the price discrepancy between
negotiable shares and non-negotiable shares has resulted in unbalanced interests
between tradable shareholders and non-tradable shareholders, etc.
Thus, these disadvantages of share structure call for action for changes. According to
company law and the securities law of PRC, the reform on the share structure of listed
companies which was designed to float the former non-negotiable shares for the
purpose of unloading state-owned shares through the open market and protecting
interests of shareholders, led by state council, was launched in 2005. A pilot
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programme was introduced in late April 2005, and the non-tradable shares reform for
all listed companies has been completed, by and large, by the end of 2006. 15 It is
obvious that the historical hangover which has been afflicting China's stock market
for years has been unshackled.
With China joining the WTO, thereby introducing more competition in all industries
in the PRC, there are more PRC-based finance, telecommunications, energy, logistics
and other companies coming into the stock market. More companies with businesses
all over China will be ready to tap into the stock market. By the end of 2006, as Tables
3-2 and 3-3 show, a total of 1,434 companies were listed in both of SSE and SZSE
with a total issued capital of 12,655.38 billion A shares and B shares; total market
capitalization of A-share and B-share have reached 89,403.89 billion RMB Yuan and
total trading volume of A-share and B-share were 16,145.22 billion shares.
Meanwhile, to comply fully with China's Commitments in joining WTO, China's
stock market is opening wider to the outside world. The CSRC and the People's Bank
of China jointly promulgated "the Interim Administrative Measures of Domestic
Securities Investment by Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII)" which took
effect on December 1, 2002. The QFII scheme aims to perfect the investor structure of
China's stock market by introducing foreign investors into the domestic stock market,
to bring in the investment strategies and philosophies of developed markets, and to
lead to more effective allocation of resources. Since 2002, foreign institutions have
been allowed to invest directly in China's A-share market via QFII scheme, and
foreign companies are also allowed to take over Chinese listed companies. 16 At the
end of 2006, a total of 52 QFII has been licensed following the approval of the first
QFII on May 23, 2003.
15 See "Guidance Notes on the Split Share Structure Reform of Listed Companies issued by the
CSRC, August 23, 2005
16 See "China's Securities and Futures Markets" issued by the CSRC, April 2004, p28-p30.
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3.2 Additional Specifications about IPOs in A-share market
3.2.1 Public Offerings of A-share
The Chinese State Council and the CSRC have made the best efforts to encourage and
standardise IPO activities on the principles of "transparency, fairness, and justice".
The Company law of PRC, the first law that regulated corporations and listed
companies as well as share issues, became effective on July 1, 1994. The Securities
Law of the PRC, that is the first comprehensive national law on securities in China,
came into effect on July 1, 1999. Since then, a comprehensive law framework for
stock issuance, listing and information disclosure has been formed with such
administrative regulations, rules and bylaws based on Company Law and Securities
Law of PRC. According to article 14 of Securities Law, Public Offering Review
Committee (PORC) was also established in September 1999. PORC is composed of
25 members, including 5 CSRC staffs and 20 external experts and is responsible for
making recommendations on stock issuance and listing applications to the CSRC. In
practice, the recommendations by PORC should be accepted by CSRC. Therefore, the
PORC is the de-facto decision-making body for public offering applications. Since the
State Council and the CSRC took a series of important actions in 2001, there is now
more transparency, fairness and justice in the course of stock issuance and listing. The
Exchanges committed priority resources to encourage more listings lrom blue-chip
companies while providing an excellent follow-up service to post-listing companies.
They also made efforts to improve regulations and rules related to IPOs, trying to
create a favourable market environment for new listings.
Currently the process of IPOs in China is quite similar to western practice except lor
the approval procedures of IPOs. In the approval procedures, the issuers must be
under qualified sponsors' guidance for at least a year. After the guidance period, with
the recommendation of sponsors, these companies may submit the application
documents to the CSRC for approval. Then the issuers must disclose information to
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the public if the application has been accepted by the CSRC. Before the CSRC makes
a decision, PORC will first carry out detailed verification and in turn submit their
recommendations to the CSRC. The final decision will be made by the CSRC in
accordance with the comments from PORC. 17 Table 3-5 shows that 70 companies
made IPOs in 2006, raising 1,572.24 RMB Yuan in total.
3.2.2 Significance of Pricing New Share in the Process of IPOs
Initial public offerings are the first step for new shares to float on the stock market. It
will affect resource allocation and in turn significantly influence the whole economy.
Pricing new shares is a critical step in the course of IPOs, because new share price
will influence the efficiency of resource allocation in stock market. Given the offering
cost, low new share prices will reduce the proceeds raised from IPO. On the other
hand, too high IPO prices will discourage the interest of investors, increase offering
cost, and enhance the risk of offering failure, although more funds can be raised. As
far as investors are concerned, an extra profit will be obtained post-market by the
investors who subscribe shares in a primary market given a low offering price. The
pricing efficiency in a primary market means the rationality of IPO pricing, which can
be testified by the divergence of offering price in primary market and market price in
second market after listing. If the closing price on the first listing day is below the
offering price, it signifies overpricing; at the same time, if the condition reverses,
tremendous extra income can be earned on the first dealing day. This implies that the
offering price is undervalued, which is also called underpricing, which is prevalent in
the stock market according to research done by scholars abroad and domestically.
Generally speaking, the price of IPO has a strong relationship with offering modes,
pricing methods and supervision system related to shares issuance and listing, all of
which affect or even decide the IPO price in the primary market, influence the
efficiency of the primary market and in turn makes a crucial impact on the whole
economy.
17 See "China's Securities and Futures Markets" issued by the CSRC, March 2005, P8.
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The development of IPOs ol A-share in China, or put differently, the development of
issuance and listing system in China has made a successful transition from an
administrative approval system to approval system and is making great efforts towards
a register system. At all levels, the features of each stage are directly related to the
general government management capability and stock market development of the
time.
3.3 The Evolution of Stock Issuance and Listing System in China's Stock Market
3.3.1 Administrative Approval System (1993-2000)
The Administrative Approval System for securities issuance and listing was founded
at an early stage in the development of China's stock market which came into being as
the period of economic transition from the planned economic system to the market
economic system. In practice, this Administrative approval system included the
administrative quota control and enterprises recommended by government.
During a long period of time, the aggregate amount of new shares to be listed every
year was determined by the quota. Chan, Wang and Wei (2004) state that under the
quota control, the approval of share issuance and listing involves two stages. At the
first stage, the quota for the following year was set jointly by the State Planning
Committee, the Central Bank and the CSRC in terms of macroeconomic financial
circumstances, development of state-owned enterprise reform and stock market
operation situations. The State Planning Committee implemented the overall balance
of the quota allocation. The quota was then distributed to each province and relevant
ministry that owned key state-owned enterprises. At the second stage, each province
or ministry chose the firms in light of certain criteria that reflected the regional
development needs and differences in industrial and production structure. Within each
regional quota, the local Securities Regulatory Authorities invited enterprises that
wished to go public, and then made a selection based on criteria that combined good
performance as well as sector development objectives. The local Securities Regulatory
Authorities then forwarded the applications of the chosen enterprises to the CSRC for
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final approval, though this was usually a routine matter. However, in practice, the
quota for IPO often went to state-owned enterprises regardless of their performance
and profitability. The merit of this system was the balance mechanism in dealing with
the interests of different provinces and industries, and fitted to the macroeconomic
circumstance and stock market operation situation at the early stage of China's stock
market. Following the further development of China's stock market, more and more
weaknesses in this system were exposed, such as the lacking of transparency and
justice in the process of chosen issuers; inefficient resource allocation; weak
self-discipline conception in the market; imperfect market mechanism etc. Those
weaknesses have shown that the administrative approval system failed to meet the
demands of development of China's stock market.
China first announced plans to scrap the decade-old IPO quota control system in June
1998, but full implementation was delayed because local Securities Authorities were
slow to use up the outstanding quotas allotted to them in previous years following the
onset of the Asian financial crisis in late 1997 which made equity fund raising less
attractive to enterprises. Part of the quotas allotted for 1997 and 1998 remained in the
18hands of the local Securities Authorities and were allocated to enterprises in 2000.
The Administrative approval system including quota control and enterprises
recommended by government was completely abolished in March 2001. 19
3.3.2 Approval System (2001-Now)
3.3.2.1 The Primary Stage of Approval System (2001-2003)
In March 2001, the CSRC, according to the provisions of the Securities Law and with
the approval of the State Council, established and implemented the approval system
for stock issuance and listing. The new system changed the practices of former
administrative approval system for stock issuance and listing.
Compared to the administrative approval system, there were three differences between
18 See "Circular on the questions concerning stock issuing quota of the year 1997 issued by the
CSRC, June 7, 2000.
19 See "the CSRC monthly bulletin white book" issued by the CSRC, 2, 2005.
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them. Firstly, this new system stressed that securities firm acting as the lead
underwriter were responsible for selecting and recommending enterprises for the
approval of the CSRC. In practice, the securities companies should tutor the issuer for
one year before submitting their application documents to the CSRC for approval.
This action reduced the interference of government, especially reducing the impact of
regional protectionism. Secondly, the quota control system stopped completely. The
volume of new share issuance would be determined by the needs of enterprise growth
and market operation situation. Market mechanism started to be respected. Thirdly, the
issuers must disclose information to the public after their application documents were
accepted by the CSRC which was compulsory, and the public offering review
committee took preliminary verification and voted on the issuance applications. Those
measures made the selection of listing firms more transparent and decreased
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. It also helped to ensure that
companies listing on the stock exchanges were of higher quality and investment
funded by the equity financing was more efficient and profitable. The move, from
quota control system to approval system was a significant step towards market
economy. Due to an imperfect market mechanism and the lack of consciousness of
self-discipline under specific application of this new system, some securities
companies defaulted in recommending enterprises. They failed to disclose the hidden
risks during investigation; some profit-hungry underwriters took actions of
falsification with the enterprises to deceive investors and supervisory departments;
some underwriters concentrated on helping the enterprises to be listed on the exchange,
but they ignored the necessity to supervise the operation and growth of enterprises
after being listed. 20 However, to correct the above weaknesses and to further perfect
the new system, the CSRC carried out the Securities Issuance and Listing Sponsor
System in 2004, which was an important action to strengthen stock issuance system
reform.
3.3.2.2 Sponsor System (2004-Now)
The securities issuance and listing sponsor system was officially promulgated on
December 28, 2003 by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)
according to NO. 18 Decree of Chairman of the CSRC, Interim Measures on
20 See "The Target of Reform on Stock Issuance System—speech by Gao XiQing, Vice-Chairman of
CSRC" issued by CSRC, May 14, 2000.
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Securities Issuance and Listing Sponsor System", and was officially put in force on
February 1, 2004. The main aim of the sponsor system was to introduce a market
constraint mechanism in the primary market to deepen IPOs operation in China's
stock market. Under this system, the registration administration system was
established for sponsors. The securities firms which met the requirements set by
CSRC could be registered as official sponsor institutions with CSRC, and the
practitioners of securities companies could be registered as sponsor representatives
after passing the examination set by CSRC. Companies going public should be
"sponsored" by a sponsor institution and a qualified sponsor representative.
Sponsoring could be divided into two stages. The first stage for sponsors was to help
companies to finalise the listing application and go public. The sponsoring process
had not finished after companies were listed. In fact, the second stage for sponsors
was to carry on their continuous supervision for listed companies for more than two
accounting years. This system was intended to intensify the responsibilities of
sponsors, mainly, securities firms, in the process of issuing and listing of securities.
Any misconduct of sponsors would be punished and recorded by the CSRC, which
would be disclosed to the public. In a word, the sponsor system emphasised the duties
and responsibilities of sponsors to assure credibility and accuracy of the information
21disclosed by companies to be listed."
The implementation of the sponsor system further perfected the approval system and
built up a solid foundation for the transition of the stock issuance and listing system
from approval system to registration system.
3.4 The Changes of IPO Pricing and Allocation Mechanism in China's Stock
Market
3.4.1 Major IPOs Pricing and Allocation Methods in the World
The three major pricing and allocation methods in the IPOs process, fixed price public
21 See Decree of Chairman of the CSRC No. 18 "Interim Measures on Securities Issuance and Listing
Sponsor System" issued by the CSRC, December, 28, 2003.
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offering, book building and auction, have been documented in the literature. They
have advantages and disadvantages of their own, so they are adopted in different stock
markets with different environments.
In fixed price public offering, the offering price was decided by negotiations between
underwriters and issuers. Fixed price public offers is a kind of very simple IPO
method with low cost of issuance and usually used in the emerging stock market or
suitable to the small scale of issuance, as Busaba and Chang (2002) and Sherman
(2004) point out that the issuers prefer a fixed price offer because it is cheaper for the
firm to sell its offerings through the fixed price method, and Chowdhry and Sherman
(1996b) explain that in fixed price public offering, information acquired during the
subscription period arrives too late to be used in pricing the offering, so it is better for
small orders to reduce the risk that the offering will fail. This method has become
uncommon in recent years due to its weakness. Under fixed price public offering,
Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) argue that underwriters have no way to give investors
the incentive to accurately report their information. The offering price cannot reflect
the demands of market. As Ritter (2003) put forward, the offering price is set
relatively early by underwriters and issuers before a lot of information about the state
of demand is known. Chemmanur and Liu (2003) also demonstrate how fixed price
public offers do not allow the offering price to reflect the information collected. At the
same time, the underwriters and issuers do not have discretion to allocate the IPO
shares according to their preference which was discussed by Chemmanur and Liu
(2003). They argue that the issuers are allowed to control price but not allowed to
control allotment in fixed price public offers. Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002)
suggests that fixed price public offers lead to inefficient pricing and winner's curse.
This fixed price public offers method was adopted in Singapore, Finland and the UK
before the early 1990 that is supported by Koh and Walter (1989) and Levis (1990).
Sherman (2002) defines that auction method is a "one size fits all" approach.
Underwriters set an amount of issuing share, but do not set offering price. The offering
price and allocation of shares are determined solely by bids and this process from
bidding to listing lasts about one month. Sherman (2004) explains that there are two
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types of auction, one is a discriminatory price auction which is to pay what you bid,
and the other is uniform price auction. Compared to other methods, because of the
quality of investors, the price may be set too high or too low. There is no
communication between issuers and investors; the issuers do not know how many
bidders will choose to participate when making decisions. Levin and Smith (1994)
point out that auctions cause too little or too much evaluation and too much remaining
uncertainty that brings out increasing risks to both issuers and investors. On the other
hand, there is no allocation flexibility in auction method that underwriters cannot
allocate shares by their preference, and issuers just wait to see what happens after
bidding, so auctions sell fewer shares on average. Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002)
sets the mode to analyse that Dutch auctions lead to inefficiencies, to the extent that
they are conducive to tacit collusion by investors. This auction method was used in
Italy, Sweden and the UK in the 1980s and Malaysia, Singapore and Turkey in the
1990s.
Ritter (2003) argues that book building precedes pricing and allotment in IPOs, which
has been the prevailing US IPO distribution method for decades and began to be
adopted in the UK in the early 1990s for privatizations, and is now predominant
throughout Europe and Asia. The principle of this pricing method is that offering price
and quantity of issuance are decided by the demands of investors and other collected
information from the market. At the initial stage of book building, the underwriter sets
an indicative price range on the issuer's behalf, then starts a "road show", which
discloses information regarding an issuer's performance, and invites investors to bid
for a price and an amount of shares. The bids may carry a price limit, such as within
the indicative price range, or have no price limit. Thereafter, the underwriter collects
bids from investors. At the end of the book building process the underwriter, on the
issuer's behalf, fixes a price and allocates the shares according to the underwriter's
preference In the process of book building, two key features have been shown. One is
that the share price is based on the bids from investors, especially qualified
institutional investors and the other is that shares are mainly allocated to institutional
investors.
Book building has become popular and is widely accepted in the US market, the
Japanese market and the UK market because of its three major advantages:
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There is a well communicated channel between issuers and investors in book building,
which reduces the level ot information asymmetry between issuers and investors.
Pre-marketing and road show are very useful ways for investors to collect information
from issuers and for issuers to gain a more accurate issue price from the information
investors given (Sherman 2004);
Allotment flexibility and discretion in book building is useful for the issuer to choose
an optimal structure of shareholders for their company. At the same time, this method
reduces the level of information asymmetry between underwriters and investors. It
also reduces the level of information asymmetry between institutional investors and
individual investors, because individual investors can take a free ride from
institutional investors taking part in the bidding process if they do not have better
knowledge of evaluation;
A very short time lag between price setting and share listing in book building reduces
sale risk for underwriters. In book building, the offering price will not be affected by
the changes of demand from the market because the offering price is based on
investors' demand and finally set just one day before issuing. This method with low
risk is beneficial to investors, issuers and underwriters and is now widely used in most
of the stock markets in the world.
3.4.2 The IPO Pricing and Allocation Mechanism in China's Stock Market
3.4.2.1 1984-1995: Fixed Price Public Offering In the mid 1980s, the capital market
and shares were not popular in China. Share issuing was administratively allocated by
the Chinese Government. Shares were offered at par value even with the guarantee of
minimum yields and the offering price was undervalued. However, at the initial stage
of the establishment of the stock market, a low offering price and high expected return
stimulated the enthusiasm of investors to invest in China's stock market.
In October 1992, the SCSC and CSRC were founded which is a symbol of the
establishment of a unified market supervision system. Under the quota control system,
the quantity of issuance, offering price and P/E ratio were decided by the CSRC. The
CSRC also took charge of the timing of IPOs according to the stock market situation
and capacity (Chi and Padgett, 2005). At that time, the fixed price public offering, a
simple pricing and allocation method, was introduced to China s stock market. But, in
practice, the fixed price public offering was very different from other international
62
stock markets. It was an administrative pricing method. The formula of offering a
price could be described as fixed P/E ratio multiplied by after tax earning per share
that came from issuers 1 annual reports (Chi and Padgett, 2005). In this pricing formula,
underwriters and issuers were not involved in the pricing process because the fixed
P/E ratio was set by the CSRC and hence this offering price could not reflect the
information of demand and supply from China's stock market. At this stage, the
lottery method and online auction method as parts of fixed price public offers in
China's stock market were used to allocate the new shares to Chinese investors. In
1992, shares allocation was based on a lottery mechanism. A fixed number of lottery
forms was issued, such as limited quantity of lottery forms for each individual investor
and fixed quantity of shares per lottery form. The chance of winning for each investor
was unknown in advance. In 1993, the way of limiting the quantity of lottery forms
were abolished and it was replaced by an unlimited number of lottery forms;
individual investors could buy as many lottery forms as they liked, but each investor
was required to put a certain amount of money into a special saving account when
submitting applications for new shares, which could not be withdrawn until the
process of lottery was completely finished. In 1994, online auction, as an experiment,
was also introduced to bid for the price and the quantity of IPOs. Due to the small
scale of the market and imbalance of supply and demand, the experiment failed.
Online auction has only been used to bid for quantity of shares since 1994 (Chan,
Wang and Wei, 2004).
Considering the basic market environment, the quality of investors and the structure of
investors, the fixed price public offering was suitable for China's stock market at its
early stage but, with the development of China's stock market and deepening of
economic reform, its disadvantages became obvious. New share price determined by
the government neglected market mechanism. This pricing method induced the undue
"package" of issuers, brought false accounts and other actions of falsification,
decreased the quality of information disclosure and increased the risks in the operation
of issuers and investors after being listed. In a word, the defects of pricing by the
government became obvious and obstructed the improvement of China s stock market.
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3.4.2.2 1996-1999 Fixed P/E Pricing Method
Before the Security Law came out in 1999, a relative fixed P/E ratio was adopted in
the formula set by CRSC to price new shares. During this period, the formula for
calculating the offering price still consisted of after tax earning per share and P/E ratio.
The P/E ratio was maintained by CSRC from 13 to 16, the upper limit was 16. The
allocation method did not change over this period (Chan, Wang and Wei, 2004).
Under this method, the offering price still could not reflect the relationship between
demand and supply in the stock market, which brought out a huge gap between
offering price and market price. The offering price was underpriced while the market
price in the secondary market could be more than doubled. Investors showed extreme
enthusiasm for the stock market and forgot the increasing investment risk; some
issuers even started to make false profit reports in order to raise more capital.
Considering the fact that the market was dominated by a huge number of individual
investors with only the barest knowledge of capital investment, the CSRC started to
amend the measure of earning per share after tax to reduce the gap between offering
price and market price.
1. In December 1996, the CSRC issued ''Notice Concerning Several Provisions on
Share Issuance", which stipulated that the after tax earning per share would be based
on the arithmetic means of earnings per share in the past three years instead of
expected earning per share. The aim of this amendment was to reduce the possibility
of making a false profit report and improve the quality of information disclosure.
However this amendment ignored the issuer's performance potential in the future.
2. In September 1997, a new notice was issued by CSRC, in which a further correction
on the measure of after tax earning per share was required. The after tax earning per
share was calculated by earning per share after tax one year before issuance and
expected earning after tax per share in the current year. The new formula showed that
consideration had been given to both past profit and expected profit, to some extent,
22
this adjustment made the measure of earning per share much fairer than before.
3. In March, 1998, the CSRC issued "Supplementary Circular Concerning Several
Issues on Share Issuance". It was the third attempt to amend the measure of earning
per share, which was calculated as expected earnings in the current year divided by
weighted shares outstanding in the current year. This new formula actually considered
22 See "Circular on stock issuance of year 1997" issued by the CSRC, September 10, 1997.
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the company's performance in the current year. 23
During this period, the CSRC amended the pricing formula three times, and some
problems were sorted out by the adjustment. Unfortunately, the essence of the
administrative pricing method had not been changed at all. Underwriters and issuers
still had no rights to decide the offering price according to demand and supply of the
market. This administrative pricing method with uniform P/E ratio could not meet the
requirements of a market-oriented stock market. Many weaknesses were explored in
practice, especially the following two.
For one thing, underwriters' capabilities at sale and valuation were not actually
reflected under this method; and investors didn't have the chance to be involved in
pricing IPOs. Even worse, both underwriters and investors found that IPOs could
bring high expected return without risk in China's stock market. On the other hand,
due to the P/E ratio set by the CSRC, the offering price did not reflect any difference
among issuers, and hence it couldn't help investors to distinguish between
out-performing issuers and under-performing issuers. There was no way to reduce the
information asymmetry between issuers and investors. At the same time, under the
quota control system, the issuers didn't have rights to change the scale of issuing IPOs,
and driving up the offering price was the only way to raise extra funds from the stock
market. According to the pricing formula, P/E ratio was fixed by the CSRC, so
earning per share manipulation was the only way to make issuers' dreams come true.
This weakness induced some issuers to make a false profit report, therefore it reduced
the quality of information disclosure in the stock market and hindered the
development of China's stock market.
3.4.2.3 1999-2004: Various Allocation Methods and Book Building Pricing Method
Based on "Security Law" implemented in July 1999, the offering price should be
decided by negotiations between issuers and underwriters, and institutional investors
would also be involved in the pricing process. A new change in the pricing method
came out though the offering price should still have been approved by the CSRC.
During this stage, the determination of offering price was allowed to exceed the
interval of the offering price and also to break through the limitation of P/E ratio set
before by the CSRC.
23 See "Supplementary Circular Concerning Several Issues on Share Issuance" issued by the CSRC,
March 17, 1998.
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On February 22, 1999, "Guidance on Trial Implementation of IPO Pricing Analysis
Report was issued by the CSRC. It required the issuers to submit a pricing analysis
report signed by the issuers and underwriters in the application process. The measures
ol pricing, negotiated ollering price and P/E ratio were required to be described in the
report.
On July 28, 1999, CRSC issued "Circular on Further Perfecting Share Issuance
Methods'". There were three main points. Firstly, a new concept, strategic investors
such as long term institutional investors, was introduced to China's stock market, and
endowed with priority in purchasing IPOs shares. Secondly, the CSRC divided issuers
into two groups according to their total shares outstanding; each group was required to
employ different allocation methods for allocating IPOs shares. For group one, issuers
with total shares outstanding less than 4 billions RMB, were required to apply an
online auction and various lottery methods for allocating IPOs to investors; for group
two, issuers with total shares outstanding over 4 billions RMB, a new method was
provided by the CSRC. Under this new method, about 25-75 percent of total IPOs
shares set by the CSRC was required to be allocated to long term institutional
investors without an online auction, in the meantime, an online auction was also
adopted for allocating IPOs shares to non-institutional investors. Lastly, book building,
as a very popular means of pricing and allocating IPOs in the developed stock market,
was introduced to China, which could be regarded as a significant step for Chinese
IPOs mechanism reform.
On April 4, 2000, the CSRC announced a new notice as a supplement to the "Circular
on Further Perfecting Share Issuance Methods' 1 issued on the 28th of July 1999. In
this new notice, firstly, the limit on issuance methods caused by total share
outstanding was removed by the CSRC. Every issuer, no matter that its total shares
outstanding were less than 4 billions RMB or over 4 billions RMB, could choose any
issue method they want. Secondly, the allocation ratio ranging lrom 25 percent to 75
percent of total IPOs shares for long-term institutional investors was removed by the
CSRC. The CSRC gave more rights to underwriters and issuers to make decisions on
their own in accordance with the market situation and stock liquidity after being
listed 24 .
24 See "Ci rcular on Concerning amending correlative Provisions to the Circular on Further Perfecting
stock Issuance Methods dated on July 28, 1999" issued by CSRC, on April 4, 2000.
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"Notice" dated on July 28, 1999 plus "Amended Notice" dated on April 4, 2000 was
the milestone in the course of Chinese IPOs reform.
1. Issuers, underwriters and institutional investors jointly decide the offering price in
light of the demand and supply from the stock market for the first time, pre-marketing,
"road show' and information disclosure, which could reduce the level of information
asymmetry among investors, underwriters and issuers, and make an offering price in
the primary market much closer to market price in the secondary market.
2. Cultivation and expansion of long-term institutional investors are useful in
improving the structure of investors in China's primary market and assuring the bids
from investors are more real, more veracious and reflect the demand of investors.
On the February 14, 2000, "Circular on Concerning Relative Issues on Placing New
Shares to the Secondary Market Investors" was issued by the CSRC. In the new
"Notice", a preferential allocation method for secondary market investors was
introduced by the CSRC to China's stock market. The new Notice prescribed that a
certain proportion of IPOs shares was allocated to secondary market investors.
Investors with their own tradable shares in the secondary market could purchase
certain amount of IPOs shares. The amount of IPOs shares investors could buy
depended on the market values of A-shares they possessed. They could not place new
shares if their market value was less than 10,000 RMB Yuan. There were three
purposes to the launch of this method. Firstly, compared to the secondary market,
there was expected high return with low risk in the primary market. This method led
the secondary market investors to share expected high returns from the primary
market with primary market investors, and helped to improve investors' interests and
confidence in the secondary market. Secondly, the new method encouraged investors
to keep shares and focus on long-term investment. Lastly, this method tried to
encourage capital inflow from the primary market to the secondary market to stabilise
the secondary market.
On August 21, 2000, "A Guidance Concerning Placing New Shares to Institutional
Investors" was issued by the CSRC. The volume of issuance and the base offering
price were determined by the issuer and the lead underwriter, and asked institutional
investors to take part in a price inquiry. The offering price was finally decided by
institutional investors' subscription. Two points were stressed. Firstly, the priority in
purchasing IPOs shares for institutional investors was adjusted by the CSRC. For the
amount of issuance less than 8 millions shares, underwriters and issuers weren t
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allowed to allocate a certain ratio of IPOs shares to institutional investors; for the
amount ot issuance over 8 millions shares, underwriters and issuers were allowed to
allot a certain ratio within 50 percent total new shares to institutional investors; for the
amount ot issuance over 20 millions shares, underwriters and issuers had the right to
increase the allocation ratio for long-term institutional investors. Secondly, the CSRC
strengthened its management on the qualifications of the institutional investors.
Issuers were required to detail the identities of long-term institutional investors in their
prospectus and each issuer could choose only two long term institutional investors. A
special group was founded by the CSRC to examine and approve the qualifications of
long term institutional investors.
3.4.2.4 2005-present: Price Enquiry System and Book Building
On August 28, 2004, the Amendment of Company Law and Securities Law was
passed by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress. China
introduced a new pricing system for IPOs, also known as an IPOs enquiry system and
which took effect on January 1, 2005. This represented one of the major efforts made
by the CSRC to improve transparency in the pricing process and protect the interest of
investors.
Under the new pricing method, investors had voices in the pricing process. It gave
institutional investors the opportunity to influence major decision in the listed
company they invested in. The issuers are required to disclose more information in
addition to offering price and P/E ratio, such as the issue P/E ratio based on the
earning forecast, price to book ratio, etc. The issuers and their sponsors have to
publish their letter of intent to the public, commence promotion and price inquiry after
their application is approved by the CSRC.
Price inquiry shall be divided into two stages, namely, preliminary price inquiry which
is used to determine the range of offering price and P/E ratio and book-building price
inquiry which is used to make a more rational final offering price. The preliminary
price inquiry must be conducted in writing among at least 20 qualified institutional
investors; (if 400 million shares or more are offered, the number of institutional
investors must exceed 50). The range of the offering price and P/E ration will be
determined according to the result of the preliminary price inquiry. Thereafter, issuers
and their sponsors shall conduct a book-building price inquiry within the range of
offering prices among qualified institutional investors. A final offering price will be
determined by the result of the book-building price inquiry. Finally, the range of
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offering pi ice, the final offering price with the basis of determination, and P/E ratio
shall be lepoited to the CSRC tor records and disclosed to public. As for allocation of
new shares, the allocation preference is towards institutional investors who
participated in the book-building price inquiry. The placing shares shall not exceed 20
percent of the total number of shares offered if less than 400 million shares are offered
to the public; the placing shares shall not exceed 50 percent of the total number of
shares offered if 400 million shares or more are offered to public. In practice, the
issuers and their sponsors have the right to adjust the above ratio in accordance with
the market situation after approval of the CSRC.
This new amendment represents a milestone in the history of China's stock market,
indicating the establishment of a market-oriented IPO pricing system. The enquiry
system helped to improve the efficiency of resource distribution and facilitated healthy
development of China's immature stock market.
It is worth mentioning that since the "Security Law" carried out in 1999, the CSRC
has not given up the lottery method to allocate new shares. It is still applied to most
cases especially in the cases of oversubscription, though many other methods were
introduced, changed and even abolished with the development of China's stock
market.
3.5 Present Status of China's Stock Market
Basically, there are three noticeable status quo in China's stock market.
3.5.1 Small Market Size
At present, China's stock market has already entered a new stage ol development, but
the scale of stock market is not large enough to compare with other stock markets.
In financial literature, generally the level of stock market development is measured by
two indicators which are the size ol the stock market and the liquidity ol the stock
market (Korajczyk, 1996). We use the ratio of market capitalisation divided by gross
domestic product (GDP) to calculate the size of the stock market. Market
capitalisation equals the total value of all listed shares. 1he assumption underlying the
use of this variable, as an indicator ol stock market development, is that the size ol the
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stock market is positively correlated with the ability to mobilise capital and diversify
risk.
Table 3-6 has shown that the size of China's stock market in terms of market
capitalisation relative to GDP is far smaller than that in other stock markets, not to
mention those mature markets such as the United States Market, United Kingdom
market etc, although the ratio of market capitalisation and GDP is increasing. In 2005,
China's market capitalisation-to-GDP ratio was 34.94 percent. Compared to other
emerging markets, at the same time, Singapore and Malaysia were 178.39 percent and
139.06 percent, respectively. India was 68.6 percent 4, and Korea was 91.18 percent.
The indicator of size not only represents the degree of the stock market development,
but also represents the level of country economic development. 25
3.5.2. High Speculation
Another indicator, the liquidity of the stock market, is employed to measure the
degree of the stock market development. This liquidity measure complements the
measure of the stock market size since markets may be large but inactive. Our
measure of liquidity equals the ratio of the total value of trades on the major stock
exchanges divided by market capitalisation and is frequently called the turnover ratio.
The turnover ratio also represents the degree of activity in the stock market.
China's stock market liquidity in terms of the turnover ratio has decreased compared
to when it started, but it is still much higher than other stock markets. As Table 3-7
shows, the total value of tradable shares-to-GDP ratio in China's stock market was the
lowest. It did not increase although the Chinese GDP was raised. This situation was
caused by the special Chinese shareholder structure in whereby 60-70 percent
state-owned shares and legal person owned shares cannot be traded in the stock
market. Compared to the same developing market, at the end of 2004, the ratio of total
value of tradable shares-to-GDP was 38.74 percent India, Malaysia and Singapore
were 54.48 percent, 50.55 percent and 75.64 percent, respectively. At the end of 2005,
25 Source: http://devdata.worldbank.org
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China was 26.24 percent, India, Malaysia and Singapore were 55 percent, 38.27
percent and 102.62 percent, respectively. The fluctuation of Chinese turnover ratio
was sharp compared to other countries. In Table 3-8, during the 14 years, from 1993
to 2006, China's gap between the highest level (329 percent) and lowest level (81.3
percent) of turnover ratio was highest (247.7 percent); India's gap between the highest
and the lowest turnover ratio was 180.9 percent; the gap in Malaysia was 76.8 percent
and the fluctuation of turnover ratio in Singapore's market was the smoothest in the
four countries we discussed above - the gap was a mere 42.4 percent. Superficially, it
seems that the turnover ratio of China's stock market is not abnormal, and the
turnover ratio started to reduce after 2001 while China's stock market was developing
and perfecting. However, if we take into account that approximately 60-70 percent of
shares outstanding is not allowed to be circulated, China's stock market might have an
extremely high turnover ratio of over 300 percent, which could be the highest in the
world. Summing up these measures, it is not very difficult for us to argue that China's
stock market at the moment is small yet highly active compared to other markets. To
some extent, this high activity has turned out to be speculative.
3.5.3 Market Segmentation
A share and B share markets are segmented: price movements in the two markets are
hardly related. The problem of market segmentation is a derivative of the
compartmentalized share structure. At the beginning of experimentation with the
B-share market, there were valid socio-political reasons and macroeconomic
justifications for Chinese policy-makers to separate the A-share market from the
B-share market. Chinese policy-makers did not want to weaken its strict capital
control though they had been fully aware of the importance of foreign funds to
Chinese economic reform. An integration of China's A-share market with B-share
market would demand in effect the immediate realization of full convertibility of the
Chinese currency on the capital account for which macroeconomic conditions in
China were not ripe. More importantly, if the A-share market merged with the B-share
market, it would aggravate the ideological debate on how not to erode public
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ownership in the shareholding system, which has been the most difficult yet unsolved
issue, and the B-share market would perhaps not be allowed to exist. The
disappointing performance of the B-share market stems from its congenital
deficiencies, which are gradually exposed when the A-share market and the H-share
market expand steadily. Relative to the A-share market, the B-share market lacks
liquidity and is very small. The non-convertibility restriction effectively rules out any
arbitrage between A-shares and B-shares. Recently, the B-shares have traded at a
discount. In addition, investing in China's B-share market is not easy. Owing to the
low degree of transparency and legal framework in China's market, coupled with
inadequate information dissemination, foreign investors are discouraged. Compared to
the H-share market, the B-share market has no advantages in attracting foreign
investors. There is a tendency for foreigners to buy the H-shares listed in Hong Kong
rather than the B-shares listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen. This is because the listing
requirements of the well-established stock markets such as the Hong Kong Exchange
give more confidence to foreign investors.
If we agree with the argument that splitting up the national market into several
markets reduces liquidity and increases uncertainty and volatility, and the greater the
number of players in an efficient market, the more financial liquidity and depth will
result, it is not very difficult for us to understand that the fundamental solution to the
B share market is to merge with the A share market. Chinese policy-makers are fully
aware of the above limitations of China's stock market development. Nowadays, they
have been taking action, trying to perfect relevant regulations and laws to curb the
speculation and bubbles while enforcing non-tradable shares conversion into tradable
to tackle the compartmentalised share structure problem. In the near future, we should
see Chinese policy-makers finding the solution to segmented A and B share markets
and merging them together to form a united Chinese stock market.
All of us know that China's stock market is still in the primitive stage. But the
development of the stock market is one of the most important elements of China s
economic and financial reform. In around 15 years, China's stock market has emerged
from virtually non-existence to being an important segment of the country s financial
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sector. The establishment and development of China's stock market make great
contribution to the Chinese SOEs ownership reform, to economic model transition and
more importantly to changes in the ideology.
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Chapter 4
IPO Underpricing: Evidence from China's Stock Market
4.1 Introduction
IPOs are the firm's first offerings of shares to the public for raising equity capital in
the stock market. The best-known anomaly associated with the process of the Initial
public offering (IPO) and which has been documented is the IPO underpricing. The
IPO underpricing, namely the large initial returns, is measured from the offering price
to the market price at the end of the first trading day. In 1963 the US Securities and
Exchange Commission first empirically found there were positive average initial
returns on companies going public. The discovery was based on casual observations
and no explanations were offered, but academic studies followed. Logue (1973) and
Ibbotson (1975) are among the first to use US data to document this anomaly in their
academic literature. Ibbotson (1975) finds that the distribution of initial return is
highly skewed, with a positive mean and a median near zero. Using data from the
1970s and 1980s, numerous studies have confirmed the underpricing anomaly. For
instance, Ibbotson, Sinderlar and Ritter (1988) find that the average first-day IPO
returns are 16.3 percent in the years 1960-1987. Ibbotson, Sindelar and Ritter (1994)
report that for 2,439 US IPOs in 1975-1984, the average initial return on IPOs with an
offering price of less than US$3.00 is 42.8 percent whereas the average initial return
on IPOs with an offering price of US$3.00 or more is only 8.6 percent. Koh and
Walter (1989) test the underpricing anomaly in the Singapore stock market and
confirm its existence. Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) not only confirm the
existence of the anomaly but also argue that this anomaly is a common phenomenon
both in the developed stock markets and in the emerging stock markets on the basis of
his cross-country studies. The findings are robust throughout all 25 economies
including the US, UK, Hong Kong and Taiwan China, the average premium ranging
from 4 percent in the French study to 80 percent in the Malaysian study.
The anomaly has already been well documented and many different IPO underpricing
hypotheses have been developed, but satisfactory explanations have not yet been
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found. Economists continue to be haunted by these questions: why the shares are
"abnormally" discounted to the outside investors both systematically and statistically?
Why would a firm willingly underprice its shares at the cost of limiting the equity
capital received? Though IPO underpricing anomaly has been highlighted and studied
for a very long time, unfortunately this topic has barely been touched upon by Chinese
scholars. Su (1998), in conjunction with Fleisher, might take a lead in exploring the
IPO underpricing phenomenon in China's stock market using the IPO underpricing
theories. They constructed their sample with two data sets: one is a sample of 308 A-
share IPOs and the other is a sample of 57 B-share IPOs during the period of
1988M12-1996M1 and their findings were rather astonishing: the mean IPO initial
return was 948.59 percent, which is much higher compared to those that have been
reported in other country studies conducted by Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994).
In other words, the first-day market closing price is on average almost eleven times as
high as the initial price offered to the domestic investors. But generally speaking, the
topic of IPO underpricing in China's stock market is under-researched. The empirical
tests of the existence of the underpricing anomaly in China's stock market are seldom
seen, let alone systematic research applying the latest IPO underpricing theories with
China's stock market.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate if the underpricing anomaly exists in China's
stock market and look for the explanations of this phenomenon. This study is going to
relate IPO initial returns to variables either widely used in studies of IPO underpricing
in literatures or elaborately selected to take into account some special factors, which
might also influence IPO underpricing in China's stock market, hoping to make a
valuable contribution to better understanding of IPOs anomalies in China s stock
market. At the same time, I would like to compare my findings with those from
similar studies in the literature.
A brief literature review will be conducted to review the developments of the IPO
theory and practice in section 2. Section 3 introduces an institutional background
regarding China's stock market in order to have a better understanding the
methodology put forward in section 4. On the basis of empirical studies, conclusions
will be drawn in section 5.
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4.2 Literature Review
Since the IPO underprcing anomaly was discovered, it has been well documented in
the literature. To provide answers to this anomaly, many IPO underpricing theories
have been developed to address why the shares are "abnormally" discounted to
outside investors both systematically and statistically, in other words, the sudden
wealth earned by outside investors. Many different theories based on microeconomic
uncertainty and information asymmetry focus on various aspects of the relationships
between investors, issuers and the investment bankers taking the firms public.
4.2.1 The Winner's Curse Hypothesis 1
An important rationale for the underpricing of IPOs is the "winner's curse"
explanation introduced by Rock (1986), incorporating the information asymmetry and
rationing. On the basis of rationing due to oversubscription to a fixed number of
shares sold at a fixed offer price, Rock (1986), for simplicity, assumes that all
investors are grouped into two categories: completely informed, and completely
uninformed, with respect to knowledge of the future market price of the share being
sold. In his winner's curse hypothesis, informed investors will attempt to buy shares
only when an issue is underpriced. Uninformed investors thus face an adverse
selection or a winner's curse: if they get all of the shares they demand, it is because
the informed investors do not want the shares. Faced with this adverse selection
problem, uninformed investors will only submit purchase orders if, on average, IPOs
are underpriced sufficiently to compensate them for the bias in the allocation of new
issues. The IPOs must be underpriced to induce uninformed investors to join the bid.
Put differently, prior knowledge of the absence of the informed investors could reduce
the winner's curse problem and consequently the need for underpricing. Using Rock s
framework, Carter and Manaster (1990) model the role of the investment banker s role
in the IPO underpricing. They show that more prestigious investment bankers are
associated with less risky IPOs. To preserve its reputation, the prestigious underwriter
screens the firms that go public and selects the less risky ones, using information
unavailable to the general public. This, in turn, reduces the uncertainty and
1 The term "winner's curse" is from the auction literature: In a sealed bid auction with bidders who
have some independent private information on the value of the item being auctioned, the highest l er
at the auction finds out ex post that her valuation was probably too high. Thus, the person w o wins t e
auction may lie cursed by learning that s /he overpaid.
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information asymmetry between informed and uninformed. Investors know that by
subscribing to issues of reputable investment banks they face less risk, and,
consequently, the initial day return is lower for these issues.;
Besides, a report from the World Bank (1995) argues that the choice of offering
mechanism adopted for the new issue affects the degree of underpricing. Chowdhry
and Sherman (1996) compare some key features between the US Firm Commitment
method and the UK Open Offer for Sale. They find the UK-style offering tends to lead
towards greater underpricing and further argue that the winner's curse or the adverse
selection could be reduced by the allocation method. In addition, they also find that
IPO underpricing is positive related to the time period between IPO date and first
trading date.
The basic idea behind the winner's curse is quite simple. Firstly, underpricing should
decrease as information becomes less heterogeneous across investor groups. At the
extreme, when all outside investors possess the same information about the firm, there
should not be any underpricing. Secondly, through the choice of the underwriter, the
firm can reduce some of the uncertainty about its prospects and therefore reduce the
need for underpricing.
Yu and Tse (2006) use 343 online fixed-price offerings from November 1995 to
December 1998 to examine the degree of underpricing and investigate if the winner's
curse hypothesis, the ex ante uncertainty hypothesis and signalling hypothesis exist in
China's stock market. Empirical results show that the level of underpricing is high, on
average 123.59 percent. They find that the winner's curse hypothesis and the ex ante
uncertainty hypothesis have very high explanatory power to underpricing in China s
stock market, but the signalling hypothesis is not valid in China's stock market. Chi
and Padgett (2005) test the degree of underpricing and seek explanations of IPOs
underpricing in China's stock market using data on 668 new shares from 1996 to
2000. They find the initial return is 124.95 percent which is similar with the finding of
Yu and Tse (2006). The information asymmetry hypothesis is supported by empirical
results, but signalling hypothesis is not. Their findings are consistent with the findings
of Yu and Tse (2006).
4.2.2 The Signalling Hypothesis
As for the signalling hypothesis, underpricing is an equilibrium outcome for an issuer
to signal its quality to the investors. Various signalling mechanisms have been
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advocated in otdet to help convey entrepreneurs private information about the value
01 the firm to potential stockholdeis and in order to add credibility to the information
given in the prospectus. Allen and Faulhauber (1998), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989),
and Welch (1989), argue that "good" firms try to distinguish themselves from "bad"
firms by incurring a cost that less successful firms cannot profitably sustain. This cost
is the underpricing of the initial issue. In other words, the better firms will underprice
more and will have higher earnings, dividends and payout ratios. Ritter (1991)
confirms that there is a significant negative relationships between IPO underpricing
and the past information for the firms such as the earnings per share prior to going
public and the age of the firm going public.
Welch (1989) formalises the notion that good firms underprice to "leave a good taste
in investors' mouths." The hypothesis is that the owner's incentive to leave a good
taste is the possibility of coming back to the market for the sale of additional securities
on more favourable terms. The cost of the underpricing could then be covered in the
aftermarket by selling the shares retained at the IPO, or by issuing further shares
through seasoned equity offers (SEOs).
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) also argue that firms employ two signals to convey the
mean and variance of their future cash How: the degree of underpricing and the
fraction of shares held by insiders. The intuition is that entrepreneurs who retain a
large investment stake in the company only do so if they are very confident about the
firm's prospectus. Investors recognize this commitment by the entrepreneur and
accordingly place a higher valuation on the IPO." There is another signal that cannot
be failed to notice: IPO underpricing could be used as a means ol privatisation ol the
State-owned enterprises (SOEs). Privatisations ol the larger state-owned enterprises
are usually accomplished through the capital markets via public share offerings, or
share issue privatisations. IPO underpricing ol state-owned enterprises, therefore,
could be regarded as a strong signal lor a government to be committed to pro-market
privatisation policies.
Perotti (1995) argues that the government's dual role, both the issuer and the
regulator, puts it in a position to alfect the value ol the lirm alter the sale. I his
2 This suggests that IPO underpricing is an increasing function of insider ownership for a high quality
issuer. Howere, Hughes (1986) argues that, other things equal, the greater is the fractional insider
ownership, the less is the information asymmetry, and the lower the need to underprice a new issue. In
addition, for a given amount of funds to be raised, if the firm issues few shares (i.e., retains a larger
insider ownership), the offer price will be higher and underpricing will be lower.
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exposes private investors to an information asymmetry, not about the value of the
SOE s assets but regarding a government s commitment to privatisation.
Perotti (1995) presents a model of IPO underprice with government policy
uncertainty, where a government retains a large stake of the state-owned enterprises
and underprices partial sales to signal its intent to commit credible future privatisation
policies. He further argues that a populist government's motives for privatisation are
to raise money and to acquire the politically valuable option to redistribute firm value
after privatisation because the populist government cannot support privatisation in the
future for political reasons and will choose to sell a large portion of an SOE but
underprice little at all. On the contrary, a committed government values the benefits of
privatisation more than the lost proceeds due to IPO underpricing and is motivated to
signal its identity. The committed government is willing to accept the lower proceeds
because signalling commitment immediately initiates the economic benefits of
privatisation. Under policy uncertainty, a committed government may choose to retain
a large stake of the state-owned enterprises and underprice a partial sale to signal its
intent to credibly commit to future pro-market privatisation policies.
In short, the signalling hypothesis argues that underpriced new issues leave a good
taste with investors, allowing the firms and insiders to sell future offerings at a higher
price than would otherwise be the case. Issuers with larger IPO underpricing are more
likely to issue subsequent equities and more likely to issue larger amounts of
subsequent equities because a high value issuer can afford to underprice its IPO.
Earnings and dividend policy after the IPO help the market revise its views about the
firm's quality. In addition, insider holdings as well as underpricing signal the firm's
value. As for a government issuer, IPO underpricing could be used as a means of
privatisation of its SOEs.
Chen, Firth and Kim (2004) employ 701 A-share IPOs and 117 B-share IPOs in the
period 1992-1997 to investigate the degree of underpricing and the explanations of
IPOs underpricing. They find the initial return of A-share is 145 percent, much higher
than the initial return of B-share which is just 10 percent. The main reasons for II Os
underpricing in A-share stock market are twofold, firstly it is for future equity
offerings which is consistent with the argument of Welch (1989), and secondly is the
ownership structure of the company. A large proportion of shares owned by state and
legal persons leads to greater underpricing which is consistent with Mok and Hui
(1998). The results from Chi and Padgett (2005) and Yu and 1 se (2006) show that the
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signalling hypothesis is not valid in China's stock market. Su (2004) adopts 587 IPOs
from January 1994 to December 1999 to examine the degree of underpricing of IPOs
in China s stock market and seek explanations for underpricing to China's stock
market. He finds that winner s Curse' hypothesis and signalling hypothesis can be
used to explain underpricing phenomena in China's stock market.
4.2.3 The Ownership Dispersion Hypothesis 3
Brennan and Franks (1995), Mello and Parsons (1998) and Booth and Chua (1996)
develop a new explanation of the underpricing anomaly: the ownership dispersion
hypothesis. They argue that an issuing firm may intentionally underprice their shares
in order to generate excess demand and be able to have a large number of small
shareholders. There are at least two reasons for firms to do so. For one thing,
dispersed ownership may improve liquidity, and this strategy would tend to make for a
lower rate of return required by investors and thus a higher equilibrium price for the
firm's shares. For another, IPO underpricing would lead to oversubscription, which
allows the issuer both to ration the allocation of shares and to discriminate between
applicants so as to reduce the individual size of new block-holdings post-IPO. The
greater dispersion of outside holdings reduces incentives for the new shareholders to
monitor the current management. Presumably, the managers of some firms are willing
to underprce for control reasons, to the detriment of shareholders. Other managers
may want to underprice in order to enhance liquidity, to the benefit of shareholders.
This dispersed ownership will both increase the liquidity of the market for the stock,
and make it more difficult for outsiders to challenge managements. Issuer's demands
for broad ownership dispersion and a liquid secondary market for the shares determine
the equilibrium level of underpricing.
Maug (1998) provides a model that links underpricing to market liquidity, rationing
and discrimination against large investors in the IPO. 4 Chan, Wang and Wei (2004)
3 The IPO underpricing anomaly has already been well documented and many different IPO
underpricing hypotheses have been developed. This chapter aims to test these three hypotheses using
the data generated from China's stock market. Besides these three hypotheses, several others have also
been developed to give explanations for this anomaly such as the costly information acquisition
hypothesis (Benveniste and Spindt 1989) and the cascade hypothesis (Welch 1992). For details, p ease
refer to Roger G. Ibbotson and Jay R. Ritter, Chapter 30,Initial Public Offerings, R. J arrow et al., Eds,
Handbooks in Operations Research And Management Science, Vol. 9, Netherlands: Elsevier Science
B.V., 1995. We might carry on to test them in our future research.
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present that IPOs underpricing is positive to the number of days between offering and
listing which is consistent with the finding of Mok and Hui (1998); is negative to the
number of shares being issued and is also positive to the number of stock investors in
the province from which the IPOs come. Mok and Hui (1998) argue that high equity
retention by state, a long time-lag between offering and listing and ex-ante risk of new
shares are key determinants of market-adjusted IPOs underpricing.
4.3 Methodology
In this chapter, we would like to integrate the winner's curse hypothesis, signalling
hypothesis and ownership dispersion hypothesis to empirically test the existence of
the underpricing anomaly in China's stock market and explore the causes for this
phenomenon, using factors either documented in the literature or representing the
special status of China's stock market. At the same time, we would like to compare
my findings with those from similar studies in the literature as well.
4.3.1 Empirical Study of Underpricing Anomaly
Stage 1: At the first stage, we are going to set up a univariate model to test the
hypothesis that the underpricing anomaly does exist in China's stock market on the
basis of two measures of the IPO underpricing extent. If the hypothesis cannot be
statisticalh' rejected, we then go to the second stage.
4.3.1.1 Measurement of the IPO underpricing
To measure the extent of IPO underpricing, two measures are calculated for each
initial public offering as follows:
P - P
1) A simple IPO return: S R = — —
* i 0
where SR, is defined as the simple IPO return of the zth company going public, Pl0
the initial offer price for the zth company and PtX the closing price for the z'thcompany
on the first trading day.
4 In contrast, Stoughton and Zechner (1995) provide a model where rationing in the IPO is used to
favour large rather than small shareholders so as to obtain an ownership structure that improves
monitoring of the firm by outsiders and thereby raises firm value.
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And then the average simple return ( E S R , ) ,the mean of;? IPOs, could be measured
as
1 " P — p
: E S R ,= — ' °
» «=i P,/0
The simple return for an individual stock is a measure of the stock's performance
during its IPO and may fluctuate in response to shocks affecting either itself solely or
the stock market as a whole. In order to concentrate on the extent of IPO underpricing
for each individual IPO precisely, an alternative measure, a market-adjusted simple
return, is introduced controlling the impact of those shocks related to the whole
market.
P - P1 m l ' m 0P ~P2) A market-adjusted simple IPO return: MSR, = — —
P h"1 10 1 m 0
Where MSR, is defined as the market-adjusted simple IPO return of the /th company
going public, Pml is the closing price of the appropriate benchmark on the first
trading day of the new issue i and Pm0 is the closing price of the benchmark
corresponding to the last offering day of the new issue i. In this study, the Shanghai
A-share Price Index is used as a proxy for the benchmark when the new issue will be
listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange while the Shenzhen A-share Price Index is
used as a proxy for the benchmark when the new issue will be listed on the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange.
And then the average market-adjusted simple IPO return (EMSR, ), the mean of n
1 "
IPOs, could be measured as: EMSR, = —V
n ,=i
P - Pri\ ri o P - P1 m\ 1 »m0
P P1 ( 0 1 m 0 /
In order to avoid spurious empirical results, natural logarithm is introduced to
transform financial data in the hope of stabilising the mean and variance of a variable
and simplifying the calculation. Therefore, SR t, ESR,, MSR, and EMSR( could be re-
expressed respectively as follows:
P - PSR. = '°
P.
In/5,, - In Pl0
10
ESR, =-2,
n ,=i
1 » ( p _ p ^1 ' ,1 r-iO
Pio y
i f ( l n ^ , - l n ^ 0 )
n l=l>
MSR, = P - Pri\ i0
/i
P - P
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EMSR, = -Y
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Pn
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,
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4.3.1.2 IPO Underpricing Univariate Model
The model could be expressed as follows:
IPORENT = a + PRC IP IPO + s
In this model, we would like to test the hypothesis: there is a positive relationship
between the reciprocal of IPO price and the IPO initial returns, that is, the smaller the
IPO price, the larger the IPO initial returns, that is to say, the IPO underpricing
anomaly does exist in China's stock market.
Dependent variable IPORETN: either the natural logarithm of the simple IPO
return SR, or the natural logarithm of the market-adjusted simple IPO return MSR,,
which have been defined above. We use these two measures of return in our empirical
work to generate more accurate results (Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay, 1997).
Incidentally, a and /? are coefficients and s is a stochastic error term in the model.
Explanatory variable:
RCIPIPO: the reciprocal of IPO price; IPO initial return is measured by the price of
IPO(Po) and the first day market closing price(Pi), it means that the IPO initial return
includes the offering price and they may be spuriously negative correlated. To correct
for this possible spurious correlation, we use the reciprocal of IPO price (RCIPIPO) as
an explanatory variable. '
Stage 2: We are going to launch univariate analysis to respectively test the validity of
the winner's curse, signalling hypothesis and the ownership dispersion hypothesis.
Besides, we also examine a relationship between the IPO returns and those variables
elaborately chosen to represent the special status of China's stock market.
Dependent variable: IPORENT, as defined earlier, is either IPO simple return or IPO
market-adjusted simple return and prospective explanatory variables are as follows:
METHODS: the choice of share allocation method. This dummy variable will take a
value of unity if the shares are allocated by the network bidding and zero it by a local
issuing agency testing which of the allocations will lead to greater/less underpricing
and increase/reduce the adverse selection or the winner s curse, namely, testing the
winner's curse hypothesis: the allocation method could affect the adverse selection
problem.
LNAGE. the age of the firm, the reason for selecting this variable is nearly the same as
the reason for selecting EPS, testing if there is a significant positive/negative
relationship between IPO underpricing and the past information for the firms to
support the signalling hypothesis or winner's curse hypothesis.
LNDAYS : number of days elapsed between the announcement of an IPO and the first-
day market trading, testing if IPO underpricing is positively related to the time period
between IPO date and first trading date.
LNEPS : the earnings per share prior to the IPO issue, ratio of the profit a year before
the IPO date divided by the outstanding shares at the time of the IPO. The reason for
selecting this variable is that it could be regarded as a signal of the quality of the firm
going public. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) argue that the better firms having higher
earnings and will underprice more while Rock (1986) argues that the degree of
information asymmetry is a decreasing function of earnings per share. We would like
to examine if there is a significant positive or negative relationship between IPO
underpricing and the past information for the firms to support signalling hypothesis or
winner's curse hypothesis.
LNINSIDER: the natural logarithm of ^ ns '^ eowners ^P standing for the ownership
Total shares
structure and the degree of the ownership dispersion is used to test if underpricing and
insider ownership are positively related to each other.
LNIPOSZ : natural logarithm of IPO size. We use the gross amount of outside capital
raised as a proxy for firm size, testing the signalling hypothesis: the smaller the IPO
size, the Larger the IPO initial returns.
LNLOTTERY: as an indicator of oversubscription to the IPO offer. A small value
lottery signifies that the outside shares are more dispersed and are allocated more
evenly, testing if there is a negative relationship between the IPO return and the
lottery.
LNMKGDP : natural logarithm of the ratio of the IPO capitalization to GDP, which is
a proxy for the aggregate supply for shares relative to the aggregate demand for
shares. We argue that underpricing is partially due to a relatively small aggregate
supply of shares.
LNSEOSZ : natural logarithm of subsequent equity offerings size, testing the signalling
hypothesis: there is a positive relationsnip between IPORENT and LNSEOSZ, that is,
issuers with larger IPO underpricing are more likely to issue subsequent equities and
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more likely to issue larger amounts of subsequent equities. There is a positive
relationship between IPORENT and LNSEOSZ.
L N S H R I I . logarithm of the average number ot tradeable shares each shareholder
possesses, representing the degree of the ownership dispersion.
LNSTATE: logarithm of the size of single large shareholder (state shares and state-
owned legal person shares), standing for government policy uncertainty regarding the
privatisation.
Stage 3: According to the general to specific economic modelling approach in the
sense that one starts with a model with several regressors and then whittles down to a
model containing only the "important" variables (Gujarati, 1995). On the basis of the
univariate analysis a finally augmented multivariate model will be set up, integrating
the winner's curse hypothesis, the signalling hypothesis, the ownership dispersion
hypothesis and adding some new variables standing for China's stock market features
to see if they make contribution to the underpricing of Chinese IPOs and better
explanations of the underpricing of Chinese IPOs.
Throughout the empirical work in this chapter, two statistical estimation methods will
be employed. One is the method of ordinary least squares (OLS) and the other is the
robust regression method. Certain assumptions such as errors are normally,
independently, and identically distributed (normal i.i.d), OLS has some very
attractive statistical properties that have made it one of the most powerful and popular
methods 01 regression analysis. Unfortunately the flip side of this statement is often
overlooked: if errors are not normal, or not i.i.d., in other words, one ol the
assumptions of OLS is not held, then other unbiased estimators might outperform
OLS. As an alternative to OLS, we also apply the robust regression estimation
method. This method aims to achieve almost the elficiency ol OLS with ideal data and
substantially better-than-OLS efficiency in non-ideal (for example, non-normal errors)
situations (Gujarati, 1995).
4.3.2 Sample Description and Data Collection
Our sample firms are obtained from the 1991-2000 editions ol the Shanghai and
Shenzhen Stock Exchange Statistics Annual. 1he sample data set contains 698 firms
going public and subsequently listed either on Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange
during the sample period from January 1994 to December 2000 (72 months).
Firms are selected from the list of listed firms il
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1) They make a firm commitment offering of at least ¥1 Chinese currency per unit.
2) The unit contains only a single share of stock (no warrants attached),
3) The issue is an initial public offering, and
4) The firm is, of course, subsequently listed on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange
or Shenzhen Stock Market.
As at the end of 1993, there were 183 firms going public and 106 firms were listed in
the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 77 firms listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 5
These firms are not included in our sample set. There are two reasons for this. China's
stock market started at the end of 1990. During the period between 1991 and 1993,
stock price volatility in China's stock market was rather high and there was a rather
high positive correlation among all the stocks, despite the fact that the listed
companies had quite different attributes and business performance. Therefore, the
data, especially the first-day market closing prices prior to 1994 are full of speculative
bubbles and cannot be used. Another reason for this is related to the Chinese
accounting system. The traditional Chinese accounting system was brought from the
former Soviet Union in the early 1950s for a highly centralised economy and was
quite different from the generally accepted accounting principle in the market
economies. Different industries had different accounting regulations enforced by
different government departments, and therefore, the financial report formats from
different industries were quite different and led to lack of comparability. On July 1
1993, the new "Enterprise Accounting Standards" and "Enterprise Financial
Accounting Principle" came into effect and brought Chinese accounting practices
closer to international standards. We exclude those 183 firms before January 1994 so
that the variables regarding listed company financial ratios are constructed under the
new accounting standard. During the period of 1994M1 to 1999M12, there were 766
firms going public and then listed in either Shanghai or Shenzhen stock exchanges.
Another 78 firms are also rejected either because they have been listed for less than
two years or because they do not have enough data points or because they have some
data gaps.
The study uses mainly data from the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges and the
prospectus and the annual financial reports of the sample firms. Some data arc also
retrieved from Datastream, an on-line financial database, which is a subsidiary of
5 Source: China Stock Market Yearbook 2000.
' ' Source: Chinese Stock Market Statistics 2000.
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Primark Global Information Systems. Other resources from which data are collected
include the Central Bank of China, the State Statistics Bureau of China and some
financial consulting companies in Shanghai such as the Kingway Research and
Development Centre.
Of course, the time length and the number of the sample might be extended in any
further study.
4.4 Empirical Results and Conclusions
4.4.1 Empirical Results
1. In investigating the linkage between the IPO return and the reciprocal of IPO price,
we find that there is a positive relationship between these two variables. In other
words, the underpricing anomaly does exist in China's stock market.
i) Table 4.1 provides the definition of variables and Table 4.2 presents a brief
descriptive statistics summary of these variables. It shows that the mean IPO simple
return in our sample is 130.01 percent whereas the mean IPO market-adjusted simple
return is 76.64 percent. This is similar to the result of Chi and Padgett (2005) which is
129.16 percent.
ii) The econometric results reported in Table 4.3 show that: no matter which IPO
underpricing measure is used, simple return or market-adjusted simple return and no
matter which estimation method is used, OLS or robust regression, there is a positive
relationship between IPO initial return and the reciprocal of IPO price, with the
coefficient being positive and the t-statistics being statistically significant. Put
differently, the smaller the IPO price, the larger the IPO initial return. I he empirical
result denotes that the underpricing anomaly does exist in China's stock market.
iii) But the mean IPO initial return is 130.01 percent which is much smaller than
948.59 percent, the Su's finding in 1998. We argue that the difference is attributed to
the different sample number and time length. Su's finding is based on 308 firm-
commitment A-share IPOs between December 1986 and January 1996 while our
sample comprises 698 A-share IPOs during the period of January 1994 and December
1999. A dramatic decrease in the extent of IPO underpricing could partly result from
the fact that since 1994, more and more firms have gone public and been listed on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges.
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2. When looking at the relationship between the IPO return and deliberately selected
variables on the basis ot the univariate analysis, we find that IPO return is negatively
related to the number of IPO days, the time gap between offering and listing dates
(DAYS), earning per share (EPS), the ratio of insidership to total shares outstanding
(INSIDER), the size of IPO (IPOSZ), the percentage of successful application for the
offer (LOTTERY), the ratio of the IPO capitalisation to GDP (MKGDP) and the size
of single large shareholder (STATE) and positively related to allocation methods
(METHOD) and the size of SEO (SEOSZ). There is no significant correspondence
between IPO return and AGE, the age of a firm. As for the relationship between IPO
return and SHRPP, we also find SHRPP is statistically significant in explaining IPO
return with the exception of only using simple return as a dependent variable in the
OLS regression. We will further test the validity of SHRPP in the multivariate
analysis. The econometric results reported in Tables 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 show that:
i) There is a negative relationship between IPO return and IPOSZ and also a positive
relationship between the IPO return and the size of the SEO. The smaller size of initial
offering and the larger size of SEOs, the higher IPOs initial returns. The findings
coincide with the signalling hypothesis (Allen and Faulhaberl989, Grinblatt and
Hwang 1989, Welch 1989) that argues that underpriced new issues leave a good taste
with investors, allowing the firms and insiders to sell future offerings at a higher price
than would otherwise be the case. Issuers with larger IPO underpricing are more likely
to issue subsequent equities and more likely to issue larger amounts of subsequent
equities because a high value issuer can afford to underprice its IPO. Besides, IPO
initial return is negatively related to the earnings per share (EPS), the proxy for the
firm's intrinsic value. Testing this implication is complicated by the lack of error-tree
measure of the firm's intrinsic value. We use the earning per share (EPS), which
stands for the firm's intrinsic value, as an explanation variable. The higher a tirm s
intrinsic value, the higher IPOs prices, the lower IPOs initial returns. This finding is
not consistent with the signalling hypothesis (Allen and Faulhaber 1989) that argues
that the better firms having higher earnings and will underprice more, but it is
consistent with Rock (1986), who argues that the degree of information asymmetry is
a decreasing function of earnings per share.
We further argue that there might be two distinctive explanations for this. For one
thing, Chinese investment banks usually employ the price-earnings-ratio method to
help firms going public to decide their offer prices, using offer prices to those similar
1 0 0
firms which have gone public for reference, thus the higher EPS, the higher offer
price. For another, being an emerging market, China's stock market is highly
speculative. Chinese investors, generally speaking, do not pay much attention to value
strategies; instead they focus on the short-term capital gain. That is to say, they do not
care about the firm's intrinsic value; they are just interested in the activity of the
shares they are trading. Hence, the shares with high EPS do not necessarily have a
bigger percentage increase in price than those with lower EPS on the first trading day.
In addition we find this is a negative relationship between IPO initial return and the
variable STATE which is the size of a single large shareholder (state shares and state-
owned legal person shares), representing government policy uncertainty regarding the
privatisation. This is contrary to the finding of Chen, Firth and Kim (2004). The
negative relationship shows that the Chinese government is a committed government,
not a populist one. According to Perotti (1995) a committed government values the
benefits of privatisation more than the lost proceeds due to IPO underpricing and is
motivated to signal its identity. The committed government is willing to accept lower
proceeds because signalling commitment immediately initiates the economic benefits
of privatisation. Under policy uncertainty, a committed government may choose to
retain a large stake of the state-owned enterprises and underprice a partial sale to
signal its intent to credibly commit to future pro-market privatisation policies.
ii) We find that the allocation method (METHOD), the percentage of successful
application for the offer (LOTTERY) and the IPO time gap between offering and
listing dates (DAYS) make a statistically significant contribution to the IPO
underpricing. In other words, our findings are consistent with the adverse selection or
the winner's curse hypothesis such that the IPOs must be underpriced to induce
uninformed investors to join the bid, the choice of offering mechanism adopted for the
new issue affects the degree of underpricing and the IPO underpricing is positively
related to the time period between IPO date and first trading date; there is a significant
negative relationships between IPO underpricing and the past information for the
firms;
iii) There is a negative correspondence between IPO return and LNLOTTERY.
According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), available information about a
firm and the expected future payoffs affect an investor s demand for shares. The
number of investors bidding for an IPO affects the overall demand for shares and
therefore affects the degree of IPO underpricing, given the fixed IPO pricing and the
1 0 1
amount of initial sale. Our findings that the smaller the chances of shares allocation,
the higher is the investors' rewards are consistent with the results of Brennan and
Franks (1997) and Booth and Chua (1996) which argue that the issuers use IPO
underpricing to attract oversubscription, with the intention of promoting a dispersed
outside ownership and retention of control after the IPO.
iv) The time gap between offering and listing dates (LNDAYS) has a statistically
significant negative effect on the IPO initial return, which is different from the results
of Mok and Hui (1998), Chan Wang and Wei (2004) and Su and Fleisher (1998b).
They find that the IPO return is positively related to the time gap between offering and
listing dates. We argue that a shorter interval gives investors less time to collect
information for the valuation of the IPO, so a shorter time gap imposes more risk and
the investors should merit a higher IPO return.
v) The allocation method (METHODS) for the IPO offering has a positive, highly
significant effect on IPO initial return. The IPO initial return will be higher when
firms issue shares through local issuing agencies. The reason is that local investors
lack sufficient information to value the shares, so they should be given a higher return
to compensate. In addition, a national issuing network is likely to be more cost-
effective and informational efficient, thus the investors should be given a lower return.
vi) The variable AGE, the age of a listed firm, has no statistically significant effect on
IPO initial return. One possible explanation is that Chinese listed firms have a very
short history. China started its shareholding system experiment in the early 1980s;
listed companies came out in the 1990s. At the end of 1990 there were only twelve
listed companies in China's stock market.7 Therefore, the listed companies are quiet
young and their history is too short and the variable AGE could not be used to test il
there is a negative relationship between IPO underpricing and the past information of
the firms.
3. In examining the special ownership structure in China's stock market, we iind the
ownership dispersion hypothesis is valid. In other words, the IPO return is negatively
related to the insider ownership (INSIDER), the size of single large shareholder (state
shares and state-owned legal person shares, SI ATE) and the ratio of IPO
capitalization to GDP (MKGDP), but positively related to the average number ol
tradeable shares each shareholder possesses (SI IRPP).
7 Shanghai Stock Exchange Statistics Annual 1991.
1 0 2
i) We find that the IPO initial return is significantly affected by the special ownership
in China's stock market. The IPO return is negatively related to INSIDER and
STATE. Though our findings are different from Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt
and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989), they are consistent with Hughes (1986) which
argues that the greater the fractional insider, the less the information asymmetry, and
the lower the need to underprice a new issue. In the context of Su's(1998b) finding:
extremely high mean simple return, 948.59 percent, for 308 IPOs during December
1986 to January 1996, a plausible explanation is that China's stock market structure
radically changed in 1994. Prior to 1994, the experimental times of China's stock
market, most of the companies going public were non-state-owned and small-sized
state-owned enterprises. But since 1994, more and more medium, large and even
super-large-sized state-owned enterprises have been going public and the highly
centralised ownership structure has taken shape. Enterprises with more than 60
percent shares outstanding are not allowed to trade. In the meantime, the mean IPO
simple return in our sample - 698 IPOs from January 1994 to December 1999 - has
decreased to 130.01 percent, that is to say, the extent of IPO underpricing has been
mitigated.
ii) We find the IPO initial return is negatively related to rationing of the capitalisation
of IPO to GDP (MKGDP), which confirms our hypothesis that IPO underpricing is
partially due to a relatively small aggregate supply of shares (Su and Fleisherl998).
For one thing, Chinese investors lack access to alternative investments. Besides bank
deposits ar.d government bonds, the only option left perhaps is investing in the stock
market. For another, the size of China's stock market in terms of market capitalisation
relative to GDP is rather small, not to mention the lact that less than 40 percent
outstanding shares are allowed to be tradable.8 The excess demand lor shares over
share supply in the secondary market usually pushes the share price level up which
leads to expansion of the difference between IPO price and the first-day market
closing price. The result implies that the smaller the ratio ol IPO capitalisation to
GDP, the higher is IPO initial return.
8 At the end of 2000, China's market capitalization-to-GDP ratio was round 31.82 percent while those
of Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, China were 352.99 percent 383.26 percent and 130.72 percent,
respectively.
Source: The World Bank Development Indicator CD-ROM 2001
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iii) IPO market-adjusted return is positively and significantly related to the average
number of tradable shares each shareholder possesses (SHRPP). This finding is
consistent with Booth and Chua (1996) who argue that investors will be willing to
price a stock using a lower discount rate if they expect a liquid market for their shares.
Thus, the aitermarket price depends upon the dispersion of ownership. If we use
turnover, the ratio of the total value ot trades on the major stock exchanges divided by
market capitalisation to measure the liquidity of China's stock market, the present
status of China's stock market confirms Booth and Chua (1996)'s argument. Table 4.8
reveals that China's stock market liquidity measured by turnover ratio is much higher
than that of Singapore stock market, yet much lower than those in other emerging
markets. At the end of 1999, the ratio for China's market was 118.32 percent, while
those of Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan China were 40.68 percent, 248.04
percent and 237.57 percent respectively. We have to pay more attention to the results.
Superficially, it seems that the turnover ratio of China's stock market is not abnormal.
However, if we take into account that approximately 60-70 percent of share
outstanding is not allowed to be circulated, China's stock market might have an
extremely high turnover ratio of over 300 percent, which could be the highest in the
world. We, therefore, could further argue that due to immaturity of China's stock
market and massive ownership dispersion of tradable shares, most Chinese investors
pay little attention to value strategies and are just lured by short-term capital gains
between offer price and first day trading price and between short buy and short sale in
the stock market.
4. When doing univariate analysis, we have found that variable AGE is nothing to do
with the IPO initial return, but the results about the validity of variable SHRPP are
contradicted using OLS estimation and robust estimation when using IPO simple
return as dependent variable. With the help of the multivariate analysis, we will
address this problem, and then, an augmented multi factor model will be set up.
i) In a preliminary multifactor analysis using both estimation methods, we find that
SHRPP and AGE are not statistically significant. In other words, these two variables
cannot be used to describe the behaviour ol IPO initial return and should be dropped.
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 show the empirical results and we find that without these two
variables, the goodness of fit, in fact, increases slightly. As we have explained before,
the listed companies are quiet young and their history is too short, the hypothesis that
there is a negative relationship between IPO return and the history ol a firm going
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public has been rejected. As for the invalidity of SHRPP standing for ownership
dispersion, one explanation is that due to the special ownership structure in China's
stock market, around 60-70 percent of A shares outstanding, which mainly consists of
the so-called state shares and state legal shares, is not allowed to be tradable.9 That is
to say, other variables standing for highly centralized ownership such as STATE,
INSIDER might have fully overshadowed the significance of SHRPP representing the
dispersion of the tradable shares accounting for less than the 40 percent outstanding
shares.
ii) An augmented multifactor model integrating winner's curse, signalling hypothesis
and ownership dispersion hypothesis emerges:
In IPORETN =
a + pvMETHOD + /?, In DAYS + in EPS + /34 In INSIDER
+ /? 5 In IPOSZ + pb In LOTTORY + /37 In MKGDP + /? 8 In SEOSZ + /3q In STATE + e
We cannot fail to notice that in Tables 4.9 and 4.10, except AGE and SHRPP,
INSIDER, MKGDP AND STATE which are statistically significant in univariate
analysis are not valid in the multivariate analysis. The main reason is that this model is
vulnerable to multilinearity, namely, there is a very high correlation among
LNINSIDER, LNIPOSE, LNMKGDP and LNSTATE. 10 Table 4.11 provides the
correlation of those explanatory variables used to construct this multifactor model. If
we recall the definition of these three variables, the multilinearity problem is not
surprising. As mentioned before, around 60-70 percent A shares are directly or
indirectly held by Chinese government and are not tradable, LNIPOSE, therefore, has
a highly positive relationship with LNINSIDER. LNMKGDP is a ratio of the IPO
capitalisation to GDP in which LNIPOSE is used as a part of the numerator. As Tor
LNINSIDER and LNSTATE, since the largest insider is the Chinese government, they
could be used as a proxy for each other. In fact, if we drop some of these four
variables that stand for different hypotheses, the empirical results will be improving
dramatically. Table 4.12 could confirm this. Unfortunately it is not a good idea for us
to sacrifice economic theory just for an improvement in statistical properties. How to
deal with multilinearity among financial data is a complicated yet unsolved work,
which might be a further research topic for us to conduct. In any event we have tested
9 See Provisional Regulation on Stock Issuance and Exchange, supra note 29, Art.7.
10 Although still BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased Estimator), the OLS estimators have large variances and
covariances, making precise estimation difficult due to multilinarity. There are several ways to detect
multilinearity and deal with this problem. Please refer to Gujarati, 1995, 319-346.
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several hypotheses regarding IPO underpricing anomaly, using the data generated
from China s stock market. Several interesting conclusions could be drawn from our
findings.
4.4.2 Conclusions
1. IPO underpricing anomaly does exist in China's stock market. The mean IPO initial
return in China's stock market is 130.01 percent. This is similar to the result of Chi
and Padgett (2005) which is 129.16 percent, though it is much smaller than Su's
(1998) findings, it is markedly higher than those that have been reported by Loughran,
Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994) in their cross-country studies. Their findings are robust
throughout all 25 economies including the US, UK, Hong Kong and Taiwan China,
the average premium ranging from 4 percent in the French study to 80 percent in the
Malaysian study (Longhran, Ritter and Rydqvist, 1994). Lured by such massive
opening-day capital gains, no wonder Chinese investors snapped up IPOs and believed
that subscribing to new issues was a sure way to earn a quick yet huge profit. As noted
earlier, the majority of shares are not tradable. This extremely high IPO underpricing
is due, at least partially, to surplus demand for the limited supply of tradable shares.
2. Our major findings are consistent with the winner's curse, signalling theory and
ownership dispersion hypothesis. We find that IPO return is negatively related to the
number of IPO days, the time gap between offering and listing dates (DAYS), earning
per share (EPS), the ratio of insidership to total shares outstanding (INSIDER), the
size of IPO (IPOSZ), the percentage of successful application for the offer
(LOTTERY), the ratio of the IPO capitalization to GDP (MKGDP) and the size of
single large shareholder (STATE) and positively related to allocation methods
(METHOD), the size of SEO (SEOSZ) and average number of tradable shares per
person possessed (SHRPP). History of the firm (AGE) is not significantly related to
IPO initial return perhaps due to the shortness of Chinese enterprises going public.
3. IPO underpricng anomaly is also attributed to the special status of China s stock
market. The imbalance between demand for shares and share supply and high
speculation aggravates IPO underpricing. More importantly, the special ownership
structure - the extremely centralised ownership - has a statistically and economically
significant effect on IPO underpricing, which could be regarded as an important signal
of the commitment of privatisation in China.
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Table 4.1. Definitions for Variables to Explain IPO Initial Returns
Variables Description
EPS The earnings per share prior to the IPO issue
METHOD 1he choice of share allocation method. Dummy variable.
IPORETN IPO initial return. Either SR, or MSR, due to different
measurement
SRj A simple IPO return for the ith company going public
MSRi A market-adjusted simple IPO return for the /th company going
public
LNAGE Natural logarithm of firm's age
LNDAYS Natural logarithm of time gap between offer and trade dates
LNINSIDER The natural logarithm of the ratio of the insidership to total
shares
LN1POSE Natural logarithm of IPO size
LNMKGDP Natural logarithm of the ratio of the IPO capitalization
to GDP
LNSEOSE Natural logarithm of seasoned equity offers size
LNSHRPP Natural logarithm of the average number of tradable
shares each shareholder possesses
LNSTATE Natural logarithm of the size ol single large shareholder
(state shares and state-owned legal person shares)
LOTTERY An indicator of oversubscription to the IPO oiler
RC1PIPO Reciprocal of IPO price
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Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics for Explanatory Variables
V a r i a b l e O b s M e a n S t d . D e v . M i n M a x
MSR | 6 9 8 . 7 6 6 3 9 3 1
. 3 2 7 9 5 6 4 . 1 5 4 6 8 5 1 1 . 6 8 9 3 2 9
SR | 6 9 8 1 3 0 . 0 1 3 8 7 8 . 3 4 9 2 6 - 1 5 . 3 0 7 2 6 4 6 9 . 0 9 0 9
m e t h o d | 6 9 8 . 2 5 2 6 7 6 7 . 4 3 5 0 1 3 1 0 1
l n a g e | 6 9 8 7 . 7 5 1 4 2 9 . 3 6 8 1 8 3 6 9 8 4 7 1 6 9 . 5 9 9 6 7 6
l n d a y s 6 9 8 3 . 1 1 7 4 1 8 . 5 9 8 9 5 4 4 1 . 6 0 9 4 3 8 5 . 0 0 3 9 4 6
l n e p s 6 9 8 - . 9 3 8 9 2 6 6 . 3 2 6 7 3 6 2 - 1 . 9 9 4 2 8 4 . 1 5 3 1 5 4 5
l n i n s i d e 6 9 8 9 . 5 2 5 8 6 3 . 7 8 4 4 1 3 9 8 . 5 1 7 1 3 2 1 3 . 0 9 5 3 9
l n i p o s z 6 9 8 9 . 9 2 6 0 6 6 . 7 2 0 8 0 4 8 8 . 1 0 1 6 7 8 1 2 . 3 8 8 3 9
l n l o t t e r 6 9 8 - . 0 1 9 6 1 8 2 1 . 1 1 2 2 - 2 . 0 4 0 2 2 1 4 . 5 5 3 8 7 7
l n m k g d p | 6 9 8 - 9 . 0 9 9 7 4 5 . 7 8 1 6 5 1 6 - 1 0 . 5 6 3 - 6 . 3 2 7 8 3 7
l n s e o s z 6 9 8 1 0 . 3 8 7 1 8 . 2 5 9 7 0 9 9 0 2 0 . 5 0 5 3 9
I n s t a t e 6 9 8 3 . 8 7 5 8 4 5 . 4 1 1 9 0 8 6 2 . 2 9 3 0 6 8 4 . 4 4 2 4 7 4
l n s h r p p 6 9 8 8 . 1 4 0 4 5 9 . 7 1 5 5 8 5 9 6 . 8 3 7 3 3 3 1 0 . 8 3 1 6 5
r c i p i p o 6 9 8 . 1 7 8 1 1 7 6 . 0 4 8 3 5 0 3 • 0 6 7 7 0 4 8 . 4 0 8 1 6 3 2
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Table 4.3 Univariate Analysis of the IPO Underpricing Anomaly
S R ( O L S ) | C o e f . S t d . E r r . t P > 11 1 A d j R - s q u a r e d
r c i p i p o | 3 4 6 . 1 1 2 8 7 3 . 4 1 2 4 7 4 . 7 1 5 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 4 3 6
SR (R O BU ST ) | C o e f . S t d . E r r . t P > 1 1
r c i p i p o | 1 7 7 . 8 6 6 5 6 7 . 5 8 2 3 7 2 . 6 3 2 0 . 0 0 9
M S R ( O L S ) | C o e f . S t d . E r r . t P > | t | A d j R - s q u a r e d
1 . 1 5 0 8 6 . 3 0 9 9 8 9 9 3 . 7 1 3 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 2 6 7
MSR ( R O BU ST ) | C o e f . S t d . E r r . t P > | t
r c i p i p o 9 9 3 5 2 7 . 3 1 4 5 8 6 8 3 . 1 5 8 0 . 0 0 2
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Table 4.4 Univariate Analysis of Explanatory Variables with SR Using OLS
Estimation
S R | C o e f . S t d . E r r . t P > 1 1 A d j R - s q u a r e d
m e t h o d | 2 2 . 8 0 7 3 8 . 2 8 5 0 6 4 2 7 5 3 0 . 0 0 6 0 . 0 1 3 9
l n a g e 6 . 0 5 5 0 8 8 9 . 8 6 4 3 5 9 0 6 1 4 0 . 5 4 0 - 0 . 0 0 1 3
l n d a y s - 2 1 . 1 0 4 0 5 5 . 9 8 6 7 0 4 - 3 5 2 5 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 2 3 9
l n e p s - 4 8 . 4 4 4 6 8 1 0 . 8 9 0 8 7 - 4 4 4 8 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 3 8 8
l n i n s i d e r | - 2 2 . 3 0 8 8 4 4 . 5 1 4 9 3 ] - 4 9 4 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 4 7 8
l n i p o s z | - 3 5 . 7 0 7 7 4 . 7 6 0 9 4 8 - 7 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 0
l n l o t t e r y | - 1 5 . 3 5 8 1 3 3 . 1 8 8 2 4 - 4 8 1 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 5 5
l n m k g d p | - 2 9 . 8 8 7 5 5 4 . 4 3 6 8 6 8 - 6 7 3 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 6 9
l n s e o s z | 1 4 . 1 3 6 1 6 . 4 6 6 4 1 2 . 1 8 6 0 0 1 5 0 0 1 0 5
l n s h r p p | 5 . 6 6 3 8 5 7 5 . 0 7 0 6 6 4 1 . 1 1 7 0 2 6 5 0 0 0 0 5
I n s t a t e | - 2 4 . 8 7 9 3 7 8 . 7 4 5 0 1 2 - 2 . 8 4 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 5 0
no
Table 4.5 Univariate Analysis of Explanatory Variables with SR Using Robust
Estimation
S R | C o e f . S t d . E r r . t P > 1t 1
m e t h o d | 1 9 . 6 7 3 3 6 7 . 4 3 9 1 8 5 2 . 6 4 5 0 . 0 0 8
l n a g e | 3 . 7 3 8 5 4 9 8 . 8 0 4 1 7 1 0 4 2 5 0 . 6 7 1
l n d a y s | - 2 2 . 0 0 0 2 4 5 . 3 1 8 3 5 4 - 4 1 3 7 0 . 0 0 0
l n e p s | - 2 7 . 3 7 1 3 4 9 . 9 9 6 2 9 3 - 2 7 3 8 0 . 0 0 6
l n i n s i d e r | - 1 8 . 4 8 8 6 6 4 . 0 2 2 6 3 4 - 4 5 9 6 0 . 0 0 0
l n i p o s z - 2 6 . 2 7 8 1 9 4 . 3 8 8 0 3 2 - 5 9 8 9 0 0 0 0
l n l o t t e r y | - 1 3 . 8 8 9 9 3 2 . 8 5 1 4 9 6 - 4 8 7 1 0 0 0 0
l n m k g d p - 2 2 . 8 7 7 2 6 4 . 0 4 1 3 3 - 5 6 6 1 0 0 0 0
l n s e o s z | 1 1 . 8 0 6 4 1 5 . 1 1 2 1 4 2 . 3 0 9 0 0 0 9
l n s h r p p | 7 . 8 8 2 0 6 3 4 . 5 0 5 4 9 6 1 . 7 4 9 0 0 8 1
I n s t a t e | - 2 0 . 9 9 0 1 9 7 . 8 3 1 4 - 2 . 6 8 0 0 . 0 0 8
Table 4.6 Univariate Analysis of Explanatory Variables with MSR Using OLS
Estimation
MS R | C o e f . S t d . E r r . t P > 1t 1 A d j R - s q u a r e d
m e t h o d . 0 8 5 8 5 1 3 . 0 3 4 7 3 3 8 2 4 7 2 0 . 0 1 4 0 . 0 1 0 8
l n a g e - . 0 2 3 3 3 6 . 0 4 1 2 9 3 - 0 5 6 5 0 . 5 7 2 - 0 0 0 1 5
l n d a y s - . 0 7 3 7 7 0 4 . 0 2 5 1 6 0 4 - 2 9 3 2 0 . 0 0 4 0 0 1 6 0
l n e p s | - . 1 6 0 3 8 5 5 . 0 4 5 9 4 9 - 3 4 9 1 0 . 0 0 1 0 0 2 3 4
l n i n s i d e r | - . 0 8 7 4 2 2 7 . 0 1 8 9 5 9 9 - 4 6 1 1 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 7
l n i p o s z | - . 1 2 6 8 0 9 6 . 0 2 0 2 6 3 4 - 6 2 5 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 5 7
l n l o t t e r | - . 0 8 9 6 4 0 4 . 0 1 3 0 2 7 2 - 6 8 8 1 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 9 0 5
lnmkgdp | - . 1 1 6 6 5 4 5 . 0 1 8 6 8 9 9 - 6 . 2 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 7 5 3
l n s e o s z 1 . 0 9 7 9 5 8 . 2 4 9 5 6 7 2 4 . 3 9 9 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 3 7 9
lnshrpp | . 0 3 9 5 1 4 4 . 0 2 1 1 7 4 2 1 . 8 6 6 0 0 6 3 0 . 0 0 5 3
I n s t a t e | - . 1 0 3 6 9 3 6 . 0 3 6 6 0 7 8 - 2 . 8 3 3 0 0 0 5 0 . 0 1 4 8
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Table 4.7 Univariate Analysis of Explanatory Variables with MSR Using Robust
Estimation
MSR | C o e f . S t d . E r r . t P > 1 1 1
method . 0 7 5 7 2 1 4 . 0 3 5 1 0 8 2 1 5 7 0 . 0 3 2
lndays | - . 0 8 6 6 6 6 7 . 0 2 5 1 0 7 9 - 3 4 5 2 0 . 0 0 1
lneps - . 1 4 6 2 3 9 4 . 0 4 6 4 9 6 2 - 3 1 4 5 0 . 0 0 2
lninside - . 0 8 9 3 8 4 4 . 0 1 9 0 8 9 6 - 4 6 8 2 0 . 0 0 0
lniposz - . 1 2 4 5 3 8 1 . 0 2 0 5 5 9 7 - 6 0 5 7 0 . 0 0 0
l n l o t t e r - . 0 8 7 5 5 7 6 . 0 1 3 3 8 1 1 - 6 5 4 3 0 . 0 0 0
lnmkgdp | - . 1 1 6 4 8 4 1 . 0 1 8 9 2 1 6 - 6 1 5 6 0 0 0 0
l n s e o s z 1 . 0 8 1 4 9 2 . 2 5 1 5 4 1 8 4 . 2 9 9 0 0 0 0
lnshrpp | . 0 4 3 4 4 0 1 . 0 2 1 2 7 7 5 2 . 0 4 2 0 0 4 2
I n s t a t e - . 1 1 1 5 2 1 1 . 0 3 6 8 0 4 9 - 3 . 0 3 0 0 0 0 3
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Table 4.8 Stocks Traded, Turnover Ratio (%)
Country Name 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
China 164.03 235.18 115.86 329.03 244.17 130.12 118.32
Hong Kong,
China
61 55 37.30 44.20 113.40 54.40 37.51
India 27.46 24.15 10.52 17.36 27.14 56.00 52.90
Japan 25.86 24.93 30.90 37.10 47.20 40.30 33.77
Korea, Rep. 172.18 174.15 97.76 110.35 140.55 184.73 248.04
Singapore 26.2 26.7 42.20 28.70 49.90 50.50 40.68
Taiwan, China 252.42 366.11 227.84 243.43 368.46 261.79 237.57
United
Kingdom
80.5 77.1 77.10 36.80 44.40 53.40 74.90
United States 53 53 85.70 92.80 103.20 106.20 78.00
Source: The World Bank Development IndicatorCD-ROM 2000
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Iable 4.9: Multivariate Analysis with or without Variables AGE and SHRPP
Dependent
Variable: SR With AGE and SHRPP Without AGE and SHRPP
Regressors OLS ROBUST OLS ROBUST
METHOD
17.55621' 18.4747" 17.65051' 18.6481"
(2.164) (2.433) (2.181) (2.444)
LNAGE
0.5334
(0.053)
-0.5603
(-0.059)
LNDAYS
-37.3106" -33.9255" -37.2806" -33.9024"
(-5.958) (-5.7X9) (-6.016) (-5.802)
LNEPS
-39.2472°
-. I364c -31.5947° -32.8453°
(-1.764) (-1.732) (-1.789) (-1.773)
ININSIDER
28.9556 15.5074 27.609 13.7076
(1.1257) (0.644) (1.084) (0.571)
LNIPOSZ
-52.8509" -39.8471" -53.5087" -42.9302"
(-5.257) (-4.235) (-5.412) (-4.604)
ENMKG DP
-23.1447 -12.1628 -21.4370 -9.0875
(-0.813) (-0.457) (-0.765) (-0.344)
1 1 5
LNSEOSZ
53.8836 a 45.9310a 54.08093 47.7490a
(6.536) (5.953) (6.680) (6.254)
LNSHRPP
1.7457
(0.400)
4.7971
(1.174)
LNSTATE
-1.1855
-4.1698
-1.3124 -3.6907
(-0.136) (-0.509) (-0.165) (-0.492)
LNLOTTERY
-13.4129 a -13.5491a -13.38643 -13.53923
(-3.962) (-4.277) (-3.966) (-4.254)
F-value
18.45
(0.0000)
15.61
(0.0000)
22.64
(0.0000)
19.05
(0.0000)
Adjusted R2
0.2917 0.2947
Notes:
1. The dependent variable is IPO simple return, SR.
2. Figures in parenthesis under coefficients are t-values.
3. The levels of significance are shown as follows: a denotes 1% significance, b 5^
significance and c 10% significance.
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Table 4.10: Multivariate Analysis with or without Variables AGE and SHRPP
Dependent
Variable: MSR With AGE and SHRPP Without AGE and SHRPP
Regressors OLS ROBUST OLS ROBUST
METHOD .098 ln .1033a ,0997a . 1058a
(3.023) (3.091) (3.074) (3.159)
LNAGE -.0331
(-0.819)
-.0298
(-0.715)
LNDAYS 1696a -.1676" -.1660:1 1628a
(-6.773) (-6.496) (-6.683) (-6.347)
LNEPS -.1364 -.1577° -.1426° -.1662c
(-1.530) (-1.717) (-1.709) (-1.809)
LNINSIDER -.1109 -.1364 -.1212 -.1520
(-1.007) (-1.202) (-1.108) (-1.346)
LNIPOSZ 1935a -.1818a -.1992a -.1935a
(-4.846) (-4.420) (-5.054) (-4.753)
ENMKGDP .1235 .1347 .1357 .1560
(1.045) (1.106) (1.160) (1.292)
1 1 7
LNSEOSZ
LNSHRPP
LNSTATE
LNLOTTERY
2.7659 a
(8.227)
.0230
(1.319)
- .0212
(-0.607)
-.0835a
(-6.172)
2.9188a
(8.428)
.0323
(1.174)
-.0314
(-0.872)
-.0815 a
(-5.845)
2.84303
(8.578)
-.0085
(-0.267)
-.0837a
(-6.187)
3.0084a
(6.254)
-.0179
(-0.545)
-.0817 a
(-5.848)
F-value
Adjusted R :
23.87 (0.0000)
0.3506
23.67 (0.0000) 28.87 (0.0000)
0.3499
28.32
Notes:
1. The dependent variable is IPO market-adjusted simple return, MSR.
2. Figures in parenthesis under coefficients are t-values.
3. The levels of significance are shown as follows: a denotes 1% significance, b 5%
significance and c 10% significance.
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Table 4.12:
Multivariate Analysis with and without LNIPOSZ, LNMKGDP and LNSTATE
Dependent
Variable: SR With LNIPOSE, LNMKGDP and
LNSTATE
Without LNIPOSE, LNMKGDP
and LNSTATE
Regressors OLS ROBUST OLS ROBUST
METHOD 17.6505 b 18.6481 a 22.2426 a
(2.181) (2.444) (2.6999) 20.8950 3
(2.753)
LNDAYS -37.2806 3 -33.9024 3 -39.3639 a
(-6.016) (-5.802) (-6.359) -37.0934 3
(-6.506)
LNEPS -39.5947° -32.8453° -56.6145 a
(-1.789) (-1.773) r-5.776; -39.4697 a
(-4.373)
ININSIDER 27.609 13.7076 -25.5488 a
(1.084) (0.571) -22.0602 3
(-5.327)
LNIPOSZ -53.5087 3 -42.9302 a
(-5.412) (-4.604)
LNMKGDP -21.4370 -9.0875
(-0.765) (-0.344)
1 2 0
LNSEOSZ 54.08093 47.74903 38.3146a
(6.680) (6.254) (2.918) 36.76083
(2.966)
LNSTATE -1.3124
-3.6907
(-0.165) (-0.492)
LNLOTTERY -13.3864 3 -13.53923
-18.96393
(-3.966) (-4.254) (-5.707)
-17.20513
(-5.622)
F-value 22.16 (0.0000) 18.77 (0.0000) 21(0.0000) 24.40(0.0000)
Adjusted R2 0.2902 0.2508
Notes: 1.The dependent variable is IPO simple return, SR.
2.Figures in parenthesis under coefficients are t-values.
3.The levels of significance are shown as follows: a denotes 1% significance, b 5%
significance and c 10% significance.
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Chapter 5
Long-run Underperformance: Evidence from China's stock market
5.1 Introduction
One of the puzzles regarding Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) is their poor long-run
investment performance reported in Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) and Ritter (1991).
Aggarwal and Rivoli and Ritter examine the long-run performance of new issues in
the US and report some degree of underperformance in the aftermarket. Aggarwal and
Rivoli (1990), on the basis of a sample of 1,598 IPOs issued during 1977-1987,
document an abnormal return of-13.73 percent for investors purchasing all IPOs in
the open market at the close of the first trading day and holding each for a period of
250 trading days. Ritter (1991) examines the underperformance of US IPO firms
categorised by adjusted initial returns using a sample of 1,526 IPOs issued during
1975-1984. He reports that there is a tendency for firms with high adjusted initial
returns to have the worst aftermarket performance. The tendency is stronger for
smaller issues than for large issues. Besides, Ritter's study also indicates that the
underperformance of IPOs extends beyond the first year of trading. Loughran and
Ritter (1993), for 4,753 US companies going public in 1970-87, document the
underperformance of IPOs relative to seasoned firms with the same market
capitalisation. Loughran and Ritter (1995) document the significant downward drift of
IPO firms in the US three to five years subsequent to the offerings.
Various studies with international data generally suggest that the long-run
underperformance of IPOs is a global phenomenon. Aggarwal et al. (1993) for Latin
America, Keloharju (1993) for Finland, Levis (1993) for the UK, and Ljungqvist
(1994) for Germany report average market-adjusted losses of 47.0 percent, 8.1
percent, 21.1 percent, and 8.6 percent, respectively, by the third anniversary of their
first trade. Studies in Hong Kong (McGuinness, 1993) also report negative
aftermarket performance with market adjusted prices falling by six or seven percent.
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Investigation of the long-run underperformance of Chinese IPOs is interesting and
timely. Chinese stock exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen
Stock exchange (SZSE), were only set up in December 1990 and January 1991
respectively.1 China's stock market has been an important avenue for the investment
of funds and for the growth of the private sector since then. The evidence of long-run
underperformance has a huge effect on the functioning of the Chinese capital market
and the cost of raising funds for individual Chinese firms. Accordingly, this study will
contribute to the literature by examining the hitherto unexplored matter of the
investment performance of Chinese IPOs.
This chapter has two main objectives. Firstly, we will examine and measure the extent
of long-run underperformance of Chinese IPOs. According to our preliminary
analysis, we do find the existence of the long-run underperformance in Chinese IPOs.
Our second objective, therefore, is to empirically test the validity of three hypotheses:
the divergence of opinion hypothesis (Miller 1977), the speculative bubble hypothesis
(Tinic 1988, Shiller 1990) and the windows of opportunity (Ritter 1991). All
hypotheses are widely used to explain the long-run underperformance phenomenon in
the stock markets. In short, we empirically examine Chinese IPOs to provide one case
of the international evidence on the long-run underperformance of IPOs.
The chapter proceeds by reviewing some of the international literature on IPO long-
run performance in section two. Data and methodology are then described in section
three, followed by the empirical analyses and findings in section four. Finally, the
summary and conclusions are presented in section five.
5.2 Literature Review
Three hypotheses have been proposed to explain the phenomenon of the long-run
underperformamce of IPOs, the divergence of opinion hypothesis (Miller 1977), the
speculative bubble hypothesis (Tinic 1988, Shiller 1990), and the windows of
opportunity (Ritter 1991).
1 China's Stock Market Yearbook 1992. China Finance Publishing House, Beijing China.
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5.2.1 The divergence of opinion hypothesis (Miller 1977)
Miller (1977) presents an explanation based on changes in the divergence of opinion
among investors. According to him, an IPO is usually subscribed to by investors who
are the most optimistic about the issue and its price is set by this group rather than the
appraisal of the typical investor. Further, the greater the uncertainty about the value of
the IPO, the higher the price that optimistic investors are willing to pay relative to
pessimistic investors. In the long run, as more information about the issuing firm
becomes available, the divergence of opinion between these two groups of investors
will narrow and, consequently, the market price will drop. Thus, Miller predicts that
IPOs will generate abnormal returns in the short-run but they will have smaller price
appreciation than seasoned firms (i.e., underperformance) in the long run. He also
expects an IPO's long-run return to be negatively related with its ex ante uncertainty.
As surveyed in Loughran (1993), international evidence is generally consistent with
Miller's prediction.
5.2.2 The speculative bubble hypothesis (Tinic 1988, Shiller 1990)
Tinic (1988) proposes an alternative explanation. According to him, the market for
IPOs is subject to fads or speculative bubble. Shiller (1990) adds that IPOs are
underpriced by investment bankers to create the appearance of excess demand.
According to them, the long-run performance of IPOs would be negatively related to
the short-run underpricing due to the speculation of "those investors who would not
get an allocation of the oversubscribed new issues from the underwriter at the offering
price" and also due to "price manipulation", firms going public taking advantage ol
temporary improvements in performance to issue new shares when investors have
overly optimistic expectations about firms' future prospects. I herefore, this
hypothesis, in some way, is developed on the basis of Miller s hypothesis. With US
data for the period between 1977-1987, Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) lound that, altei
adjusting for market movements, the return to the investors who purchased at the
closing price of day 1 in the alter market and held until day 250 (a one-year period)
was significantly negative (-13.73 percent). They concluded a lad or speculative
explanation for the long-run underperformance in the IPO market.
Lee, Taylor and Walter (1996) investigate long-run performance for 132 IPOs in the
Singapore stock market. This is an important study because ol the high levels of
oversubscription in the Singapore stock market. 1he returns are based on two
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measures, one is raw wealth relatives, and the other is adjusted wealth relatives in
which market index is used as the benchmark portfolio. Their empirical results show
that the long-run returns are not abnormally poor and not relative to initial
underpricing. The high oversubscription levels, which is a feature in the Singapore
stock market are not associated with the speculative bubble or fad hypothesis. They
argue that the high oversubscription levels are demand expansions from informed
investors. Chan, Wang and Wei (2004) investigate the long-run performance based on
1 or 3-year A-share and B-share buy and hold returns and related benchmark
portfolios, and wealth relatives. They find that A-share IPOs slightly underperforms
their non-IPOs benchmarks with wealth relatives ranging from 0.90 to 0.98. They also
find that post-issuance stock returns for A-share IPOs are positively related to changes
in operating return on assets, changes in sales growth rate, etc. long-run performance
is not purely driven by speculation, but is a reflection of a firm's operating
performance
5.2.3 The Windows of Opportunity Hypothesis
If there are periods when investors are especially optimistic about the growth potential
of firms going public, the large cycles in volume may represent a response by firms
attempting to "time" their IPOs to take advantage of these swings in investors'
sentiment. The windows of opportunity hypothesis predicts that firms going public in
high volume periods are more likely to be overvalued than other IPOs. It has the
timetable implication that the high volume periods should be associated with the
lowest long-run returns.
Ritter (1991) investigates long-run performance of IPOs in US stock market by using
samples of 1,528 in 1975-1984. In his empirical work, he chooses a set of samples and
a set of marching firms which are listed on the US stock market and are to some
extent matched by industry and market capitalisation with each IPO. I he returns are
calculated for two intervals: the initial return period (normally one day), and the
aftermarket period which is delined as 3 years after the IPOs exclusive of the initial
return period. The long-run performance is measured by three lactors, the first is the
cumulative average adjusted returns which are computed by several dillerent
benchmarks, the second is 3-year but and hold returns for both the 11Os and a set of
matching firms. The final one is the wealth relatives. After cross-sectional and time
series analysis, he finds that investors are periodically over-optimistic about the
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earnings potential of young growth companies and firms take advantage of these
"windows of opportunity". Cai and Wei (1997) study long-run stock returns and the
operating performance of 180 IPOs listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange during the
1971-1992 period by using value-weighted and equally-weighted market portfolio. In
contrast to evidence from the US, the post-issue deterioration in operating
performance cannot be attributed to reduced managerial ownership. The windows of
opportunity hypothesis is strongly supported by this study.
Yi (2001) employs 1,032 IPOs in the US between 1987 and 1991 and Ritter (1991)'s
methodology to examine long-run performance in the US stock market. His study
finds that IPOs firms, as a whole, underperformed a market index and control firms
over a 3-year period after going public. Investors may have been too optimistic about
future prospects of the IPO firms, especially those that had negative earnings. The
finding is in general consistent with the finding of Ritter (1991).
In China's stock markets, the majority of shares are state-owned shares which are non-
tradeable, as the supply of tradeable A-shares is smaller relative to the number of
investors, the marginal buyers will be over-optimistic because of the wide divergence
around the estimates of the stock's true value. This may cause divergence of opinion,
or speculative bubbles, or windows opportunity in the IPO market. Such explanations
are very important in the Chinese context, which implies that markets are inefficient.
Mok and Hui (1998) test the speculative bubble hypothesis by tracing the cumulative
average excess returns over time. The excess market returns of the overpriced A-share
IPOs, in particular, remained significantly positive over 350 days and this represents a
real phenomenon, rather than a speculative conjecture. Chi and Padgett (2005) employ
market adjusted returns, Shanghai index and Shenzhen index as corresponding
benchmarks, and wealth relatives to examine long-run performance in China s stock
market by using 668 IPOs from 1996 to 2000. Their results show that when there is an
increase in the market index and market initial returns on IPOs, the CSRC launches
more IPOs to the market. There is a close relationship between the index performance
and issuing numbers. They argue that the CSRC did a good job in timing IPOs to
catch the windows opportunity.
Ritter and Welch (2002) even argue that long-run performance may be the most
controversial area of IPO research. In this chapter, we employ the methodology of
Ritter (1991) to investigate long-run performance in China's stock market.
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5.3 Data Description and Methodology
5.3.1 Data Description
According to prior research, Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1993) report that the
period of long-run underperformance last 3 to 5 years in the US stock market.
Compared to other developed markets, China's stock market is new. Some factors
have to be considered when we started to choose data from A-share stock market.
Firstly, the new "Enterprise Accounting Standards" and "Enterprise Financial
Accounting Principle" came into effect on July 1993. Secondly, before 2000, the
scale of IPOs was very small, and many IPO companies also placed shares to market
within 5 years after their IPOs. After 2000, the scale of IPOs started to increase and
the types of IPOs' industry became more diverse. For each matching firm, we choose
non-issuing firms listed on SSE and SEZE that have not placed issues within 3 years.
A total of 237 A-share IPOs are identified that have data available during the period
1997-2001. The main emphasis of this study is on the long-run investment
performance of IPOs. To investigate long-run performance of all these IPOs, this
study employs standard event study methodology similar to the one used by Loughran
and Ritter (1993) and Ritter (1991) and Gompers and Lerner (2004). Long-run
performance of IPOs in the sample will be statistically measured and empirically
tested using various return measurements, horizontal periods and portfolio
benchmarks to gain a better understanding of it.
5.3.2 Methodology
To investigate the aftermarket performance of IPOs, this study employs standard event
study methodology. Our return results are based on three measures, namely, buy-and-
hold abnormal return, the wealth relative and the cumulative abnormal return
according to available data.
5.3.2.1 Buy-and-hold Abnormal Return
As in Ritter (1991), the holding period returns (R,) are computed as:
« , = n o + o - >
/=i
where r„ is the raw return on firm i in event month t. This measures the total return
from a buy and hold strategy where an IPO is purchased at the first day of going
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public and held until it's the Tth-year anniversary. T stands for three different periods
such as 1-year, 3-year and 5-year which we have chosen. For example, the three-year
HPR could be computed as:
r , = n o + o - i
(=1
In addition to this event time analysis, we also launch the so-called calendar time
analysis for our sample of IPO firms, which is employed by Gompers and Lerner
(2004). In order to examine the calendar time performance, we calculate returns for all
firms that were already public at the beginning of the year and do not celebrate the
fifth anniversary of their IPO by the end of the year.
The market-adjusted or abnormal return (ar) for stock /' in event period t is defined as:
where r lt is the raw return on stock i in event period t and rmt is the return on the
market index for event period t. In accordance with Ritter (1991), abnormal returns
are calculated for two time intervals: the initial return period, defined as the offering
price to the first closing price, and the aftermarket period, defined as 1 year after the
offering exclusive of the initial return period. Return months are defined as successive
21-day trading periods relative to the offering. Thus, month 1 consists of event days 2-
22; month 2 consists of event days 23-43, and so forth.
As in Ritter (1991), this chapter utilises value weighted market indices rather than
matching firms based on market capitalisation, the approach used by Loughran and
Ritter (1995). Barber and Lyon (1997) document that test statistics based on abnormal
returns with the use of a reference portfolio, such as an equally weighted market index
may be mis-specified owing to new listing, rebalancing, and skewness bias. When
calculating Shanghai A-share market-adjusted returns, we use the Shanghai A-share
price index as the benchmark portfolio. I he Shanghai A-share price index is the
value-weighted price index.
The average abnormal return (AR) on a portfolio of n stocks lor event period t is the
equally weighted arithmetic average of the market-adjusted returns:
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A R , = ~ ± a r „
The statistical significance of the average abnormal return (AR) is determined by using
the usual t-statistic, which is computed for each period as:
t(AR,) = AR, / SE(AR,)
where SE(ARJ is the standard error of the average abnormal return in period t and
t(AR t) is the t-statistic (with n-2 degrees of freedom) for the null hypothesis that the
average abnormal return in any given period is zero.
5.3.2.2 The Wealth Relative (WR)
Alternatively, also as in Ritter (1991), performance measurement for a group of IPOs
could also be assessed by the wealth relative (WR), which is defined as follows:
1+ average T year total return on IPOsWK =
1 + average T year total return on matching firms
A wealth relative of greater than 1.00 indicates IPOs outperform the stock market
price index, while a value below 1.00 indicates IPO underperfonnance.
5.3.2.3 The Cumulative Abnormal Return
Though Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that buy-and-hold returns provide reliable
inferences because they mimic returns that an investor could actually have achieved,
Fama (1998) argues that buy-and-hold returns, calculated above might provide an
unreliable measure of performance. He argues that cumulative monthly returns
provide a more reliable measure, especially when performance is measured over a
long interval. The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is calculated by cumulating the
average abnormal returns from the beginning of the first full calendar month of
trading to event month t:
t
CAR, = Yj AR <
<=i
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The statistical significance of the cumulative average abnormal (CAR) is determined
by using the t-statistic. The t-statistic lor the cumulative abnormal return in month t is
calculated as:
t(CAR,) = ^
yjt* var+2*(/-l)*cov
where t(CAR,) is the t-statistic for the null hypothesis that the cumulative average
abnormal return over period t is equal to zero, t is the event month, var is the average
(over 36 months) cross-sectional variance, and cov is the first-order autocovariance of
the AR, series.
After the measurement of the long-run performance of IPOs, the next step is to test
two hypotheses, the divergence of opinion hypothesis (Miller, 1977) and the
speculative bubble hypothesis (Tinic 1988, Shiller 1990) that have been mentioned
above, in other words, to see if these two hypotheses are valid in China's stock
markets, or the long term underperformance of Chinese IPOs could be explained by
these two hypotheses. A multiple regression is used to test these two hypotheses. The
model is given as follows:
Return = a 0 + a ]Ln(Size) + a 2 Ln(\ + Age) + aJR + a 4 Sub + s
The dependent variable, Return, is measured using the market-adjusted buy and hold
return over three different holding periods (1) the 1-year period inclusive of the first
month (Regression 1); and (2) the 3-year period inclusive of the first month
(Regression 2). LN denotes the natural logarithm. Variable LN(Size), which is a proxy
for ex ante uncertainty, is measured by the natural logarithm of the book value of
equity after the offering. The impact of an IPO's age on the long-run performance is
examined by utilising LN(1+Age) as an explanatory variable where Age is measured
by the difference between the year of going public and the year of founding. To be
consistent with the divergence of opinion hypothesis namely, a negative relationship
between the long-run performance and uncertainty), Regression 1 and 2 should yield
positive coefficients for LN(Size) because the ex ante uncertainty is inversely related
to a firm's size. Hence, LN(1+Age), the operating history of the firms going public
could be regarded as another proxy for ex ante uncertainty and also gives a negative
signal. To test the speculative bubble hypothesis, namely, the long-run performance of
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IPOs should he negatively related to the short-term underpricing, the market-adjusted
r e t u r no n t h e f i r s t t r a d i n gd a y , I R ,i s i n c l u d e di nt h e m o d e la n d a n e g a t i v es i g n f o rI R
is expected. Besides, explanatory variable Sub, the over-subscription ratio,
representing the extent of the subscription, could be regarded as an alternative for
over-optimism of investors and a negative sign is expected as well.
5.4 Empirical Findings
As we have mentioned, lirstly, we use buy-and-hold strategy, including event time
analysis and calendar time analysis to calculate returns over four different periods to
measure the returns of Chinese IPOs. The findings are presented in Tables 5.1 and5. 2.
The long-run stock performance is measured by first computing 1-year, 3-year and 5
year holding period raw returns including the initial return. We use the Shanghai and
Shenzhen A-share Price index as the benchmark to measure the long-run abnormal
returns of IPOs. That is to say the adjusted returns are calculated by subtracting the
corresponding 1-year, 3-year, and 5-year period returns of the Shanghai and Shenzhen
A-share Price index from the IPOs' raw returns and on the basis of individually
adjusted return we get average adjusted return (AR). Then, the cumulative average
return (CAR), the summation of the average market-adjusted returns, is calculated to
represent the gains/losses from a strategy of buying IPOs on the first day of listing to
avoid potential problems with the buy-and-hold strategy. Table 1 shows the average
returns and cumulative average returns of Chinese IPOs, using event time analysis.
The CARs are shown for months 1, 2, 3, 12, 24, 36, 48, 60 and 72. The AR in the first
month is negative. Month 12 also shows a negative abnormal return, reflected in the
decline of the CAR. By month 36 the cumulative average return is -1.34 percent,
showing a substantial decline in investment value. Although the Ibbotson (1975)
results suggested underperformance ends alter about four years, the results here
indicate a continuing deterioration in performance lor Chinese IPOs. By month 60 the
CAR is -1.58 percent. Lastly, an alternative measure of long-run performance, the
Wealth Relative, gives similar findings. Iable 5.3 represents the long-run stock
returns for Chinese IPOs categorised by the year ol issuance and provides
corresponding Wealth Relatives (WR). I he performance ol IPOs declined and the
performance of matching firms also decreased. Wealth Relatives lor IPOs made in the
sample period vary. In most years, however, Wealth Relatives are less than one,
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confirming the widespread incidence of underperformance documented in the
previous section. I wo findings stand out: for one thing, consistent with other
countries empirical results, the Chinese evidence shows that the level of IPO
underpertioinance is economically and statistically significant; tor another, the
Chinese evidence also shows that a gradual but steady decline tendency in the long-
run performance continues even after the fifth year anniversary of public listing. The
result from table 5.3 is consistent with Chan, Wang and Wei (2004) and Chi and
Padgett (2005)
The results of multiple regression tests of two hypotheses, the divergence of opinion
hypothesis and the speculative bubble hypothesis, are provided in Table 5.4.
Regression 1 and 2, employing different sample periods examines the validity of these
two hypotheses in explaining the long-run underperformance. All t-statistic are
represented in parentheses. Two findings emerge. On one hand, variable LN(I+Age),
the natural logarithm of the number of years of the company before going public and
variable Sub, the over-subscription ratio, do not have a significant impact on Return,
the market-adjusted buy-and-hold return. Because most of the listing companies in
China's stock market are converted from state-owned enterprises that had a very long
history, the Age might not be a very sensitive proxy for the ex ante uncertainty for
Chinese IPOs. As for over-subscription, which is frequently evident in Chinese IPOs,
the reason why it is not associated with a "speculative bubble" is that over-
subscription is better described as informed demand expansion following ex ante
rational price setting in the prospectus in a market setting where investors demand for
an IPO is not constrained by bias in the allocation methods used by issuers and
underwriters. On the other hand, variables LN(Size), the natural logarithm ol the book
value of equity after IPO and IR, the market-adjusted return on the first trading day,
both have a statistically significant effect on Return and have the right signs.
Coefficient of variable LN(Size) is statistically significant and has a positive sign,
which means the divergence of opinion hypothesis (Miller 1977) receives support in
the case of Chinese IPOs. Similarly, Coefficient ol variable IR is statistically
significant and has a negative sign, which means the speculative bubble hypothesis
(Tinic 1988 and Shiller 1990) also receives support in the case of Chinese IPOs. In
other words, there is a negative relationship between market-adjusted buy-and-hold
return and market-adjusted return on the first trading day, namely, in the short-run,
Chinese IPOs are underpriced but in the long-run Chinese IPOs underperformed. In
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any event, both hypotheses could be employed to explain the long-run
underperformancein China's stock market.
5.5 Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, we empirically investigate Chinese initial public offerings to provide
one case ol the international evidence on the long-run performance of IPOs using a
sample of 237 Chinese IPOs listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange from 1997 to
2001. Although IPOs' long-run performance has been extensively examined in the
finance literature, Chinese IPOs have received little attention. The present study
advances the finance literature by investigating this matter. This study leads to a
number of important conclusions.
Firstly, and similar to the US and UK initial public offerings in general, Chinese IPOs
are not only underpriced in the short run but also underperform in the long run. The
long-run performance is negatively related to the short-run underpricing. The finding
is consistent with Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) and Ritter (1991) and other economic
scholars.
Secondly, the aftermarket, long-run downward drift is not only confirmed but also
found to be large in magnitude relative to the stock market price index performance.
Thirdly, the post-issue operating performance is also poor. Chinese evidence shows
that the level of IPO underperfromance is economically and statistically significant.
Moreover, Ibbotson (1975) and Ritter (1991), in their respective US studies, suggest
poor performance ends after three or four years. Loughran and Ritter (1995) find the
poor stock performance extends to 5 years after issue, with no further
underperformance in the sixth year. Chinese evidence, however, shows that such a
gradual but steady decline tendency in the long-run perlormance lasts more than three
years and continues even after the fifth anniversary ol public listing.
Lastly, the divergence of opinion hypothesis and the speculative bubble hypothesis are
both valid in China's stock market. That is to say, the long-run underperformance of
Chinese IPOs could be explained by these two mutually inclusive hypotheses. In
short, due to the overoptimistic behaviour ol investors towards the future prospects ol
new public firms (the divergence ol opinion hypothesis, Miller 1977) and due to the
speculation of "those investors who would not get an allocation ol the oversubscribed
new issues from the underwriter at the olfering price and also due to price
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manipulation", firms going public take advantage of temporary improvements in
performance to issue new shares when investors have overly optimistic expectations
about firms' future prospects (the speculative bubble hypothesis, Tinic 1C)8K and
Shiller 1990), long-run underperformance has existed in China's stock market and
negative abnormal returns continue up to at least five years subsequent to listing.
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Table 5.1 Average Abnormal Returns (ARs) and Cumulative Abnormal Returns
(CARs) for Chinese IPOs Using Calendar Time Analysis
The long-run stock performance is measured by first computing IPOs' raw returns
txcluding the initial return. 1hen the adjusted returns or abnormal returns are
calculated by subtracting the corresponding market returns of China's stock market
from the IPOs' raw returns. On the basis of individual abnormal returns, average
abnormal returns will be calculated, finally, the cumulative average returns (CAR),
the summation of the average market-adjusted returns, are calculated to represent the
gains/losses from a strategy of buying IPOs on the first day of listing.
Month of
seasoning
AR(%) t-statistic CAR (%) t-statistic
1 -0.68 -0.53
2 0.0085 0.04X5 -0.51 -2.9724
3 0.0089 0.0778 -0.55 -1.0215
12 -0.32 -1.9436 -0.68 -3.6)445
24 0.0032 0.2715 -1.28 -1.0762
36 0.0385 3.3381 -1.37 -2.1914
48 0.0029 0.5137 -1.50 -3.3327
60 -0.0032 -1.8987 -1.59 -24936
72 0.00401 0.7206 -1.65 -25118
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The market-adjusted or abnormal return (ar) for stock /' in event period t is defined as:
where r„ is the raw return on stock i in event period t and rmt is the return on the
market index for event period t.
The average abnormal return ( A R )on a portfolio of n stocks for event period t is the
AR, = -£ar„
n ,=i
equally weighted arithmetic average of the market-adjusted returns:
The statistical significance of the average abnormal return ( A R )is determined by using
the usual t-statistic, which is computed for each period as:
t ( A R , )= A R l / S E ( A R , )
where SE(AR,) is the standard error of the average abnormal return in period t and
t(AR,) is the t-statistic (with n-2 degrees of freedom) for the null hypothesis that the
average abnormal return in any given period is zero.
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Table 5.2 Average abnormal returns (ARs) and Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs)
for Chinese IPOs using calendar time analysis
The long-run stock performance is measured by first computing IPOs' raw returns
excluding the initial return. 1hen the adjusted returns or abnormal returns are
calculated by subtracting the corresponding market returns of China's stock market
from the IPOs' raw returns. On the basis of individual abnormal returns, average
abnormal returns will be calculated. Finally, the cumulative average returns (CAR),
the summation of the average market-adjusted returns, are calculated to represent the
gains/losses from a strategy of buying IPOs on the first day of listing.
Month of
seasoning
A R(%) (-statistic CAR (%) t-statistic
1 -0.57 -0.57
2 0.01 0.0564 -0.56 -1.9197
3 0.01 0.0859 -0.55 -1.2301
12 -0.20 -2.1183 -0.71 -2.7616
24 0.02 0.1228 -1.07 -1.9473
36 0.04 2.2206 -1.34 -2.5956
48 0.003 0.4890 -1.42 -1.8258
60 -0.003 -0.4911 -1.58 -2.3272
72 0.003 0.6851 -1.63 -2.2616
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The cumulative abnormal return ( C A R ) is calculated by cumulating the average
abnormal returns from the beginning of the first full calendar month of trading to
t
C A R , = Y j A R ,
<=i
event month t:
The statistical significance of the cumulative average abnormal ( C A R ) is determined
by using the t-statistic. The t-statistic for the cumulative abnormal return in month t is
calculated as:
, ( C A R , ) = C A R ' * ^
yjt * var+ 2 * (/ -1) * cov
where t( C A R , ) is the t-statistic for the null hypothesis that the cumulative average
abnormal return over period t is equal to zero, t is the event month, var is the average
(over 36 months) cross-sectional variance, and cov is the first-order autocovariance of
th qAR, series.
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Table5.3: Long-run Performance of Chinese IPOs Relative to the matching firms
All returns are measured by average 3-year, and 5-year buy-and -hold returns exclusive
of the first trading day return. Wealth Relative (WR) is defined as:
yyn _ 1+ average T year total return on IPOs
1+ average /' year total return on matching firms
(Excluding initial return)
Three-year period
Year
Sample
size
IPOs
11PR(%)
WR
Matching
firms
1IPR(%)
1998 26 -2.92 -3.77 -3.47
1999 55 3.6 0.43 -11.10
2000 75 -0.99 0.23 -2.72
2001 70 -0.93 0.26 -0.19
Year
Sample
size
Five-year period
IPOs
11PR(%)
WR
Matching
firms
1997
1 1
-2.75 0.42 -2.15
1998 26 6.48 0.48 -12.14
1999 55 -2.27 0.55 -9.47
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Table 5. 4 Results of Multiple Regression for Chinese IPOs
Return =a 0 + a{Ln(Size) + a2Ln(\ + Age)+ a3IR + a,Sub + e
where
Return = market-adjusted buy-and-hold return
Size = the natural logarithm of the book value of equity after IPO
Age = the number of years in operating before the offering
IR = market-adjusted return on the first trading day
Sub = the over-subscription ratio of shares offering
(Values in parentheses represent t-statistics. Significance at a 5% and 1% level is
indicated by one and two asterisks.)
Holding Regression 1 Regression 2
period Month 1-12 Month 1-36
Constant
1.230
(1.663)
-0.778
(-0.912)
LN(Size)
0.564
(2.704)**
1.064
(2.890)**
LN(1+Age)
0.714
(0.883)
-0.613
(-0.907)
Sub
-1.145
(-1.682)
-2.193
(-1.316)
IR
-0.497
(3.319)**
-0.701
(2.956)**
No. of observations 221 136
Adj. R2 0.28 0.21
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Chapter 6
CAPM and FF3 FM: The Case of China's Stock Market
6.1 Introduction
Ritter and Welch (2002) put forward that "Long-run performance may be the most
controversial area of IPO research, with some researchers lining up behind an efficient
markets point of view. Kooli and Suret (2004) present that the existence of long-run
systematic price patterns raises questions concerning aftermarket efficiency which makes
the study of long-run performance of IPO important. Eckbo and Norli (2005) propound
that this long-run return evidence challenges the efficient markets hypotheses.To some
researchers, they have started to use the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)
and Fama-French Three-factor Model (FF3FM) to investigate the long-run performance
in the stock market.
In this Chapter, we are going to empirically examine the validity of the CAPM and
FF3FM using data from China' stock market and try to find a better explanation of
long-run underperformance in China's stock market.
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows:
Methodology about the Fama-MacBeth approach used to test CAPM is explained in
Section 2. The methodology towards testing FF3FM is also specilied in this section.
Section 3 reports the findings on the CAPM tests in China's A-share markets while
Section 4 reports the findings on the FF3FM tests in China's A-share market. Alter the
conclusions provided in Section 5, some additional explanations of the CAPM tests in
China's stock market are added in the last section, Section 6.
6.2. Literature Review
Markowitz (1959) creatively casts the investor's portfolio selection problem in terms ol
expected return and variance of return and he further argues that investors would
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optimally hold a mean-variance efficient portfolio; that is, a portfolio with the highest
expected return lor a given level of variance. On the basis of Markowitz (1959)'s
research, Sharpe( 1964), Lintner(1965) and Mossin(1966) independently developed the
standard form ol the capital asset pricing model, which is often referred to as the
Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin model or the standard CAPM. The CAPM rests on eight
assumptions as follows:
There are no taxes or transaction costs;
Assets are infinitely divisible;
An individual cannot affect the price of a stock by his buying or selling action. This is
analogous to the assumption of perfect competition;
Investors are expected to make decisions solely in terms of expected values and standard
deviations of the returns on their portfolios;
Unlimited short sales are allowed;
Unlimited lending and borrowing at the risk-free rate;
Investors have homogenous expectations of risk and return;
All assets are marketable (Edwin and Gruber, 1995).
Under such assumptions, the standard CAPM yields the following expression for the
equilibrium expected returns, E(R,), on asset i:
E ( R , )= R f + l t ( R J - R f \ p , ( I )
where Rj is the riskless rate of interest; E(Rni) is the expected return on the market
portfolio of all assets; and /?, = co v{R,, R m )/ the covariance between the return on
asset i and the market return divided by the variance of the market return, is the measure
of systematic risk of asset i.
The CAPM categorises risk into two types: one is the systematic risk and the other is
non-systematic. It argues that volatility arising from specific events (called
non-systematic risk) can be eliminated in a diversified portfolio while volatility resulting
from general movements in stock price and the tendency of all stocks to fluctuate in the
same direction (called systematic risk) cannot be diversified away. I he main implications
could be expressed as follows:
I) CAPM relates the expected return for any asset with the risk for that asset as measured
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by beta.
2) /?, the slope in the regression of an asset s return on the market, is the only risk that
affects expected return, namely, p suffices to explain expected return. When this
proposition holds, then
3) There is a positive price of risk in the capital markets. [E(RJ - RJ, the market risk
premium in terms of excess returns, is positive.
Put differently, the essence of CAPM is that the expected return on any asset is a positive
linear function of its beta and that beta is the only measure of risk needed to explain the
cross-section of expected returns.
The development of the CAPM can be regarded as a revolution in the field of finance.
There is, of course, a huge amount of literature to examine if the CAPM is valid since the
CAPM was developed. The early empirical tests focusing on the relationship between
return and the beta confirm the CAPM's prediction that the higher the risk, the higher the
return such as the empirical findings of Fama and MacBeth (1973). But with the process
of testing the CAPM, several anomalies in terms of firm characteristics such as the
price-earnings-ratio and size emerged, challenging the CAPM's argument that the beta is
sufficient to describe the cross-section of expected. That is to say, these firm
characteristics might also have explanatory power for the cross section of the expected
returns beyond the beta of the CAPM. The price-earnings-ratio effect was first
documented in the academic literature by Basu in 1977. Basu (1977) describes it as such a
phenomenon: firms with low price-earnings-ratio have higher expected returns, and firms
with high price-earnings-ratio have lower expected returns.
Banz (1981) first documents the size effect, which refers to the fact that low market
capitalisation firms have higher expected returns and vice versa. Banz finds that market
capitalization (a stock's price times shares outstanding) adds to the explanation of the
cross-section of average returns provided by market ^ s. Average returns on small (low
market capitalization) are too high given their @ estimates, and average returns on large
stocks are too high.
Besides, Fama and French (1992) have found stronger evidence to cast doubt on the
CAPM's implication that the beta is sufficient to describe the expected returns. Fama and
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French look closely at the relationship between expected return and the beta in a large
cross-section of equities, testing the joint roles of market beta, size, earnings-price ratio
and book-to-market equity in the cross-section of average returns on NYSE, AMEX, and
NASDAQ stocks. Their findings are: beta does not seem to help explain the cross-section
of average stock returns, and the combination of size and book-to-market equity seems to
absorb the roles of earnings-price ratio in average stock returns. Put differently, they
explain the cross-section of average stock returns not by beta defined in the CAPM, but
rather by two other factors, the size and the book-to-market equity. When these two
factors are taken into account, beta adds nothing to the explanation.
Fama and French (1993) invent a famous three-factor model, arguing that many of the
CAPM average-return anomalies can be captured by this model. They start with the
observation that two classes of stocks have tended to do better than the market as whole:
one is stocks with a small size, that is to say, small market capitalisation; the other is
stocks with a high book-to-market ratio (customarily called "value" stocks: their
opposites are called "growth" stocks). They then add two factors to CAPM to reflect a
portfolios' exposure to these two classes and finally form their famous three-factor
model, which is called Fama and French Three-factor Model (FF3FM).
The model says that the expected return on a portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate
[£(/0-fy]j s exp i a j nec j by the sensitivity of its return to three factors: i) the excess return
on a broad market portfolio; ii) the difference between the return on a portfolio
of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks (SMB, small minus big); and
iii) the difference between the return on a portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and the
return on a portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks (HML, high minus low). In other
words, SMB is meant to mimic the risk factor in returns related to size. HML is meant to
mimic the risk factor in returns related to value (that is book-to-market ratios).
Specifically, the expected excess return on portfolio7 is,
E ( R , ) -R f = b l [ E ( Rm ) - Rf ]+ s lE(SMB) + h iE(HML)
where , S ' and, are the factor sensitivitiesor loadings.
Fama and French (1996) use this three-factor model to examine the simple monthly
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percent excess returns on 25 portfolios formed on size and BE/ME and listed on NYSE,
AMEX and NASDAQ during 1963M7 to 1993M12. The results show that coefficient
ccl is (i) negative tor portfolios located in the extreme quartiles of the stocks of small
capitalisation and low ratio book to market and (ii) positive for portfolios located in the
extreme quartiles of the stocks of big capitalisations and high book to market ratio. In
addition to these results on the extremes, the coefficient is not significantly different from
zero; which makes it possible to affirm that the three-factor model explains cross-section
stock returns. Their results are consistent with their assumption that the anomalies largely
disappear in the three-factor model.
Wu and Kwok (2007) investigate the long-run performance of global IPOs as compared
to purely domestic ones made by US industrial companies. In their study, the coefficient
estimate of intercept term, a, from the time-series regressions are used as an indicatorof
risk-adjusted performance for each sample. They find that global IPOs not only
underperform the market but also underperform their domestic counterparts in the three
years after issuance. Their results are consistent with the window of opportunity
hypothesis.
Although, in 1997, Chinese scholars (Liu Bo and Zhao Xiaoping 1997) took the lead in
using the standard CAPM to do an empirical analysis on the relationship between returns
and beta in Shanghai A-share market, Mookerjee and Yu (1999) subject the newly
established stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen to test market efficiency, utilizing
daily stock price data. Their study concludes that there are significant inefficiencies
present on both exchanges. They analyse that the reasons for inefficiency in China's stock
market are due to several factors. These include the restricted supply of stocks, excessive
volatility because of abrupt policy changes by the authorities, and a scarcity of
information that is a result of limited enforcement of disclosure regulations. In our study,
we will attempt to compare the CAPM and FF3FM in explaining stock returns in the case
of China. The first objective of my study is once again to test the validity of the standard
CAPM in China's A-share markets with attempts to overcome some weaknesses of the
1997 study of Liu and Zhao such as the sample period of 1993 to 1997 when China's
stock market was quite immature, and the negligence of the Shenzhen A-share market.
That is to say, we will look at the returns and risk not only in the Shanghai A-share
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market but also in the Shenzhen A-share markets during 1998 - 2002.' The second
objective is to use 1T3FM in the hope of further assessing the asset pricing characteristics
in China s A-shaic market, at the same time comparing my findings with those from
similar studies in the literature.
6.3 Methodology
6.3.1 Data Description
I he sample data set contains 237 stocks traded in China s slock market, 147 were
selected from the Shanghai A-share market and 90 from the Shenzhen A-share market
during the sample period from January 1998 to December 2002 (60 months). The
following monthly data was retrieved from DATA STIU-AM, which is a subsidiary of
Primark Global Information Systems.
i) Monthly individual slock returns ( Rt) ;
ii) Monthly value-weighted market returns ( Rm) \
iii) China interbank offer rates on one-month deposits as proxy for risk-lree interest rates
( R, );
Besides, other data related to stock capitalisation and book to market ratios are from the
Fin-China, a famous database in China.
6.3.2 Fama-MacBeth Approach to testing CAPM
The CAPM's form is simple. Thus, it is vulnerable to two potential sources ol error. I he
llrst potential problem is that the form of the model may simply be wrong. Instead ol
being linear, the actual risk-return relationship could be nonlinear; hence, the ( AI'M is
misspecified. The second potential problem is austerity; the model may not include all the
relevant factors. If so, the CAI'M would be inadequate to describe the real behaviour ol
returns. In view of these two problems, in the lust place, I employ the l ama-MacBeth
'As for China's B-share market, its size is very small comparative to that of the A-share market. As of
December 2006 Shanghai B-sharc and Shenzhen B-share markets have only l() (> B-shares together whereas
the Shanghai A-share market and the Shenzhen A-share market have 1411 A shares. Ilopef'ully, we will
conduct the similar tests on China's B-share market in the near future when there are more companies listed
in the B-share market.
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approach to test the applicability of the standard CAPM in China's stock market. In the
second place, I would like to set up a multifactor model to describe the return behaviour
in C hina s stock market. Meanwhile, 1 attempt to draw parallels between my findingsand
those from similar studies in the literature.
The basic idea of the approach that was first developed by Fama and MacBeth is the use
of a time series (first pass) regression to estimate Betas and the use of a cross-sectional
(second pass) regression to test the hypothesis derived from the CAPM. Implementation
of the Fama-MacBeth approach involves two steps.
Step 1 (First-Pass Regression). Although the CAPM is formulated in terms of ex ante
parameters, it is common to employ ex post data rather than ex ante value in empirical
studies. Thus, for each of the N securities included in the sample, we first run the
following regression over time to estimate beta, under the assumption that fit is constant
over time:
K = < * l + P , R m , + r h (3)
where R:l and Rml are the rates of return on the ith security and on the market portfolio
(that is to say, the Shanghai Stock Exchange A share Price Index when looking at
Shanghai A-share market, or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange A Share Price Index when
looking at Shenzhen A-share market) in year /; /i, as noted elsewhere, is the Beta or
market volatility coefficient of the ith security, and Tjiare the residuals. In all, there are N
such regressions, one for each security; therefore giving N estimates ol /i (.
Step 2 (Second-Pass Regression). In order to examine the validity ol the CAPM, we run a
cross-section regression. That is to say, in this stage, we run the following regression over
the sample period over the N securities:
P,+Yl, Pt + r^, Sei+r l„ (4)
where Rl is the average or mean rate ol return lor security / computed over the sample
period covered by Step 1, /?, is the estimated beta coefficient Irom the first-stage
regression. Rt is used as estimators of ER,. //, is the residual term and Sei is the
residual standard deviation of the ith security from the first-stage regression. Ihis lorm
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of the equation allows the test of a series of hypotheses regarding the CAPM.
The tests are:
i) / 3 should not be significantly different from zero, or residual risk does not affect
return;
ii) y2 should not be significantly different from zero, or there are no nonlinearitiesin the
security market line;
iii) Y\ must be more than zero, that is, there is a positive price of risk in the capital
markets, that is to say, a positive relationship exists between systematic risk and expected
return.
If the beta is not sufficient to describe the expected returns, namely, the CAPM is an
incomplete specification of priced risk, the CAPM then should be replaced by other
models such as FF3FM by adding additional risk measures beyond the CAPM beta to
compensate for risk variable omitted. Therefore, after the two-stage procedure we have
mentioned above, the following step, let's say step 3, is to employ the FF3FM for China's
stock market, which hopefully can better describe the behaviour of expected returns in
China's stock market.
6.3.3 Tests of the FF3FM for China's Stock Market
On the basis of the following equilibrium model we have mentioned belore,
E ( R , ) - R , = b l [ E ( Rm ) -R f ]+ s l E ( S M B )+ h ,E ( H M L ) ( 5 )
tests of the FF3FM methodology could be expressed as follows:
in the time-series regression, variation through time in the expected
premiums ? E ( S M B )^ a n d E ( H M L ) jn equat j on (5) js embedded in the
explanatory returns,^'" SMB, and HML. lhat is to say, the following econometric
model converted from the above equilibrium model can be used to test the validity of the
FF3FM:
R, - Rf = a,+b,( Rm -R f ) + s,SMB+ h HML + (6)
From this, we have three explanatory variables: Market, SMB and HML.
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In June of each year t from 1998 to 2002, all the sample stocks are ranked on the basis of
size (price times shares). The median sample size is then used to split the sample
companies into two groups: small (S) and big (B). Book equity to market equity (BE/ME)
for year t is calculated by dividing book equity at the end of financial year t by market
equity at the end of financial year t. It may be noted that financial year closing in China
is December for all companies every year. The sample stocks are broken into three
BE/ME groups based on the breakpoints for the bottom 30 percent (low), middle 40
percent (medium) and top 30 percent (high) of the ranked values of BE/ME for the
sample stocks.
We construct six portfolios (S/L, S/M, S/H, B/L, B/M, B/H) from the intersection of the
two size and three BE/ME groups. For example S/L portfolio contains stocks that are in
the small size group and also in the low BE/ME group while B/H consists of big size
stocks that also have high BE/ME ratios. Monthly equally-weighted returns on the six
portfolios are calculated from July of year t to June of year t+1, and the portfolios are
re-formed in June of year t+1. The returns are calculated from July of year t to ensure that
book equity for year t-1, i.e., December, is known to investors by the time of portfolio
formation. The six size-BE/ME portfolios are constructed to be equally-weighted. Fama
and French (1996) document that the three factor model does a better job in explaining
LSV equally-weighted portfolios compared to value-weighted portfolios.
Two portfolios, HML and SMB, are formed from the six portfolios presented above.
Indeed, the monthly stock returns of portfolio HML correspond to the difference between
the average monthly stock returns of the two portfolios of high B/M ratios (HS and HB)
and the average monthly stock returns of the two portfolios of low B/M ratios (LS and
LB): HML={(HS+HB)-(LS+LB)}/2.
As for the monthly stock returns of portfolio SMB, it corresponds to the difference
between the average monthly stock returns of the three portfolios of small capitalisation
(HS, MS and LS) and the average monthly returns of the three portfolios of high
capitalisation (HB, MB and LB): SMB={(HS+MS+LS)-(HB+MB+LB)}/3.
Due to the imperfection of Share price index system of China's stock market, we used
just the Shanghai A-share Price Index as our market portfolios. This weakness in our
study will disappear when various share price indices are set up in the future.
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For the dependent variables of our time-series, we consider stock portfolio returns. Indeed,
we regress monthly returns of the following portfolios: the six portfolios HS, HB. MS,
MB, LS and LB.
In addition, we would also use the combination of univariate analysis and multivariate
analysis to test the explanation power of each individual explanatory variable and jointly
test the explanation power of these three explanatory variables.
6.4 CAPM and Its Findings
According to the Fama-MacBeth approach, we first run time series regression on the
equation (1) over the period 1998 to 2002 to get beta estimate (standing for the systematic
risk) and standard deviation of residual (standing for the non-systematic risk) of every
individual stock in the sample. These estimates are then used in the equation (2) to run a
cross-section regression to test the validity of the CAPM. Table 6.1 is an empirical result
abstract from all of the tests related to CAPM, from which we can draw a brief conclusion
regarding the validity of CAPM in China's A-share market.
1) At the 1 percent level of significance, the positive linear relationship between expected
return and beta exists is coincident with the hypothesis of the CAPM. The higher the
stock's beta, the higher the return of the stock.
2) Also at the 1 percent level of significance, residual does have influence over returns,
which is not consistent with the hypothesis of the CAPM. The goodness lit is only around
15 percent, which implies that ft does not suffice to explain the expected returns;
3) Generally speaking, CAPM is not fully valid in China's A-share market, because beta
is not sufficient to describe the behaviour of stock returns. As we mentioned before,
Chinese economists (Liu and Zhao 1997) have used the standard CAPM to do an
empirical analysis on the relationship between returns and beta in the Shanghai stock
market. My study confirms the findings from Liu and Zhao.
4) It is because the testing of the CAPM validity in China s stock market suffers from a
severe problem that the beta is not sufficient to describe the expected returns in the cross
section in terms of the very low goodness fit. The next step, therefore, is that we have to
employ FF3FM to further test China's stock market.
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6.5 FF3FM and Its Findings
In addition to Table 6.2, the summary of descriptive statistics on the portfolio returns and
explanatory variables chosen according to the FF3FM, Tables 6.3 and 6.4 give overall
empirical results about the FF3FM.
1) Compared to goodness of fit in the one-factor CAPM, which is around 15 percent, the
goodness of fit in the FF3FM is much higher, ranging from 20.7 percent to 53.2 percent.
The one-factor CAPM relationship for expected returns can be rejected; yet we cannot
say that these findings from FF3FM are strong enough to support the validity of the
FF3FM in China's stock market.
2) More importantly, our findings, as a whole, arc not consistent with the main
implications of the FF3FM. Generally speaking, we have no statistically significant
evidence to support the hypothesis related to intercept driven by the FF3FM and we also
find that HML, a proxy to mimic the risk factor in returns related to value has no
contribution to the explanation of expected returns. Moreover, if we drop this explanatory
variable, the goodness of fit will increase more or less.
3) It is worth stressing that we do find that SML, the proxy to mimic the risk factor in
returns related to size, has a statistically significant power to the explanation of the
expected returns, and its explanation power is intensified when 1IML is dropped. In other
words, we do confirm that there has been size effect in China's stock market.
6.6 Conclusions
In the context of the above findings from CAPM and FF3FM, we can draw several
conclusions and inferences for China's stock market.
1. Strong evidence cannot be found to support the validity ol CAPM, though there is a
positive relationship between returns and beta, the systematic risk;
2. Strong evidence cannot be found to support the validity ol the IT3I M in China s stock
market, though there is the existence of so-called size ellect
3. It is frustrating that both goodness of lit for the CAPM and IT3I M arc too low to
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adequately desciibe China s stock, market. This could be regarded as further evidence to
reject the validity of CAPM and FF3FM in China's stock market.
4. As an emerging and immature stock market, it is more difficult for China's stock
market to be described by the CAPM in terms of either the single factor model or the
multifactor model, in this case, the FF3FM, because these two hypotheses are both based
on EMF1,the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama 1991).
5. Hence one possible implication is that China's stock market does not satisfy the criteria
for full information efficiency. Put differently, stock prices in China's stock market fail to
reflect fully all available information and trading is based on investor sentiment,
pseudo-signals, or non-information, which is regarded as anoise trading" in the language
of Black (1986), and De long. Summers and Waldman (1990). Noise trading has been
recognised as an important feature of the financial market: it not only exists, but can also
have an impression on asset prices, causing systematic deviations from the efficient
market hypothesis. China's stock market is inefficient in the weak form, which has been
confirmed by many Chinese economists and scholars, and this could be regarded as a
possible consequence of the presence of investor mood swings that are not based on
economic fundamentals, or noise trading. High volatility, or speculation, therefore, is a
concentrated expression of noise trading. Although Chinese investors start to pay
attention to intrinsic values of listed companies there is still huge speculation in the stock
market and share prices rise regardless of fundamentals.
6. The other explanation could be other factors having a strong influence on returns have
not been considered. For example, Su (1998) reveals that Chinese policy-makers usually
have an influence over the stock market. He argues that volatility is explained by
reactions to Chinese government policy changes, particularly those that affect liquidity on
China's market. Reactions to changes in underlying fundamentals of individual
companies are insignificant in comparison.
These conclusions are really important not only because they have diagnosed the
deficiencies in China's stock market development but they could also be used as
guideposts to prescribe the right remedy tor those deficiencies hindering China s stock
market development.
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Table 6.1: An Abstract of Testing Results for CAPM
China's A-share Market (177stocks)
Equ. 1 Rn = Y 0 , + Y \,Pi +ri ll
Yu 0.022141 ( 4.3339 [.000])
F-stat. 18.7825 [.000]
R 2 0.15492
Equ. 2 R n = Y o , + Y u P , + Y i + 1 , ,
Yu 0.059327 (1.4289 [.156])
Y i t -0.017160 (-0.90248 [.369])
F-stat. 9.7804 [.000]
R 2 0.15329
Equ. 3 R „ =Yo, +Y\,P, + Y 3,Se, +n„
Yu 0.026035 ( 6.2098 [.000])
hi 0.21543 ( 7.0742 [.000])
39.2112 [.000]
0.44067
Equ. 4 = Y o ,+ Y uP ,+ Y i .P ,2 + + n ,
0.075549 ( 2.2478 [.027])
-0.022829 (-1.4846 [.141])
0.21774 ( 7.1857 [.000])
27.2068 [.000]
0.44767
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Table 6.2:. Summary Statistics on the Portfolio Returns and Explanatory Variables
Mean Standard Deviation t-statistic
SL 1.010 2.22 2.850
SM 0.887 3.61 3.055
SH 0.821 3.89 1.954
BL 0.042 3.21 2.334
BM 0.050 4.96 1.885
BH 0.041 3.64 3.405
MARKET 0.663 3.83 2.956
SMB 0.902 2.76 0.889
HML 0.435 3.92 1.632
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Tabic 6.3:
Regression oi Size and Book-to-market Sorted Portfolio Excess Returns (Rn
Combinations of the Market (MKT), Size (SMB) and Value (I IML) factor Portfolios
Rt —a + bMK 'It + sSMB t + hi IMLt + £,
Regrcssors
Regressan
d
a b s h R squared
MKT SL 0.0031 0.495 - - 0.319
SM 0.0113 0.438 - - 0.301
SH 0.0142 0.464 - - 0.277
BL -0.0101 0.471 - - 0.208
BM -0.0263 0.415 - - 0.235
B l l 0.0028 0.489 - - 0.216
SM B & H ML SL 0.0322 - 1.8541 0.407
SM 0.0105 - 0.6563 0.389
S l l -0.0120 - 1.1257 0.350
BL 0.0388 - 0.9146 0.296
BM 0.0254 - 0.7549 0.315
B l l 0.0187 - 0.8710 0.229
M K T & S M B SL 0.0017 0.9321 1.6640 - 0.648
SM 0.0032 0.8547 1.1875 - 0.540
S l l 0.0107 0.8173 0.9432 0.513
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1able 6.4: t-statistics and I--statisticsof (lieEstimated Coefficients
Regressors Regressand t(a) t(b) t(s) t(h)
MKT SL 0.9854 4.8501 -
-
SM 1.2629 2.1329 -
-
S l l 0.6032 2.9094
-
-
BL -0.5886 2.6296
-
-
BM -1.5567 2.4903
- -
B l l 0.6905 3.5526
-
-1.6421S M B & 11ML S I . 1.7654 - 3.8810
SM 0.9610 - 1.7923 1.5136
0.9423S l l -1.4571 - 2.2207
BL 0.8914 - 3.0175 0.9809
-1.1 147BM 2 . 114 9 - 1.9052
B l l 1.6742 - 1.5436 0.7246
M K T & S M B S I , 1.7084 2.5159 3.3723 -
SM 1.5421 2.7185 2.3877 -
S l l 1.8753 2.3740 4.0471 ~
BL 0.8736 1.9807 3.7179 ~
BM -0.9558 1.7873 2.7449 ""
B l l 1.4785 2.766 2.6497 —
M K T & H M L SL 0.8204 2.2401 ~ 1.5432
SM -0.5159 -3.1677 1 . 2 11 8
1 5 7
S l l 1.3513 2.2758
-
-0.8766
BL 2.0312 2.3887
-
-0.9701
BM -1.3403 1.()854)
- 0.7643
B l l 0.1796 3.9510 - 0.6334
MKT, SMB&1 IML SL 0.2854 2.1677 4.2293 0.4007
SM 1.9831 1.2426 2.5968 -0.3385
S l l 0.2842 1.7904 2.2101 1.3406
BL 0.8936 0.4919 3.7540 -0.8547
BM -0.1856 1.8402 1.9082 1.2281
B l l 1.8807 0.8055 2.7476 0.8704
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Policy Implications
The development of the stock market is one of the most important elements of China's
economic and financial reform. In around 15 years, China's stock market has emerged
from virtual non-existence to being an important segment of the country's financial
sector. Meanwhile we cannot fail to notice that it is still in a very early stage of
development. This thesis conducts empirical studies on China's stock market using
contemporary finance theories in order to get a better understanding of the historic
development of China's stock market, and more importantly to explain the anomalies
in China's stock market and then put forward some policy implications on the basis of
the empirical research findings.
Like any other stock market in the world, China's stock market comprises the primary
stock market and secondary stock market and hence, the thesis, under the guidance of
finance theories, quantitatively analyses the primary market in the first place and then
carries on testing the secondary market empirically. In other words, Chapter 4 focuses
on the primary stock market whereas Chapters 5 and 6 concentrate on the secondary
market.
7.1 Conclusions
By using cross sectional regression, we examine whether short run undeipricing exists
in China's stock market and the validity ol a series ol theories used in explaining this
phenomenon, for instance, winner's curse hypothesis, signalling hypothesis and
ownership dispersion hypothesis by univariant model. I hese are the findings.
1) IPO underpricing does exist in China's stock market, and the smallci the II C)pi ice,
the larger the IPO ! 1 return. Since IPO initial returns have a positive and
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significant relationship with reciprocal of IPO pricc, they always hold whether in 01 S
method or robust regression.
2) Given three hypotheses stated before, they are all valid in China's stock market.
Particularly, we find that IPO return is negatively related to the number of IPO days,
the time gap between offering and listing dates (DAYS), earning per share (EPS), the
ratio of insiderownership to total shares outstanding (INSIDER), the size of IPO
(IPOSZ), the percentage of successful application for the offer (LOTTERY), the ratio
of the IPO capitalization to GDP (MKGDP) and the size of the single large
shareholder (S TATE)and positively related to allocation methods (METHOD) and the
size of SEO (SEOSZ).
The negative relationship between IPO return and IPOSZ as well as a positive
relationship between the IPO return and the size of the SEO is quite consistent with
the signalling hypothesis which implies that the smaller the size of initial offering and
the larger the size of SEO, the higher the IPO initial return.
Besides, we also find that the allocation method (METHOD) is positively related to
IPO return and the smaller the chances of shares allocation, the higher the investors"
rewards. Moreover, the percentage of successful application for the offer (LOTTERY)
as well as the IPO time gap between offering and listing dates (DAYS) have negative
and statistically significant relationships with IPO return; all of these are consistent
with the adverse selection or the winner's curse hypothesis
faking special ownership structure in China's stock market into account, we lind the
ownership dispersion hypothesis is valid. In other words, the IPO return is negatively
related to the insider ownership (INSIDER), the size of single large shareholder (state
shares and state-owned legal person shares, SIA1 E) and the ratio ol IPO capitalization
to GDP (MKGDP), which implies that IPO underpricing is partially due to a relatively
small aggregate supply of shares and also the smaller the ratio ol IPO capitalization to
GDP, the higher the IPO initial return.
3) One of the objectives of this thesis is to seek the reasons causing short term
underpricing of IPOs in China's stock market. Taking the special status ol Cluna's
stock market into account, this thesis argues that the imbalance between demand lor
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shates and share supply, speculation, Ihe special ownership structure, aiul extremely
centialized owneiship have a statistically and economically significant effect on
Chinese IPO underpricing.
Also based 011standard event study methodology, we investigate whether long-run
underpcrformance of IPOs exists in China's stock market, and to what extent. Since
there are two theories employed to explain this phenomenon, the divergence of
opinion hypothesis and the speculative bubble hypothesis, this thesis intends to
discover whether these two hypotheses can be used lo explain this phenomenon. I he
findings are:
1) By measuring three indicators such as: buy-and-hold abnormal return, wealth
relative, and cumulative abnormal return, we Imd the ll'O underperlbrmance exists in
China's stock market since evidence shows the level of IPO underperformance is
economically and statistically significant;
2) In the long-run, the performance of IPO companies declines gradually and steadily,
even after the filth anniversary of public listing; moreover, the long run downward
drift is large in magnitude relative to stock market price index performance; 1) lly
multiple regression test, book value of equity after IPO has a significant positive
relationship with market-adjusted buy and hold return, which is consistent with
divergence of opinion hypothesis, at the same lime, the market-adjusted return on Ihe
first trading day correlated to market-adjusted buy and hold return negatively, which
implies the long-run underperformance should be negatively related lo short-term
underpricing and is consistent with the speculative bubble hypothesis. In a word, boili
hypotheses receive support in the case oI Chinese IPOs. However, Ihe number ol yeais
before a company goes public and over-subscription do not have a significant impact
on the market-adjusted buy and hold return, which is not consistent willi these
hypotheses. The underlying reason is related to ( hinesc IPO history. Since one ol the
most important objectives in building China's stock market is to help SOks in
financing, so most of the listed companies in China's stock market are converted Irom
state-owned enterprises, and thus the conversion history is not very long. As a
consequence, the number of years before a company goes public is not very sensitive
161
to the ox unto unoortuinty. which ouusos tho insignificant influence on market adjusted
bus uiul hoKI roturn Concerning i>\ot subscription ratio which moasuics tin-extent ol
subscription uiul represents the osor-optinusm ol investors. it is bcttci described as
informed demand expansion following c\ ante rational piice selling in the prospectus
in a market setting, and investors' demand foi IPOs is not constrained bs bias in the
allocation methods used bs issuers and nnderwiiicrs
With tlu' help id the lama Maclleth approach, we build a unisaiiaul model to
examine wbethei c Al M aiul I f d NI hold in Cliina s stock market, and obtain results
as follows:
I) I APM <si»i>(lulls salid in China s A share maikct In the light ol oui model, ai the
l°o les el ol significance, residual docs have inlluencc osei returns I Ins means otliei
laetors huso critical impacts on expected return in addition to beta and the goodness lit
is loss at around only IV\>, and hence /'does not suffice to explain the expected
returns. In other svords. ( APM cannot explain the relationship betsveon beta
representing systematic risk and expected return m China's slock niaikel. though we
get a positise linear relationship botsveen expected return and beta Iroin the
regression;
.') No strong evidence supports the validity ol I f HM in China s slock market
Although llie goodness of lit is much higher, ranging Iroin I * to M l"«, il is still
not enough to statistically support the existing positive liueai relationship Moieover.
statistic ratios for intercept, and 11MI which is a proxy to mimic the risk lactoi iu
returns related lo value, are not signilicanl, and is inconsislent svitli I f UM <)nl\ one
factor. SMI., the proxy to iniinic the risk factor in returns related to si/e. is statistically
significant, svluch implies the si/e effect can partially explain the expected return in
China's slock market. What is svorlli mentioning is that there are some drawbacks
concerning the model sve have established:
firstly, sve regard inter-bank offer rates on one month deposits as risk lice interest
rule, which is n key proxy in Imlh <'APM nml M'U'M. So miy errorin OHlinmlinnlllls
rule will emise inislnkcs in ,is.scssln|A Ihe especial return. (lonemlly spenkillH..'*» <l#y
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Treasury bill rate is used as proxy for risk free rate of return internationally, but it is
not the ease in China. Because there is no such financial instrument and the interest
late in C hina does not open lully, other than as decided by market, it is decided by (lie
government to some extent. So it is a pity that we cannot llnd a proper proxy for
lisk-liee inteiest late. Besides, error in measuring beta and unobservabilily of market
portfolio are also the barriers in estimating expected return and define the relationship
between expected return and risk.
Secondly, special characteristics only possessed by China's stock market block the
efficient share circulation, for example, segmentation in China's slock market and
shares are defined as tradable shares and non-tradable shares, which also enlarges the
dilficulty in constructing the model and choosing the variables for empirical analysis
in China's stock market.
Three conclusions could be drawn from this thesis:
1) The underpricing anomaly concerning the process of IPO is examined in this thesis,
and evidence strongly supports the existence of IPO underpricing in China's stock
market. Our major findings are consistent with the winner's curse, signalling theory
and ownership dispersion hypothesis. We find that IPO return is negatively related to
the number of IPO days, the time gap between offering and listing dates (DAYS),
earning per share (EPS), the ratio ol insidership to total shares outstanding
(INSIDERS, the size of IPO (IPOS/), the percentage of successful application for the
offer (LOTTERY), the ratio of the IPO capitalisation to GDP (MK(il)P) and the size
of single large shareholder (S IA I E) and positively related to allocation methods
(METHOD), the size of SEO (SEOSZ) and average number of tradeable shares per
person possesses (SIIRPP). History of the firm (AGE) is not significantly related to
IPO initial return perhaps due to the shortness ol ( hinese enterprises going public.
IPO underpricng anomaly is also attributed to the special status ol ( hina s stock
market. The imbalance between demand lor shares and share supply and high
speculation aggravate IPO underpricing. More importantly, the special ownership
structure - the extremely centralised ownership - has a statistically and economically
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significant effect on IPO underpricing, which could be regarded as an important signal
of the commitment of privatisation in China;
2) 1 he long run underperformance anomaly concerning the process of IPO is also
examined in this thesis, and evidence strongly supports the existence of IPO
underperformance in China s stock market. Chinese IPOs are not only underpriced in
the short run but also underperformed in the long run. The long-run performance is
negatively related to the short-run underpricing. As for the aftermarket, long-run
downward drilt is not only confirmed but also found to be large in magnitude relative
to the stock market price index performance. The post-issue operating performance is
also poor and the level of IPO underperformance is economically and statistically
significant. Moreover, Chinese evidence shows that such a gradual but steady decline
tendency in the long-run performance lasts more than three years and continues even
after the fifth anniversary of public listing. Besides, the divergence of opinion
hypothesis and the speculative bubble hypothesis are both valid in China's stock
market. That is to say, the long-run underperformance of Chinese IPOs could be
explained by these two mutually inclusive hypotheses. In short, long-run
underperformance has existed in China's stock market and negative abnormal returns
continue to at least six years subsequent to listing.
3) CAPM and FF3FM are not fully valid in China's stock market; According to
Efficient Market Hypothesis, the stock market in China is weakly eliicient, which
means the price of stock reflects only historical information, and investors can gain
extra income if approaching lor more information. Hence one possible implication is
that China's stock market does not satisfy the criteria for full information efficiency.
Put differently, stock prices in China's stock market lail to reflect fully all available
information and trading is based on investor sentiment, pseudo-signals, or
non-information, which is regarded as noise trading. Noise trading has been
recognised as an important feature of the financial market: it not only exists, but also
can have imprints on asset prices, causing systematic deviations from the efficient
1 6 4
market hypothesis. China s stock market is inefficient in the weak form, which has
been confirmed by many Chinese economists and scholars, and this could be regarded
as a possible consequence of the presence of investor mood swings that are not based
on economic fundamentals, or noise trading. High volatility, or speculation, therefore,
is a concentrated expression of noise trading. Though Chinese investors start to pay
attention to intrinsic values of listed companies there is still huge speculation in the
stock market and share prices rise regardless of fundamentals.
7.2 Policy Implications
On the basis of empirical findings, policy implications could be drawn, which might
be advantageous to China's stock market development.
1). Decreasing the information asymmetry
The stock market plays a crucial role in every modern economy. As long as stock
prices accurately reflect fundamental values, the resource allocation function of stock
markets works well and resources flow to their most beneficial uses. From the
findings, we must be aware of the severity of information asymmetry in China's stock
market and hence one of the priorities for Chinese policy-makers is to intensify the
disclosure of information. Perhaps this can be done in one of two ways:
government-required disclosure and the independent collection and production of
information. Without satisfactory rules and regulations about disclosure of information
and against insider trading set by Chinese policy-makers, financial statements of listed
companies will not convey the information the investors require. Adequate accounting
practices, surveillance on doubtful insider trading cases and information disclosure are
crucial to investor confidence; Chinese policy-makers are also obliged to encourage
the establishment of third-party independent research institutions like Moody's and
Value line, which independently collect information directly from listed companies
and produce evaluations, to assure Chinese investors that they are receiving accurate
assessments of firm financial health.
2) Strengthening corporate governance
1 6 5
Ownership transformation is one thing, yet corporate governance is another. It might
be easier tor an SOh to convert into a listed company, but it might be rather difficult
to improve its corporate governance. In essence, to reduce the poor performance of
China s stock market, one oi the key issues is how to improve its corporate
governance and opeiating performance. Investors can be deceived once, but they
cannot be deceived lorever. In the long-run, the share prices represent their intrinsic
values of the operating performance of listed companies. Yes, it is Chinese
policy-makers" job to encourage the ownership reform of SOlis, but it is also a
and very important task for Chinese policy-makers to force listed companies to
improve their corporate governance and encourage business ethics and integrity
principles amongst listed companies.
3) Improving regulatory abilities
Improving supervision abilities is also a long-term task for Chinese policy-makers. It
is widely agreed that there is huge underpricing and underperformancc in the Chinese
primary stock market and huge speculation in the Chinese secondary stock market,
and also many respective suggestions and measures have already been put forward by
scholars and experts at home and abroad. On the basis of my empirical research, it
seems that we might neglect a critical fact that the Chinese primary stock market and
secondary stock market are closely linked and are interactive. We argue that so called
underpricing, in one way, means the share prices are underpriced in the primary stock
market; but in another, it might represent overpriced share prices in the secondary
stock market. Chinese investors are starting to pay attention to listed companies
intrinsic values but we still cannot lail to notice that there is huge speculation in the
Chinese secondary stock market and share prices rise regardless of the fundamentals.
This argument has been confirmed after the ( hinese secondary stock maikct is
examined by using CAPM and IT3I'M approaches in C haptci 6. II this aigument is
accepted by Chinese policy markers, curbing speculations and bubbles will not be
only for the secondary market regulation but also lor reducing the huge underpricing
in the primary stock market. At the same time, improving issue methods will not be
limited to the primary market regulation; instead it will also be used lor curbing
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speculations and bubbles in the secondary market. From another point of view, there
are three fundamental ways which could be conducted to promote China's stock
market development. 1he first one is to improve issue methods and issue mechanisms,
the second way is to consolidate the share structure, that is. to increase the tree float
b> putting state shares and state-owned legal shares into circulation, and the third will
be to merge the A-share market with the B-share market.
7.3 Future Research
1his thesis conducts a close research into China' stock market including the primary
market and secondary market, and gains some valuable conclusions through the
models established. However, there are some deficiencies concerning this thesis and
there are also some unsolved problems. Hopefully, these deficiencies and problems
can be covered and overcome in future studies.
1) The models established could be further improved. Due to the history and special
characteristics of China's stock market, the structure of the stock market is rather
complicated, including state shares, state-own legal shares, and individual shares.
Even all the tradable shares are divided into A-shares and B-shares. But the models in
this thesis are unable to be technically taken into account, which means the models
should be improved in my future research, furthermore, the supervision system ol
shares listing and offering arc in the course ol reform, changing continuously, which
makes it rather difficult for me to acquire enough samples, sample periods and data to
meet the requirements ol the empirical research and for me to carry on more detailed
empirical analysis.
2) This thesis tries its best to offer policy suggestions for China's stock market on the
basis of empirical studies, for instance, the circulation of state share and state-owned
legal share, consolidating the share structure and so on. But how to technically make
state shares, state-owned legal person shares and Chinese individual shaies unified
into one type of share, and how the entire shares can circulate in the unified market is
not specified. This could be one ol my research topics in near fututc.
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